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I NTRODUCTION 
Except for a brief historical background of the party, 
/ t h is s tudy of the role of the Mouvement Republicain Popu-
laire in French forei gn policy i s confined to the period 
from 1944 up to June, 1954. This is because, at least from 
the standpoint of the party, these ten years comprise an 
epoch. Through its leaders, Bidault and Schuman, t h e M.R.P. 
filled the French foreign ministry throughout this period. 
It was during this period that the four plans of European 
integration supported by the Ivi . R.P. were developed. Jl..nd it 
was in June, 1954 that Bidault lost the foreign ministry 
with the overthrow of the Laniel Government. No member of 
t h e M.R.P. has filled the post of foreign minister since 
then. Some brief reference is, however, made to the part 
played by the M.R.P. in the final defeat of the European 
Defense Commuhi ty and in its replacement by an expanded 
\'{estern European Union in the latter part of 1954. 
To the best of the writer's knowledge, no other study 
of M.R.P. foreign policy has been made either in the United 
States. or abroad. A glance at t h e biblio graphy will 
indicate how few books relate, even in an indirect way, to 
the :M . R.P. Most of the sources for this study, then, are 
either newspapers, other periodicals, or official publica-
tions. Particular attention was devoted to newspapers such 
as L'Aube, the New York Times, and The London Times. By far 
the greatest amount of information was derived from French 
periodicals, a complete search having been made ror the 
period involved through some of them, such as Esprit. The 
"-Journel des Debats was also used extensively to reveal the 
activity and reactions of lVl .R.P. deputies in the National 
Assembly. 
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Further information was secured by the writer in 1954 
through some attendance at the French National Assembly and 
through interviews with about twenty-rive French political 
figures, about twenty or whom were leaders of the M.R. P . 
A list of them is to be found in Appendix A. Research was 
' also carried on at the Bibliotheque Nationale, the Biblio-
' theque de Documentation Internationals Contemporains, the 
, ; ' Centre d 'Etudes de Poli tique Etrangere, and the National 
Assembly library. Much material was obtained also from the 
M.R.P. Secretariat. Outside of Paris, interviews were held 
with local M.R.P. leaders in eastern and western France, 
and the writer attended for two days the party Congress 
held at Lille in May, 1954. 
It is the principal purpose or the writer to demonstrate 
that even within a complicated political system such as that 
or France, it was the complications and contradictions within 
the political philosophy of the M.R.P. that presented the 
greatest handicap to the party. The M.R.P. sought to be too 
much to too many. The resultant conflict between policy and 
practice, between words and deeds, and between personalities 
within the party leadership militated against the success or 
Viii 
the M.R.P. in its foreign policy objectives. Secondary 
purposes of the writer are to examine the effect of person-
ali ties upon politics, the relation between religion and 
politics in France, and the effect of foreign policy issues 
upon the survival of French Governments. 
French politics is complicated enough without having to 
examine on top of that the complications of M.R.P. foreign 
policy. In Part I we consider the framework within which 
the M.R.P. operated. Chapter I is a brief historical back-
ground, especially necessary because of the M.R.P.'s status 
as a "Catholic Party". In Chapter II an examination is made 
of the significant features of the party structure itself; 
in Chapter III we determine the extent of M.R.P. allies. 
Part II relates to · the three main areas of f.:I . R.P. foreign 
policy: European integration, policy in the East-West 
struggle, and policy toward the French Union and the North 
African protectorates (which have since become free}. 
Finally in Part III a detailed examination is made of the 
weaknesses and strengths of M. R.P. tactics, especially in 
its relations with Parliament. In the course of the examina-
tion we find that even though foreign policy is a side-issue 
for many Frenchmen (as is illustrated in the latter part of 
Chapter II), nevertheless by 1953 it was becoming an ever more 
important factor in the rise and fall of French Governments. 
PART I 
CHAPTER I 
HISTORIC.AL BACKGRO UND 
The Iviouvement R'ublicain Populaire, organized in 1944 
during the period of the Resistance, is the most recent 
representati~e of political Catholicism in France, and seems 
to incorporate elements both of Christian democracy and 
s ocial Catholicism. The distinction between the two, al-
though s eldom clearly defined, is one of substance as well 
as of method. Christian democrats, on the political left of 
Ca tholicism, seek to achieve social reforms for t h e masses 
through the direct participation of Catholics in politics in 
some form of party organization. Social Catholics believ e 
tha.t h igher officials of the Church should take indirect 
political action to provide for the mas s es the amount of 
social reform considered advisable by the Catholic Right . 
The cleavage between social Catholics and Christian demo-
crats can b e traced back to the initial division of the 
l 
French Church into two parts at t h e time that t h e Civil Consti-
tution of the Clergy was drawn up by the Assembly of 179 0. The 
old order priests (pr~tres rtfractaires), who would not support 
this Civil Constitution, were found mainly in the north and 
west of France.l 
l. Seignobos, Charles, Histoire Sinc~re de la Nation Fran~aise, 
p. 364. During the M. R. P . congress of 1950 a delegate ref rred 
to the h istoric struggl e b etw een the 11BlancS 11 and t h e "Bleus", 
As early as 1830, under t he leadersh ip of L amennais, a 
g roup of Catholics began to move to ward the Left in poll tics. 
Und er t he July monarchy of the 1830's and 1840's most Catho-
lies, however, belonged to the conservative political 
group ing call ed the "resistance" rather t h an to t h e more 
progressive "movement". In fact some of the supporters o f 
L amennais, hailed as the founder o f Christian democracy, 
moved as wel l to the ri ght. h ontalemb ert soon fell into the 
pattern of social Catholicism, as did de lVIun, founder of the 
Catholic Labor Circles . The early leaders of Chris t ian 
democracy did not seem to adapt themselves as e asily t o the 
nineteenth century as did the social Catholic members of t he 
"Ralliement", who vlere inspired by Leo XIII t h rough h is 
famous encyclical Rerum Novarum in 1891. 2 
The next i mportant leader of Ch ristian d emocrats after 
Lamennais was Marc Sangnier. At t h e time of t he d eath of 
San gnier in 19 50, Bidaul t referred to him as 111' Ini tiateur" 
o f the l"l . R. P . Although the aftermath of the Dreyfus affair 
had alienated most of the political Left from Catholicism, 
1. ( cont.) d e claring that t h e "raison d ' ~re" o f the M. R. P . 
was to heal Fr ance of such wound s (L' Aube, !v1ay 20-21, 1 9 50, p. 
l). Lat e r reference will be mad e to M. R. P . interpre tations o f 
the distinction betwe en Christian democrats and social Catho-
li cs. 
2. L ' Aube, Sept. 22 , 1 9 50, p. 3; Einaudi, :.tvl a rio and Goguel, 
Fran~ois, Christian Democracy in Italy and France, p. lll; 
Journal of Mod ern History , June, ~951, p . 171; also Havard 
de la Mont agne , Histoire de la D ~mocratie Chr§tienne, p. 1 23 . 
2 
Sangnier brought together by 1900 a nucleus of Christian 
democrats to form a movement called Sillon ( "fur'row"). 
Hare a gain, hovvever , a gradual slid ing to the r ight seemed 
to occur within Christian democracy. In 1910 uangni e r 
succumbed to the condemnation of Si llon by Pius X. He also 
/ I / 
advocated t he formation of ''une elite eclairee et courageuse", 
a bl e to become a leader class.3 In both respects Sangni e r 
appeared t o be closer to social Catholicism than to Christian 
democracy . 
I 
The Li gue de la Jeune Republique, organiz ed by Sangnier 
b et-v,; e en 1910 and 1920, is an organization still in existence 
vlhi ch has continued to be on the far left of politic al 
Catholicism, only b eing exceeded in this respect by the 
small number of "Chr£tiens pro gressistes '' with whom it has 
ties . The international policy of the Jeune Re'pub lique 
was fo r ward-looking fro m the beginning, at a time when the 
League of Nations was not yet created. The Jeune Republique 
favored a supranational society (although the adjective was 
not yet in use) which was to be directed by representatives 
elected directly by the people, not nominated b y national 
govern.rnents . I'his "society" would possess a police force. 
T'ns Jeune R~publique was ess ential ly pacifistic i 1 its 
ideology , and n .rml y opposed the occupation o f the Ruhr as 
well as all other d emonstrations o f French "imperialism". 
3. L ' Aube, l.Vl ay 29 , 1 9 50, p. 2; Einaudi and Goguel , op. cit., 
p . 112. 
3 
It favored revision of the Treaty of Versailles , and s up-
ported simultaneous reduction by all nations of all arma-
ments, to be accompanied by a system of control of them. 
I Sangnier, the ori ginator of t h e Jeune Republique, sought 
closer personal contacts be tween the members of national 
groups, and to this end initiated thr ee international 
democratic congresses a fter the first World \'far. 4 
Another representative of Christian democracy, the 
Parti D ~ocratique Popul aire, was founded in 1924. Within 
it there ~<iaS an attempt made to combine Christian democracy 
and social Catholicism, but its del agates in the National 
Assembly callle as a rule from traditionally ri ght-wing d is-
tricts . Hence the party, if . Christian democratic in form, 
was more social Catholic in substance. In its international 
policy the P . D . P . favored a middle course between continued 
armament and unplanned disarmament . In practice, however , 
4 
it seemed to support the continuation of armaments . Although 
professing to support the internationalism of lristide 
i3 ri and, t h e D . . later associated itself with the two-
faced Laval policy of 1935 and 1936. Yet the party was 
LJ. . Delourme , Paul , Trente-Cinq .A.nne'es de Poli tique Rtligieuse, 
pp. 276-287; Einaudi and Gosuel, op. cit., p. 113; Carre~e 
Bourgin et Gue'rin , Manuel des Partis Poli tiques, p . 137; 
also see Vfright in Politi cal S cience Quarterly, vol. 68, no. 
4, Dec . 1953, p . 531 . 
clo sely associated as vvell with the journal L' Aube which , 
through the medium of the editorials of Georges Bidaul t, 
expressed steady hostility to the capitulations and appease-
ments of the l 930 's. 5 
At the M. R.P . congress of 1 950 the allegation v,ras made 
that o ne of the purposes of the party is to heal France of 
t he wounds caused by t he friction in the late eighteenth 
cen tury betv;een the "Bl ancs 11 and the Bleus '' over the issue 
of t h e Civil Constitution of the Clergy. By t h e same token 
it would seem that the Ivi.R . P . seeks to bring closer to gether 
the represen tatives of Christian democracy and those of 
social Catholicism. Although c ertain l eaders of the party 
are in d isagreement as to the exact distinctions between 
these two branches of Catholicism, 6 there seems to be a 
definite contrast between their purposes and methods. This 
contrast has a direct bearing on the formulation of the 
foreign policy of the M.H.P. 
~4dherents of social Catholicism favor a hierarchical 
political organization, with co n trol being exerte:i downt.v-aro 
from the h igher levels. It is believed that the function 
of the Church is to inspire the enactment of social measures 
5 . Einaudi and Goguel, o~o cit., p. 114; 1-Iarabuto, Paul, 
Les Partis Politiques et les Iviouvements, pp. 63-7; Delourme, 
lo c . cit. / . 
6. Robert Schuman and LeBrun Keris considered the di vision 
an artificial one. The former pointed out that the P . D . P . 
was to be distinguished from the ~LR .P. primarily in not 
having its members hip so closely linked with labor groups. 
Fontaneau and other H . R.P. leaders, however, saw rather 
61earcut distinctions, to b e discussed below. (See appendix.) 
5 
for the masses. Initiative would proceed from the top down , 
not from the bottom up as is typical of the methods of 
Christian democracy. Social Catholics are prone to define 
attitudes that others should have, as illustrated by stands 
t h ey have tak en at t h eir periodic meetings called Semaines 
Sociales. "~aternalism" seems to be favored. In contrast 
6 
to the emphasis on politics of individual Christian democrats , 
the social Catholics give priority to the Church over 
political considerations.7 
The composition and characteristics of the European 
"communities" that have been sponsored by the J.i.LR . P. (and 
that are to be discussed in Chapter I) might be different 
according to vJhether they represented the i deals of Chris -
tian democracy or those of social Catholicism. If the latter 
were t he case, there would be less likelihood of direct rep-
resentation of the people o f national groups in the legisla-
ti ve branches of these communities, and greater likelihood 
of influence exerted indirectly by the Pope and other high 
Church officia,ls . 
Although particular early organizations of Christian 
democrats ·tended to gravitate toward social Catholicism, it 
is not to be denied that the Catholic Left represented ' 
primarily b y Christian democracy had in general advanced in 
7. See for example article on De Mun in Encyclopedia 
Americana, 1949. A social Catholic suggested that the P . R.L. 
is the party closest to his group of Catholics. (See 
appendix.) 
anfluence by 1940, in France as a whole if not within the 
National Assembly itself. The second i'forld War, ho wever, 
brou&~t new schisms into the ranks of French Catholics. 
-' / Th e Ri ghtist "fiC.eles 11 (faithful to Petain) were opposed to 
the Leftist "compae:nons" of the Hesistance. The Church 
7 
itself had quite an equivocal record during the Vich y period, 
Perhaps it was to overcome this black mark that the Church 
threw much of its v-,rei ght behind the M. H.P. in 1945 and 1946. 
Yet it seems unlikely that any party could possibly recon-
cile all the political views contained within French 
Catholicism.8 
/ The :rvrouvement Republicain Populaire is a p arty of 
external origin, having been created by the dynamics of the 
Resistance ar~, in part, by the influence of the Church. 
It ori gi nated outside politics in the narrow sense of the 
word. ~fany leaders of the vi. R. P ., including Maurice 
Schumann, Georges Bidaul t, Colin and JYioulin ha.O. been active 
in the overseas organization of the Free French and also in 
t h e formation within France of the National Resistance 
Council. IVlost of the members of the P.D. P . and the Jeune 
. / 4 Republique had refused in 19 0 to vote constituent po wer to 
I Petain, but it was the M.R.P . that in 1944 took the only 
8 . Political Science ~uarterly, loc. cit., pp. 533-4; 
Darbon, ~Uchel, Le Confli t entre la droi te et la gauche dans 
le catholicisme fran ais, 1830-1953, pp. 241-284 passim; 
Euronean Political S stems (ed. Cole), pp. 679, 687; also 
Esprit, May, 1952, p. 882. 
,effective step ventured by any Resistance group to transcf'orm 
itself into a political party. The leaders of the H . R . P . 
believed that the Communist party should not be allo wed to 
8 
stand as the only political revolutionary movement in Franc e . 
A vacuum had been created by the inertia of other former 
political groups in France and the Ivi.R.P. stepped into that 
vacuum.9 
9 . Duverger, Maurice, Les Partis Politiques, p p . 8-16. Note 
should be taken of the difference between the "resistance" of 
the 1830's and 184o's and the Resistance of the second World 
War. On the other hand there may have been an intentional 
repetition of the term "mouvement" in the name of the Ivi . R.P. 
See in addition ilright, Gord..on, The Reshaping of F rench 
Democracy, p. 31; Einaudi and Goguel, OP. cit., pp. 115-121; 
Political Science Quarterly, loc. cit., p. 532; European 
Political Systems , p. 611; Luethy, Herbert, France Against 
Herself, p. 113. 
1, 
9 
CHAP TER II 
RELATION OF PARTY STRUCTURE TO FOREIGN POLI CY 
A Regional Party 
In succeeding chapters a close examination will be macie 
of the difficulties faced by the M. R.P. in attempting to 
develop a series of complicated objectives through. its pro -
gram o f European integration, its policy ln the East - l'ies t 
struggl e, and its policy toward the French Union and North 
Africa. First, however, attention must be given to funda-
mental handi caps to be found within the internal structure of 
the ~r..rt . P . Its keystone policy, that of European integration, 
involved clearcut invasions of sovereignty which a people as 
nationalistic as t he French were most hesitant to accept. A 
political party that sought to accomplish such a policy needed 
the broadest possible contacts with the French nation. 'rhese 
the I•I.R .P . in no way had . It will be suggested later that 
because of the narrowness of its contacts within Fr a...'1.ce , the 
party could not very well make its influence felt through the 
press , let alone through the business world. :IYiore i mportant, 
however , was the basi c fact that the M. R. P . was a regional 
party. 
The geographical representation of the ~ . R . P . in the 
French P arliament, although totaling eighty-odd seats (1947-
1954), was unbalanced. It would have been difficult enough 
f or the IYI . R . P . to lead a "European movement 11 controlling as 
10 
j_ t did a relatively small number of the ei ghty-nine d ep art-
ments i n France . It was even more d i fficul t i ~ v i ew of U1e 
f act that the party's greatest strength lay in a few of 
those mountainous areas of France that were strongly cleri-
cal (composed of Catholics who too k their reli gion seriously) 
or else in the far east and the far west, especially in 
Brittany. This former province was farthest removed in fact, 
and to a great extent in spirit, from that part of Europe 
·wh ich was directly involved in the pro gram of integration. 
The local interests of the predominantly rural voters in 
these 1'-l . H.P. strongholds were quite divorced, at least in 
their o1vn minds, from European problems, and it is hard for 
the leadership of a party to disregard the inclinations of 
its strongest supporters. The N .R.P. lack ed sufficient 
strength in urban areas vlhich are as a rule more inclined to 
be sensitive to the currents of internationalism t h an rural 
areas. 
Of course it is possible for a party with only regional 
strength and with a conservative nationally-minded electorate 
to prosecute an internationalist policy if it has leaders 
with sufficient political presti ge who are themselves inter-
nationally-minded. Pflimlin and Schuman of the M. R.P., 
coming as they did from the border provinces of Alsace and 
Lorraine, were internationally minded, but Schuman at least 
did not have enough political presti g e in the eyes of the 
French Parliament. 'l'ei t g en, the perennial president of the 
() 
N 7l' /! Q 1/T .IE 
Information on tlhis map is adapted from a map on page 
174 of Einaudi and Goguel, op. cit. The departments in 
which the l~l.R.P. received at least 30% of the vote at the 
peak of the party's strength in 1946 were: ].1anche, Ille-
et-Vilaine, Morbihan, Maine-et-Loire, Finisterre, Orne, 
Haute-Savoie, Moselle, Bas-Rhin, and Haut Rhin. These ten, 
plus Basses-Pyr?nles and Hautes-Pyrenees, were the twelve 
pillars of M.R.P. strength.* 
*Those departments are underlined in whi.ch the Ivi .R.P. re-
tained at least 20% of the vote in 1951; It also attained 
this percentage in Mayenne, Jura, Vendee and Loire. In 
l.forbihan ' i ~- .was: in an Independent alliance. ( Goguel, 
o p • cit. , p • 108 ) • 
11 . 
party, owed his allegiance . .:; to the cons ervative, clerical 
voters in :ari ttany. De l'Ienthon came from the mountainous 
department of Haute Savoie, and Bidault from near the geo-
graphi cal center of ? ranee in Haute Loire. These last two 
lead e rs, and especially Bi dault, had considerable political 
presti ge. But just as Jwerican isolationism has been pre-
dominantly located in the past in the mid-west of the United 
Btates , so also is nationalism especially strong in moun-
tainous departments of France like Haute Savoie or else 
centrally located departments like Haute Loire. 
French peasant op inion has always had an i mportant 
although indire ct bearing on the shaping of French foreign 
policy, and there has been at least in the past a tradition-
ally close identity between the peasantry and Catholicism. 
Any party such as the 1'1 . R . P . which relies strongly upon both 
is affected sooner or later by their fundrunental conserva-
tism. The stronges t J:1I.R.P. newspaper is the provincial 
Ouest-France, published in Rennes in Brittany. Its prede-
cessor, the Ouest-Eclair, viaS one of the earliest social 
Catholic journals in the provinces. Henri Tei t g en, father 
of the M. R.P. president, had become its editor in 1909. As 
early as 1910, after Sangnier's Sillon had been condemned by 
I 
Pius X, Ouest-Eclair slowly and prudently moved away from 
its former support for the Christian democrat Sangnier . 
Al though the paper supported the Briand policy after the 
first World War, it thereafter became "poincariste •.• ready 
12 
13 
.to doze in a tranquil bourgeoisisme" . . As Ouest-France, the , 
/ 
successor of the Ouest-Eclair, has grown in strength it has 
become more conservative and more nationalistic.l 
The predecessors of t h e I•I . R.P. were, if anythi ng, more 
narrowly regional in their strength than the ~i . R . P . itself. 
I Exc ept for its leader de Ribes, the Parti Democratique P opu-
laire drew its fifteen deputies either from the west of 
France or from Alsace-Lorraine. Its supporters, as well as 
/ 
t hose of the Jeune Hepublique, were mainly confined to 
tw elve departments, which are also the 11moles 11 (strongholds) 
of t h e ~ . R .P. .~though it received five million votes in 
the election of 1946, the 1•1. R .P. had only 350,000 adherents, 
who were reliable party members. In that year, when the 
£<i .R. P . got 25.9% of all votes cast, it was really strong 
only in Normandy, Brittany, Poi tu, Champagne, Alsace and the 
"annexed" part of Lorraine, some few mountainous areas, and 
the urbanized department of Nord. In many of these areas, 
as for example in Alsace, the local priest, the re3ional 
journal, and the town maire were all in the f..'.f . R. P . fold. 
Hence the idea of havi ng another party allegiance did not 
occur to the averag e peasant. In contrast, there is a band 
1. Delourme, op. cit., pp. 95, 110-116, 128 , 136-190 passim, 
226, 230 et seq. It is true that in strictly a gricultural 
matters t h e Catholics have been quite pro gressive, especially 
since the developm ent of the J. A.C. and its partner organiza-
tions. S ee Political S cienc e Quarterly, Dec., 1953, pp. 
532, 551. 
14 
of departments in the center of France from Charente on the 
west to Haute Marne on the east in which the I'LR.P. is very 
weak, as the assistant secretary- general himself has admitted.. 
This band of weakness lies just above Haute Loire, the home 
department of Bidaul t. 2 
A preference for rural areas seems to be incorporated 
within the constitution of the party. 'rl1.e M. t.P. Statute 
provides for the allotment of delegates to the National 
Congress by a rule of 11pro gression 11 which gives less than 
proportionate weight to the lare:;er departmental federations, 
and more than proportionate representation as a result to 
federations in less populous rural departments. Ac cord ing 
to ~l . R . P . leaders the employment of this rule of pro gression 
did not lead in itself towa1~ provincialism or a greater 
stress on rural than on urban areas. One of these leaders 
contended that this rule was necess ary to reflect provincial 
differences which are very striking in ? rance.3 Nonetheless, 
it app ears t h at by incorporating such a provision in their 
statute the ~·.i: . R . P . did to that extent insulate itself a gainst 
urban influence. 
~ihile it did. not extend its geo graphical base to any 
app reciable extent, t he Y-i.R •• appeared to hav e streng thened 
2. Einaud i and Goguel, op. cit., pp. 114, 187; Fauvet, ~· 
cit., p. 1 9 0; Commonweal, loc cit., p. 358 ; Appendix; 
Nmoi gna g e Chre'ti en, lvl ar. 12, 19 5L~, p. 3 :3. In Alsace mo st 
of t h e Protestants have been Gaullists since 1947 because of 
the apparent cl e ricalism of the 1-'l.H.P. ( Appendix). 
3 . See Appendix. 
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its lo cal posi tion s in early 1954 . In some cases, at least, 
t his chan g e seems to have been connected. v.ri th the party's 
consistent support of the principle of European integrat ion. 
In 1953 it had gained in Alsace, Champagne and Brittany , and 
in early 1954, despite a co n test with a coalition a gainst the 
E . D . C., t he Ivl . H. P. secured a significant s eat in the Nation a l 
Assembly from Saumur, which was followed b y t he vic t ory of 
Mad ame P eyrolles in the greater Paris department of Seine- et-
Oise . In this election she was the only candidate comi ng 
out clearly for Europ e an integration. Shortly thereaft e r, 
in J:wi a y , Sauvage of the H. R. P . won a victory in .J:Iaine-et-
Loire which represented a clear decision f or the European 
Defense Community, sin ce his opponent was definitely a gainst 
the p ropos ed treaty . Here was evidence of gains both in 
urban and rural departments, and in the industrialized de -
partment of Pas -de-Cal ais t h e N . ii. . P . cand idate at t h is time 
was the only one to gain votes for his p arty. 4 - espi te 
t hese gai ns in early 1954, howev er, the Ivi . R. P . still remained 
a regio nal part y , having real strength in only about t welve 
out of t he e i ghty-nine French political departments. 
The ]:I.R . P . has p rofess ed to be a political nmouvement" 
servin g all s roups in t h e French nation, and has maintained 
that, in contrast to other French political parties, 1 t is 
4. L'Ann~ Politique, 1953 , p . 35; Le Monde, Feb. 9 , 1954, 
p. 6 :5; May 15, p. 7:4; Ma y 18 , p . 6:1; Forces Nouvelles, 
lYl ar. 27, 1951+, p. 7; Ma y 8 , p . 5; also Appendix. 
not a 11 class 11 party.5 But the geographical centers of 
strength are so limited that it would be difficult for the 
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111 • .R .P . to maintain any proper contact with "all groups 11 in 
France . As for freedom from class allegiance, the party 
appears on the contrary to be primarily confined to a social 
milieu which might best be described as that portion of the 
French lower middle class composed of practicing Catholics . 
The portion of the lov;er middle class vlhich is d evoutly 
Catholic is to be found primarily in the rural areas referred 
to above . The party is not conservative enough in political 
and economic matters to satisfy most of the upper class or 
the " grande bourgeoisie 11 (upper middle class) in the cities, 
most of whom are closely connected with business. On the 
other hand the M. R. P . is too conservative to draw the bulk 
of its support from the lower class. Nevertheless Goguel 
credited the party with having as much support from labor in 
1954 as the Socialists had or as the R . P .F. had at the peak 
of its career. He also noted, however, that the 1 • • P . was 
moving toward conservatism and had in general replaced, in 
its l ocal strongholds, the moderate or conservative parties 
of the Thiro Republic. A student of Catholic parties in 
Europe has declared that "Catholicism and conservatism are 
expressions of an identical community type", and this seems 
to hold true as well for the Christian democratic left wing 
of Catholicism. This student has demonstrated t hat the 
5. L ' Aube, May 15, 1950 , p . 4 . 
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Chrlstian dernocr'atic vote has gro\m generally at the expense 
of the conservative parties.6 
A Catholic Party 
Neither g eographic region nor class is as important to 
the l~'I.R .P. as is religion. By calling itself the Party of 
the Fourth Republic the l~l:. R . P . sought to establish its 
uniqueness among French parties. In its foreign policy it 
d emonstrated uniqueness in the persistence, unusual to French 
politics, with which it supported the pro gram of European 
integration. But the M. R. P . received an unsolicited unique 
position in the popular eye when it was given b y others the 
title of t h e ''Catholic party 11 • Although the lvi.R . P . had, by . 
virtue of its Catholic composition, close ties with many 
Catholic organizations which sponsored B.uropean integration, 
on t h e other hand the Catholic composition of the party made 
the M. R . P . easily subject to attacks from those who contended 
t h at the pro gram of European integration would lead, if sue-
cess f ul, to a "black Europe" under the domination of the 
Vatican. V'ie shall examine the basis and ex tent of t h ese 
attacks before we consider the justification for attaching 
t h e name "Catholic party" to the IVI.R .P. 
6. See App endix . Go guel , a Protestant , seems ab le to take 
a relatively dispas s ionat e view of the Ivi . R. P .; see also 
Esprit, Sept., 1951, p . 364; Journal of Modern History , Sept ., 
1952, pp. 275-282 . 
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Black is the usual color of the vestments of Catholic 
priests and nuns ru1.d other members o f the hierarchy. 'rhus 
t h e term "black Europe" calls to the mind of Europ e ans a 
Europ e under control o f t h e Papacy, wh ich had r eached t he 
p e ak o f its temporal power in the Middle Ages. 'rhe idea of 
pluralism, which is part of t h e M.R.P. political philosophy, 
d a tes back also to the Middle Ages, and incorporates the 
idea that there is a need for a division of po wer among t h e 
spontaneous and natural groups that go to mak e up society. 
'rhe pluralists believe t h at no single body, lik e the state, 
~ould represent the community as a whole.7 In t h e Mi ddle 
Ages t h e state vms only one of several competitors f o r po wer, 
and in the mind s of many Frenchmen the l'iiddle Ages a r e a s so-
elated with the Holy Roman Empire. Because of t h e close 
contacts of the 1~1. R. P . with international Catholicism, fears 
arose after 1950 in certain French circles outsid e t h e l•I . R. P . 
t h at t h e pro gram of European integration ·would l e aP. t oward 
a "black Europe", that is, a new "Saint-Empire" l ed by t h e 
Pope. 
The p rincipal warning of the dang er of a Vatican Europe 
came from Joseph Hours, one of the founders of the ri . R . P . 
7. See article by Laski i n Readings in Recent Political 
Philosophy, ( l"Iargaret Spahr, ed . , N.Y., ]llaciviillan Co., 1948) 
pp. 528 -537. S ee also V: ri ght, op cit., pp. 86-88 -; Einaudi 
and Go guel, op. cit., pp. 123-130; Duverger, op. cit., p. 
375; Comuonweal, July 22, 1949, p. 359; L' Aube, Jan. 15, 
1951, p. 3; Jeune Europe No. 23, p. 7 et seq, Le Monde, 
Jan. 14, 19 54, p • l • 
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Hours went to great lengths after 1950 to attempt to detect 
a chain of continuity linking the Burgundians of the eleventh 
century vri th the Christian democrats, and specifically with 
the H . R.P. Burgundian clericalism a:nd provincialism, said 
Hours, had been opposed to French nationalism. He also com-
pared such hostility to centralization with M. R.P. success 
in "provincial" Brittany and Alsace. In charging that there 
was a "black international" of social Catholics at the end 
of the nineteenth century, Hours contended that t he "foun-
ders" of Christian democracy were neither liberal, nor 
8 democrats, nor patriots. Hours did not properly distinguish 
between social Catholicism and Christian democracy, although 
as t he reader has seen the lVI . R . P . does include elements of 
both of these branches of Catholicism. 
A long journalistic controversy was carried on between 
/ 
Hours ani Etienne Borne, intellectual leader of the H. R. P ., 
on the connection between the Catholic character of the 
Iv1. R . P . and respect for French sovereignty. Hours contended 
t h at in its foreign policy the l\LR.P. reflected an old tradi-
tion of mistrust of sovereign states. He found that Borne 
was most disturbed at the accusation of a lack of patriotism 
in t h e Ivl . R. P . Vii thout completely denying the historical 
account of Hour s, Borne maintained that the M. R.P. was part 
of a new tradition that could not a.Yltedate the French Revo-
lution. It was Bornes contention that the subordination of 
8 . Revue Poli tique et P arlementaire, Nov., 19 53, pp . 248-257. 
the state to a "higher value" such as the "European idea" 
should not be called "antistatism 11 • To the criticism that 
an integrated Europe might be dominated by the Vatican, he 
replied that Christianity had never been solely under the 
control of the Papacy. The Pope had been in competition, 
for example, with the Ho ly Roman Emperors. 9 
However, this brought Borne up a gainst another arBU-
ment o f Hours. 'rhe Holy Roman Empire , said this critic, 
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lived in the memory of the Germans more than in that of any 
other people. The principal check to the Hapsburgs, ac-
cording to Hours, had been at the hands of the French, and 
resistance to "Europe" had been a fundamental part of French 
history •10 
In his recent book, France Against Herself, Luethy 
charged that in developing the above theories Hours was 
guilty of "indiscriminate jumbling ", but admitted that there 
is a grain of truth in what Hours said. Of all Eu r op ean 
countries , the national state is most deeply rooted in Franc e . 
The single-minded Hours , harking back as he d i d even to the 
Carolingian empire, doubtless could not make much of a case 
out a gainst Monnet, the master p lanner of such steps in 
Europ ean integration as the E .c . B. C., since Monnet was quite 
9 . Ibid.; also Terre Humaine , July-Aug., 1952, pp . 76-99; 
Sept •. , 1952, pp. 76-81. 'rhiJ controversy lasted two years. 
"Robert Schuman a-t-il brule Jeanne d'Arc?" asked Borne at 
one point. 
10. Vie Intellectuelle, Oct., 1950, pp. 276-301. 
~nclerical by inclination. But Hours might have been much 
closer to the truth in questioning as he did the motives of 
Robert S chuman , who comes from Lorraine, the center of the 
later Carolingian empire. Hours reminded his readers that 
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the idea of an international of Catholic parties was neither 
strang e nor new , having been a Hapsburg idea up until 1918. 11 
Such were the alarmist opinions of a disaffected former 
member of the M. R. P . Occasional pronouncements of party 
leadei'S themselves, especially those of ·reitgen, 12 gave some 
cause for alarm to those who feared a 11black Europe". 
Teitgen, president of the I•1.R .P., had injected a quasi-
reli gious note into a 1950 speech when he declared that there 
was an "imperious 11 necessity to construct Europe in order to 
save "Christian humanism 11 • Neither o f the two 11 colossi 11 
dividing the world, said Teitgen (Russia and the United States), 
"represent what we have at heart". Three years later he still 
spoke of making a Europe which vmuld remain the "e-uardian of 
the Christian sources on which is founded all authentic 
civilization"(!) In 'reitgen's thinking , one critic saw an 
exaltation of "indissoluble communi ties" over "eng a g ements 
qui passent", rerlecting a social Catholic preference :for 
11. Luethy, Herbert, France Against Herself, pp. 386-7 , 426-7. 
Also see footnote 10. 
12. See Appendix B for short biographical reference. Also 
L ' Au-be, Nov. 25-6, 19 50; Nov. 27, p. 3; La Do Clli-nentation 
Catholique, no 1146, Hay 3, 1953. Just prior to ·rei tgen' s 
1953 statement, the Pope had issued a plea for European unity. 
N.Y. Times , Ivlar . 16, 1953, p. 9:3. Also see Reconstruction, 
Jan., 1954, pp. 1-5 :for criticism. 
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institutions rather than contracts. By t his "mystique", 
said Detraz, the :D. . R.P . (which he called a "party of juris ts") 
was rejoining the tradition of political Catholicism. 
Despite such "clerical" statements, the l'.L R . P . gave in 
general little justification to those who feared a black 
Europe . Teitgen himself sought from time to time to empha-
size that the policy of .E.'uropean integration was not a 
"rightist policy". The v.Iarnings of Hours were discounted 
I by various H . ::\ . P . leaders. Le Brun Keris recognized the 
value of Hours as an intellectual, but declared that his 
recent violent opposition to the Ivl.R.P. had unbalanced his 
thinking. Another party leader accused Hours of being an 
"intellectual fermi" who, failing to accomplish anything him-
self, resorted to negative criticism o f those who did. 
Go suel, not a party member, was of the opinion that Hours 
had been ridiculous in go ing to such extremes in his criti-
cism, for i nstance to such an extent as to malign the patriot-
ism of the M. R. P . and to characterize the party as "ultra-
montane". ~{i thin the party, only unorthodox senator Hamon 
had fallen under the influence of Hours. 1 3 
13. Le lvlonde, Jan. 12, 1954, p . 5:1; Appendix . Ho wever, 
\'/erth, op. cit., speaks of "Vatican-sponsored M. Teitgen" 
with his dreams of a Little Catholic Europe , and a member 
o f the administrative staff of the Council of Europe who had 
formerly been a close assistant to Schuman when he v1as for-
eign minister refused to commit himself to the author as to 
\vhether S chuman had exhibited inclinations /toward a "black 
Europe" . S ee also Hours" arti cle in L'Annee Pol itique et 
Economiqu e , Jan. - f.:I ar., 1953, pp. 5-13. -
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To the extent, however, that Borne and others had de-
nied the historical connections of the i-I.H .P. with the past, 
they were d en ying a close connection between the party and 
the extended development of social Catholicism in France. 
Yet Borne, the I•I . R.P. intellectual leader, has himself 
called the party a synthesis of social Catholicism and Chris-
tian democracy, and another M. R.P. leader characterized the 
Lille National Co~gress of 1954 as a social Catholic gather-
ing . From all appearances, it would be incorrect to consider 
the party to be solely in the Christian democratic tradition. 
At another time Borne had fallen into a controversy with 
the political writer Duverger, who had said in 1950 that the 
11 \'lest will die because it seeks to d raw from Christianity a 
state d octrine, although Christianity only contains a doc-
trine of resistance to the state". Borne charged that Duver-
ger 's statement was an oversimplification, although it might 
be true in the case of a totalitarian state. 14 Duverger's 
prestige was such that statements like this one of his would 
increase suspicion in France of a party closely connected 
with the Church. Despite lY • H.P . protestations that t he fear 
OI~ a Vatican Europe demonstrated an anxiety psychosis raising 
imaginary fears, the effect upon the chances of success of 
the M. R. P . foreign policy was considerable. 1 5 A policy often 
14. L' Aube, Sept . 5, 1950, p. 1. 
15. Terre Humaine , Oct., 1951, p . 99; N.Y. Times , July 2, 1950, 
p. 12:1; May 30, p. 7:1; Politique Etrang~re, Nov., 1952, 
p. 333. 
suffers from what is thought to be its foundation, regard-
less of what its foundation really is. 
f.:I any Europeans left reli gion at home when they talked 
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about integration of Europe. Unfortunately for the l<L . H . P ., 
its anticlerical opponents nei ther allowed the party to 
leave religion at hom e nor a llowed the reli gious issue to 
lie dormant at home . Although both Blum and Guesde, leaders 
of the Socialists , had attacked the spirit of anticlerical-
ism, the ' . R.P. - Soci alist alliance that existed up to 1950 
soon became strained over this issue. he Socialists were 
not the only opponents of the I'J:.R. . P . in this respect. The 
anticlerical adical Socialists had also taken a harsh stand 
a gainst the i.VI . R. P . as early as Beptember, 19 50, because of 
the 11. ' . P . • s alleged "intransi geance" on educational reform 
and the church :School issue. 1Tearly half of the lv • R. ? . 
parliamentary group after the 1951 elections came from de -
partments where the issue of church-state relations was para-
mount . lhis had a fundamental e ffect upon the g eneral voting 
behavior of representatives in P arliament. 16 
Meanwhi le the Gaullists were indirectly encouraging t he 
I•I. H . • on the church school issue in ord e r to keep the con-
flict wi th the Socialists alive. By the fall of 1953 Mollet 
and other Socialist leaders were seeking to build a new 
16. ~-Yl~i te, op. cit., p . 277; L 1 Aube, Ap r. 5 , 1950 , p. 3; 
I-1 ay 30 , p. 3; Sept . 18, p . 3; Sept . 16-17, p . l; Esprit, 
Oct., 1951 , p . 575; Fortni ghtly, Sept ., 1951, p. 586 . 
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movement of "economic and social d erno cracy 11 to figh t a e;ainst 
the Christian democracy of "Adenauer and the l\'i.R . P ." (note 
the order of precedence), and Hallet sought as well to bring 
anticlericals among t h e practisin3 Catholics into the 
movement. 1 7 
At an early stage in the I'l . R. P . campaign for European 
integration the Socialists had opposed leaving French for-
eign policy in the hand s of such a devout Catholic as 
S chuman. In 1950 Iviollet v-1arnecl a gainst "la poll tique Vati -
cane", and another Socialist , Viviani , criticized Bidaul t 
for seeking to create an "international conscience". During 
the National Assembly debate on the European Defense Com-
munity in February, 1952, the Socialist leader l\foch declared 
~ that t he z . D . C. reminded him of the Empire of Charlemagne, 
or p e rhaps of that of Louis ;1le debonnaire'' , ·since a strong 
hand such as that of Charlemagne would be missing . Again at 
the Socialist congress the follo\ving year lvioch said , "We 
refuse t o join a crusade for t he r esuscitation of the Europe 
of Charlemagne , Napoleon or Hitl er. That urope \<Thi ch may 
be a -vatican Europe and will certainly be a Europe under 
German heg emony is the worst of all possible Europes 11 • He 
received an ovation from the congress for thi s statement . 
In 19SL~ when ] och was in the strons tactical position of 
rapporteur o f the Committee on Forei gn £ ffairs of the National 
17. N. Y.Times, July 14, 1951, p. 4:7; New Republic, Oct. 5, 
19 53, p . 6. 
26 
Assembly he opposed an E .D . C . that would be so under the 
influence of -Catholics. li'inally , at the special Socialist 
cons ress called in May, 1954 to consider the problem of the 
E . D . C., factions led b y Naeg elen, Daniel Mayer and Loch 
opposed the army plan partly because of fears of a Vatican 
E.'urop e. 18 
Those who raised the specter of a 11black Europe" were 
connecting the idea of Vatican control of Europe with that 
of German hegemony under the leadership of Adenauer, the 
Christian democrat. 19 They failed to give proper considera-
tion to the fact that the aging Adenauer had an i n creas i ngly 
tenuous grasp on the reins of control in Germany . Such fears, 
hovJever , were enough in themselves to act as a hand icap to 
the foreign policy of the M. R. P ., especially since c ertain 
Socialist leaders took a stand such as has been noted above . 
For the tactical position of the So cialists in Parliament was 
very strong when the E . D . C. treaty came up before the National 
Assembly for a final decision in the Sllillmer of 1954. 20 
18 . £<1anchester Gua!':i ian Weekly , eb . 21, 1952 , p . 2; L ' Aube , 
~ay 29, 1950 , p . l ; May 30 , p . l; Journel des Debats , Feb . 
12, 1952, p. 631; Nation , July 18 , 1953, p . 45; N. Y. Times , 
Jan. 29 , 1954; Figaro, 1-iay 31, 1954, p . 5 : 3. 
19 . Terre Humaine , July-Au g ., 1952 , p . 100. 
20 . ~n voting on the E . D . C. on Aug . 30 , 1954 the Socialists 
split 53 pro, 50 con. The E . D . C. was rejected by a vote of 
319-264. N. Y. 'rimes , Oc t . 11 , 1954, p . l. In a comment on 
the Pope's expression of regret at the rejection o f the E .D . C., 
the non-Catholic Christian Century suggested t h at the opposi-
tion by H . R.P. deputies later in 1954 to the Paris Pacts for 
an expanded vlestern Union indicated that "the Catholic P arty 
would support Europe unification so long as the union •.• 
promised to be Catholi c-controlled 11 • Christian Century, Jan • 
. 26, 1955, p . 104. 
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Now that some consideration has been given to the 
effects upon party foreign pol'icy of the common classification 
of the r~ . R.P. as the "Catholic Party" , attention must be 
given t o the relative justification of such a name. The 
special status allotted to the IH. R . P . in France as the 
"Catholic Party" might seem somewhat puzzling. Since French 
Protestants are rather evenly divided among all the parties, 
it would seem that French parties are all, except for their 
relative size, equally Catholic. On the oth er hru1d there 
are large groups of nominal Catholics tha·t are opposed to 
the Ivi.R .P . Although the younger Catholic clergy in the 
rural east an<i west of France have leaned tovmrti. the ivi . R . P ., 
city priests and bishops are more inclined to favor the 
weal thy bourgeois interests represented in other parties 
whose ties with business are closer than those o f the M. R . F . 
The party is composed primarily of 11practicing Catholics 11 , 
but for many of these as well as for the nominal Catholics, 
the Ivi . R .P. was at its inception too far to the Left. Ji.:nd 
since most Frenchmen are only nominally Catholic rather than 
devout prac tising Catholics, many of them look askance at 
any such close ties between politics and religion as exist 
viithin the Ivi . R . P .21 
Besides being handicapped in its European program b y 
fears of a black Europe, the M. R. P . is not particularly for-
tunate in the closeness of its connections wit~ the Church 
21. App endix; Commonweal, July 22, 1949, p. 359; Occidente, 
vol. XI , no. 5, 1955, p. 377. 
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1:Jecaus e it has thereby become involved in the serious splits 
between social Catholics and Christian Democrats. 
I n his recent book on the history of political Cathol-
icism in France, Darbon declared that the Right Catholics 
(social Catholics ) hate the Christian d emocrats more than 
they do the anticlericals. Yet the two branches of' French 
Catholi cism are so interwoven in the M. R. P . that at times 
the party is referred to as a Christian democra tic movement , 
and at times as a Christian social movement.22 
The leaders of the M. R.P. were well aware of the com-
plications caused by the splits in French Catholicism Hhen 
,/ 
they excluded from the title of the party the name 11 Chre-
tien11, \vhi ch in French signifies practising Catholic. Al -
though composed primarily of such Catholics, the ~I . R . P . 
insists that it is non-clerical. It keeps 1 tself open to 
all faiths , and has in fact a few Protestants and Jews in 
its midst . Michelet , who left the l•I.R . P . for the R.P.F. of 
de Gaulle , claimed that the H . R.P . was "clerical in spite 
of itself" , but the experienced poll tical observer commen-
tator Fauve t was of the contrary opinion, declaring that 
the religious composition of the M.R.P. was only evident in 
its pro gram for "freedom of education 11 • Goguel, a Protest-
ant himself, seemed to a gree with Bidault's contention that 
the 1~ .R.P. was "no vassal of the Church". 23 
22. Darbon, op. cit., pp. 241-284 passim. See Luethy , QQ. 
cit., p . 59 for reference to M. n . P . as a Christian sOcial 
· movement. / 
23. Senator Hamon (M.R.P. until 1954) has a Jewish back-
A Centralized Party 
'rhe M.R.P. program of European integration represented 
at least in part an application of the party doctrine of 
pluralism. 'rhe pluralists believe that there should be a 
division of power among the many spontaneous and "natural" 
groups that make up society. 24 Yet in supporting pluralism 
the H.R.P. was opposing the French conception of a central-
ized state, a conception which is radically anti-pluralist. 
P rimarily as a result of this centralization, France has 
failed to develop much spontaneous local community life. 
\'/here spontaneity exists in local groups, it lea.ds tov1ard 
the development of pluralism. One of the particular weak-
nesses of the M.R.P., however, in spite of this stress on 
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pluralism, has been its failure to foster enough local social 
and political activity which would make possible this type 
23. (cont.) ground, and La Gravi~re and senator Yialker are 
prominent Protestants. Mauriac agreed with Fauvet that the 
M.R.P. was generally non-clerical. Fauvet, on. cit., pp. 
168-170; Mauriac, on. cit., vol. 4, p. 163. Lecourt, par-
liamentary leader of the 11-LR.P., said the party was more laic 
in 1954 than it had been in 1945. He defined 11laic 11 in such 
a way as to imply that the relations of Church a..."J.d. state were 
those of neutrality rather than conflict. See Apnendix. 
Goguel said the M.R.P. was careful not to 11verser dans 1' es-
prit de la chapelle 11 (capsize in the sea of s p iritual affairs) 
Terre Humaine, June, 1951, pp. 48-51. Also see Cor~1onweal, 
July 22, 1949, p. 359; Einaudi and Gogu el, op. cit., pp. 
221-2; Politigue, July-Aug., 1948, pp. 611-626; Terre Humaine, 
Feb., 1951, pp. 23-6. 
24. Readings in Recent Political Plulosophy, pp. 528-537. 
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9f spontru1eous community life. 25 The party fell in step wi~ 
France, therefore, as it fell out of step with its ovm doc-
trine. 
This l'leakness of the lvl . R.P. is mainly a reflection of 
the fact that it has been from the beginning a centralized 
party. Its location of control within a few leaders (how-
ever much they may differ in viewpoints between themselves), 
allows scant leeway for the decentralization implicit in the 
idea of pluralism. Hence the actual structure of the party 
militates against one part of its political philosophy. 26 
In his recent boo k , Les Partis Politiques , Duverger has 
distinguished carefully betv1een parties of direct and in-
direct structure, between those that are centralized and 
decentralized, and those of external and internal origin. 
The M. R. P . has a direct structure, which is perhaps a result 
of its desire to imitate continental socialist methods. In 
contrast to the British Labor Party, based as it is indirectly 
upon trade unions, the French Socialists have follovred. the 
direct pattern, claiming the lo yalty of its adherents without 
the presence of any intermediate centers of loyalty. In this 
25. Esprit , lYiar., 1953, pp . 376-8; L'Aube, 1-i ay 19, 1950, p . 2. 
Francisque Gay , one of the earlier leaders of the Ivl . rt . P ., was 
very critical of the failure of the party, as also of the P .D . P . 
before it, to maintain direct contacts with public opinion and 
to stres s the civic spirit. The lvi . R.P . had developed its theo-
retical support f or pluralism onl y in respect to the family 
group . Neither the Ivi . R . P . nor the P . D . P., said Gay , had de-
veloped enough local units. In the 1 930 's he had represented 
the whole Left Bank in Paris for the ? .D . P . See Appendix . 
26. Gordon iright has gone so far as to call the M. R.P. 
11monolithic". See Wright, op. cit., pp. 65-77. 
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respect the IJI . R. P . is similar to t he French Socialists. With 
regard to the degree of centralization of control, Christian 
democratic parties in general seem to straddle the fence be-
tween the pattern of bourgeois decentralized parties and t hat 
of centralized socialist parties . But parties of external 
ori gin such as the 1\.'I . R.P. tend to be more centralize<i than 
t hose of internal ori gin. 27 
Duverger has dravm an interesting as well as provocative 
parallel between the ori gin of the H. H. P . and t h at of the 
Bolshevists: both had their foundations in an "underground" 
movement, although the two movements ~vere quite distinct in 
ch aracter. The I~I . R . P . was quick to d evelop a centralized 
organization closer to the pattern of the formerly well - knit 
French Communist party than to that of any other French polit-
leal group . The M . H.P. seems to have been from the start a 
"party" rather than a "movement", despite its name. The 
Communists, h~ving as they did a strong centralized organiza-
tion, had mo re respect for the Ici . R.P . than f or any other 
political party in France .28 
The centralized organization of the l-1.R . P . conflicted 
directly vli th the party • s professed support for pluralism. 
As early as 1945 some of the proposals made by the M •. R.P . 
in the constitutional convention had reflected a pluralistic 
27. Duverger, op . cit., pp. 17-33, 8 -16; see also Historical 
Background, page 7. 
28. Duverger , op. cit., p . 12; European Political Systems, 
p . 662. 
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concept of parliament. For example the .party favored the 
representation therein of various social and economic groups 
in French society, such as family associations. According 
to l . rt . P . doctrine there is an organic unity to these groups, 
which are not created by law but grow naturally. The state 
is considered to be only the protector anQ res~lator of such 
group s which, according to the pluralists, are the funda-
mental source of power. 29 
If the 1'1. R. P . espoused pluralism, however, it certainly 
v1as not consistent in its support of this doctrine. \tvhile 
Hours, the critic whose opinions have been cited above, 
sought to compare pluralism with provincialism, and to asso-
ciate the M. H. P . with a hostility to centralization that had 
been typical of the Burgund.ians ani t h e Sainte-Ligue, in 
actual fact t h e party, or at least its leaders, favored a 
relatively high degree of centralized control. Lecourt, 
parliamentary leader of the M . R .P., sought to resolve the 
contradiction bet\veen theory and practice by drawing a dis-
tinction between deconcentration and decentralization. The 
M. R. P ., he said, favors deconcentration but is typically 
French in its hostility to decentralization, if the latter 
meant the transfer of political control down to the depart-
mental level in France. The party, said Lecourt, was 
29. Viri ght , op. cit., pp. 86-88; Einaudi and Goguel, op. cit., 
pp. 123-130; Duverger, op. cit., p. 375; Co mmonweal, July 22, 
19 49 ' p • 3 59 • 
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enthusiastic for local or regional planning in social and 
economic matters , but was skeptical about provincial auton-
30 
omy. 
M. R. P . central i zation in practice conflicted with 
pluralism in its political philosophy . Perhaps the party has 
an oversupply of 11doctrine 11 • If so, however, much of t h is 
d octrine has taken the form of misty ideology that has not 
been brought down close enough to earth . In this respect 
it would seem that the lVl. R. P. is distinct from the Communists. 
The Co nmunists have a solid d o ctrine which in its development 
is based on tactical and practical co n siderations, but none-
theless is apparent ly unswerving in i ts purpose . Gilson, 
N . R.P. member of the Academie Francaise, asked in 1947 whether 
it \vas really so fortunate to have a codified set of ideas 
like those of the Communi sts. It was, he believed , a pattern 
of reasoning which finds peace in its own abdication . Action 
Francaise had had such a systematic doctrine , he said; s hould 
the JYI.R .P. follow the example of that extremist organization'? 
Yet if certain M. R.P . leaders such as Gi lson cast scorn on 
t h e "inflexibili ty 11 of Communist doctrine, it was not long 
until they themselves were establishing quite as inflexible 
a doctrine in the J.vi.R . P . support for European integration.3l 
30 . Revue Politique et Parlementaire , Nov . , 1953, pp. 248 - 252; 
A-opendix; Goguel considered the lvi .R . P. 1 s pluralism to be quasi-
federalist in nature, and profoundly opposed to the central-
izing tendency of France. Terre Humaine, June, 1951, p . 92 . 
31 . Politique, Oct . , 1947, pp . 673- 6. vle are to examine in 
Chapter Seven the relative inflexibility of the Ivi. R.P . pro gram 
of ~uropean integration. 
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These lead ers who in eff e ct formulated t he for eign 
policy of t h e 1--1. H. P . were either ministers in the Government 
or members of Parliament. Not ev en t h e militants among party 
adherents in t he lo wer echelons were able to carry any 
appreciable weit;ht, whether t h ey expressed t h emselves t hrough 
t he sections, federa tions, o r t he national co ngress es . As 
in the case o f other Fren ch par ties, t h ere is a great d iffer-
ence bet ween t he numb er of l'l . H. P . adhe ren ts and the number 
of those who vot e f or the part y at t he poll s . In 1954, 
acco rding to the I\• . R . P . Secretariat, the number o f "cotisants" 
(card-carrying adherents who could be chosen as voting dele-
gates at pal'"ty assembli e s) vvas only something over so ,ooo.32 
In s hort, foreign policy was c r eated by a v e ry small percent 
of the supporters of t he party. 
On the s urface, ho wever, policy was supposedly created 
by combi ned discussion ru1d decisio n s on various levels o f 
the M. H .• P . party structure . Bes i d e s the local sectio n s and 
depart ment federations, t here is a Na t io n al Co mmi ttee , as 
well as the Na tional Congress that ruee ts on ce a year. 'I'he 
section s are composed of ten or more adherents apiece , and 
eng a g e i n d iscussions, formulate r e solutions, and carry on 
educational and propaganda activity. 'rhe federati o n s are 
t he main continuous organs of the party , ho wever, each being 
32. For exampl e , compare the t wo and a half mi llion voters 
for the party in 1946 with the peak fi gure of 230,000 sub-
scribers to L ' Aube in t hat year . S ee Append i x . 
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composed of five or more sections , and of at l east one hun-
dred members. All adherents ei ghteen years old or more 
qualify for the ri ght to vote in party conclaves . Candidates 
for politi cal office are named, and by secret ballot :fed era-
tion congresses choose delegates to t he national co n gress, 
which any adherent may attend but where only delegates may 
vote. 33 
If the 11 . H. P . pretends to be a "movement'', the "movers 
and shakers " were few in number who l ed inthe search for 
ways to develop European integration. Duverger' s t hes is that 
al l parties are oli garchical applies to the H . R. P ., which 
contrasts in this respect with the Socialists. \fuile the 
r-~ . l. . P . leaders held positions in either the Gov e r nment or in 
Parliament , the .So cialists vested much of their party control 
in the mili tants , in an attempt to avoid personalization of 
power . The ivl . R .• P . l eaders i-:ho held such po wer were relativel ;y 
young and politically inexperienced co mpa,red to leaders of 
many other French parties. The exception v.U3.S Schuman, who 
was already i n his six ties when he began his lo ng stand in 
the forei gn ministry i n July , 1948 . 34 But although advanced 
in years , S chuman did not profit too much by the political 
experience that he had had . 
33. Einaudi and Go guel , op. cit., 
tltatuts Na.tionaux , 1950, a copy of 
author b y the I~I . R . P . Secretariat. 
French means "advertising ". 
pp . 154-155; see also the 
which was sup plied the 
':rhe woro ''propag and e'' in 
34 . uve r ger , op. cit., pp . 22, 73, 191, 207, 220 , 226; 
Einaudi and Goguel, op. cit ., p . 169 . Th e leaders of the 
P . D . P . had also been few . Poli tioue, Hay, 1947 , p . 873 . 
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Since the M. R. P . ·drafters of European integration were 
so few in number one wou ld think that t h ey would do every-
thing possible to publicize their pro g ram in order to compen-
sate for this . But one of the most justifiable criticisms 
of t he S chwnru1 policy is t h at t h ere was no wiQesp read cam-
paign to explain ''Europe 11 , and the sac rifice s t hat it vmuld 
entail, to t h e French people or even t o the 11omnipot.ent" 
-
Parliament . ·LR . P . president Teitgen asked in .April , 1954 
hovl many of those who criticized t h e E . D . O. had read t h e 
treaty, but it seems that t h e J.ILR . P . had not exerted itself 
very much t o have made this p o ss i b l e . Perhaps the party's 
demand for a referendum on the E . D . 0 . in early 1954 was a 
b elated. attempt to make up for its failu re to "educate" 
public opinion up until then . 35 Mu ch of the reason for this 
fai l u r e lay in the exc essi v e central i zation of control with-
i n the Ivi . R. P ~ 
At one point , it is true , the M. R . P . l eaders appar-
ently attempted to extend their con t acts with publi c opinion 
t hrough the press . Party leaders in t he Gover:rr...ment sought 
to get control of the influential and relatively independ ent 
P arisian journal, Le Mond e , in 1951 . In Au sust of that year 
Beuve- Miry had resi gned as its ed.. i t o r , and he was replaced 
for a time by the IYl . R . P . deputy Dupraz, Catrice o f the staff 
35 . International Organization , May , 1953, pp . 210- 211 ; Speech 
of P .-H. Tei tgen at Venice , Ap r . 29 , 1953 , p . 17 (M. R. P . Sec ' t) . 
\ c areful study o f the development o f public opini on is no t 
.within t h e scope of this work . 
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·of defunct L'Aube, and others. Charges were advanced by the 
hypercritical ed itor of Esprit, Domenach, that the removal 
of Beuve- !vief.y \vas an example of Government pressure insti-
gated by the lll .R . P . 11 The 'domestication' of Le Monde by 
l'l.R . P . politicians support ed by the money pov;ers is in the 
politi c al , national and moral o1uer a sinister development 
which measures the extent of a decadence", he said. This 
development seemed to demonstrate an unsuccessful attempt 
of the restricted Ivl . R . P . leadership to extend its contacts 
with public opinion as well as with party militants through 
the ma:iium of the popular Le Monde . Critics among the M. R . P . 
mili tan.ts had found that befo re its d emise the party organ, 
L'Aube , had been tying itself too closely to go vernment 
poli cy.36 
Between 1944 and 1954 the principal M. R . P . leaders Y.iere 
Schuman , Bidaul t, de !vi enthon, Tei tgen, Letourneau, I•Iauri ce 
Schumann, Lecourt, Borne, Pflimlin and Buron.37 Except for 
/ 
Etienne Borne the above named leaders of the M. R .P. are, or 
had been for a considerable time, members of one or the 
other of the chambers of the French parliament. •Iany of 
them had also been members of one or more of the many Govern-
ruents that had been formed in France since 1945 . Hence , 
although the M. R . P . was a party of external origin ani was 
36 . Esprit, Sept ., 1 9 51 , p. 375; Terre Humaine, Sept. 1 9 51, 
pp. 14-19. 
37 . See Appendix B for bio graphical material. 
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quite centralized, it did not have another quality that 
.Duverger found to be a characteristic of such "partis ext/r-
ieurs 11 • Parliamentary members usually have a rather minor 
role in parties of external ori gin . But this is not true 
of the l . R. P . and in this respect the party diff ers as well 
from the ?rench Bocialist party . In December, 1951 the 
executive committee o f the Socialist party was given the 
sole ri ght to determine vlhether to refuse a vo t e of confi-
d ence, r e gardless of the wishes of 106 Socialist members of 
t he Nation al Assembly. Again in May, 1954 a special Social-
ist congress decided that "discipline of voting " should 
apply to party support for the E .D. C. in t h e National As sem-
bly: deputies were to vote strictly according to t h e deci-
sions of the congress.38 
In contrast, although the M. R. P . is quite centralized, 
t h e influence of its members in parliament is more t h an 
proportionate to their numbers in party councils rather than 
less. As Secretary-General Colin himself explained , the 
M. R. P . believes that for reasons of stPategic control t he 
secretary-general s hould not be a member o f the GoverlLment , 
at least not coincidentally \·lith the party president, but 
he should be a 11parlementaire". The National Committee, 
said Colin , had been cri ti ci zed at times for having too many 
38 . Duverger, op. cit., pp. 8-16 ; Manchest e r Guardian Vieekly , 
Dec. 6, 1951, p . 3; Fi garo, May 31 , 1954, p. 5:3. But in 
AUBUSt , 1954 they did not! See Chapter VII 
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parliamentary members; the smaller Executive Commission, on . 
the other hand, had been reproached for not being parliamen-
tary enough . 39 
Centralization in Practice 
P erhap s the best illustration of the centralized char-
act e r of t h e M. R . P . is to be found in the me thods b y which 
political activity in the party , at t h e lower levels of t h e 
sections and the federatio n s, is reBulated from above . Th e 
Na t ional Statutes of the M. R . P . provide t h at p arty meetings 
within a federation area must be authorized b y t h e control-
ling bod y of the federation in question . For a member of 
the par ty to p articipate in other meetings he must t ak e t h e 
ad vice of the president of the federation in vlhose area the 
me eting is to be held . Any discord is to be resolved b y 
t h e National Executive Corruni t tee . 40 
Article 51 of t h e Statute is importan t in this conn ection . 
It provides tha t members o f the Mouvement may express t h eir 
thoughts (through the usual media) on condition that they 
conform t o the decisions of the National Congress, National 
Co mmi t t ee , E~{ ecutive Commi ssion and , if deputies or senators 
are involved, of the appropriate p arliamentary 11 group e 11 • 
39. See Ap p endix. 
40 . Si c • . See -Article 20 of the Statute . 
referred to as the Executive Commis.sion . 
the Secretariat, the author was unable to 
were two separate bodies . 
Elsewhere it is 
In interviews at 
find that there 
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-~hat, it might be said parenthetically, is a b i g order. On 
the other hand, the Statute s p ecifically forbids members of 
the Mouvement to disseminate propaganda within the } ouvement 
for t h e benefit of an outside orgru1ization without having 
first obtained the authorization of the Executive Committee. 
In Article 53 provision was made for a special commission of 
"discip line and arbitrage" to handle troublesome cases. 
At t he National Congresses only d elegates, as a rule, 
are allowed to vote. As an exception to this rule, party 
memb ers in the Government o.r in Parliament may vote whether 
t h ey are official delegates or not. The National Committee, 
which is renewed at each congress and controls party affairs 
betw·een congresses, has at le ast one third of its membership 
compose:l of all present or former members of the Government 
and of Parliament. The same predominance of party adherents 
active in national politics is reflected in the smaller 
Executive Commission. This Commission has the po wer to d e-
cide in what cases parliamentary members of the lvi . R ~ P . are 
to observe "unity of vote", but according to Secretary-
General Colin that body has never made use of this power . 
However, the parliamentary " groupe" had exercised a similar 
power, and Colin called attention to the close ties between 
the "groupe" and the Zxecutive Commission through the i d en-
tity of many of their members. The power of the 11 groupe 11 
should not be exaggerated, though, since as a party grows 
older, parliamentary members become surer of their local 
positions in the departments, and are harder to k eep in 
l . 41 lne. 
·rhe formal regulations in the H . .i.=t , P . Statutes, there-
fore, prescribe certain local activities of party members 
and at the same time proscribe others. A striking illus-
tration of this centralized control is to be found in the 
circumstances surrounding the exclusion from the party of 
Andrt Denis , a member of the ~ational Assembly, in early 
1954. Directly involved here was the requirement by the 
H . R . P . that the rank and file in the party support its 
policy of European integration and its policy toward the 
French Union. ·rhe report of Sirnrnonet, in the name of the 
Commission on Discipline, to the National Committee called 
41 
attention to the fact that in the National Congress of !.fay, 
1953, after a period of free debate, the motions on Indo-
China and on general foreign policy had been adopted unani-
mously except for six and three votes, respectively. All 
party candidates for the National Assembly, before their 
election, are required to accept the tenns of Article 51 of 
of the Statutes which puts considerable restriction on their 
41. ~ee St a tuts Nationaux, especially Article 48 . (For the 
first time, the Constitution o f the Fourth Republic referred 
to the National As sembly and the Council of the Republic as 
P arlement.) In t he author's interview with Colin, the 
Secretary-General referred to another body, an inner Bureau . 
It v1as considered better, he said, to have an official inner 
clique t h an one growing up around personalities. Mallet, 
Secretariat offi cial in charg e of foreign policy, was una-
ware of the existence of this Bureau. See Appendix. 
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political activi ty , as the reader has seen . It was tile dec~­
sion of the Commission that Denis h ad not k ept to this com-
mitment . It found that he had f ought a gainst these resolu-
tions of the party congress in the press , and in meeting s 
opposing lvl:. R . P . poli c y on the E .D . C. and Ind o-China he was 
-
found to have c alumniated the 11d iri geants 11 of the party . In 
fa c t, he had attempted to create a division in the party only 
three days after t he congress ended . 42 
At the Paris Congress of 1953 P r esident ·rei tgen of t h e 
M. R. P . declared that no conviction had been "tenue en bride 11 
(brid led ) within the party. 11 We d o not h ave such a thing as 
official and pre- established truth 11 , he said . It was in the 
Denis affair six mo nths later that this declaration was p ut 
to a practical test . When the chip s are down , the M. R . P . 
certainly prizes unity and dis cipline . That Denis had vio -
l ated the voting d iscipline i n the National Assembly Has not , 
according to the Commission on Di s cipline, the determining 
element . It was rather the ensemble o f h is attitud e of open 
rebellion and his action outsid e the Mouvement that led the 
Commission to its decision. iU1 attempt had b een made t o get 
him to renounce such acti viti es , but he had continued to 
42./ Reference will be made later to t he ex clusion of senato r 
Hamon . The report of the Co mmission on Discipline is dated 
Jan . 10, 1 954. ·rne author received a copy from the Secre-
tariat . Si mmonet was recently cho sen S ecretary-General of 
t he M. R. P . N: Y. Times , Jan . 13 , 1956 , p. l . 
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·participate in meetings vli th Comtnunists and members of other 
politi cal groups.43 
In t h e final analysis, Teitgen and Bi d ault basei the 
exclusion of Denis on the latter 1 s basic hostility to the 
E . D . C. But this was a step i n Europ ean integration which 
many others in the party had grud gi n gly accepted. as a rather 
bitter p ill. There 11\fas co nsiderable adverse criticism in 
t he press of this action taken a gainst Deni s by the N. R. P . 
and as a matter• of fact there was much dissension in the 
party and d ifference o f op inion even within t he Commission 
on Discipline over the wisdom o f such a step. Perhap s this 
illustra tes the hi gh d e gree o f intellectual freedom d emanded 
by the French, which i s often a d ivisive and sometimes a 
destructive influence in French poli t ics. But it also illus-
tra tes the cen tralization to b e f ound in the Ivl . :t .P ., whic h 
at time s prevented a certain necessary degree of flexi b ility, 
similar reflection of t he central i zed ch aracter of the 
l'i. H. P . was f ound in the later expulsion o f t he senator Leo 
H / ~ tl t 44 amon I rom :1e par y. 
43 . Forces Nouvel les, May 30 , 1953 , p . 1 . Bee report of 
Si mmonet; also t he comment o f P hi lip ' illiams in his article 
i n Occidente , vol . XI , no. 5, 1955 , p . 377 . 
44 . Le I'Io nd e, Jan. 12, 1954, p . 5:1; N. Y. 'rimes , Nov . 15 , 
1 9 54 ' p . 11: 2 . 
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Dualism in P arty Foreign Policy 
Throu gh t he process of centralization of control t hat 
has been described above, t he IviR. P . pres erved to outvmrd 
appearances a surprising degree of cohesion. But a clos e r 
examination reveals a striking dualism vli thin the party in 
resp ect to the development of foreign policy . This dualism , 
or split between professions end p ractice, between words and 
deed~ should not be called hypocrisy since it was not always 
so co nscious. IIIJ:oreover it was unlike ethicai dualism, 
characterized by one standaro of conduct for one's own group 
and another for other men . For there were t wo forms of 
dualism within the party . On the one hand, there was a con-
trast bet\veen the official party support for Europ ean int e -
gration a1~ t h e reluctance and hesitations of certain party 
le~- ers in the Government when they had t he chance to put 
party poli cy into effect . On t h e other hand, there was an-
oth er contrast between t he emphasis placed by the 111. H. P . as 
such on forei t.m poli.c y , and the relative u isregard for 
foreign policy evident in t he actual p roceedings of p arty 
congresses, not to men tion the meeting s of federations and 
sections . For example , the H . R.P . as a p arty stood firmly 
behind the pro gram of European integration, and accepted 
compromises in internal politics to preserve t he continuity 
of this program. But for t he success of such a p ro grrun, 
active interest of the rank and fil e in the p arty -vms essen-
tial . The French people could not be forced into support 
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for European integration, and. t h eir suppo rt would certain l y 
b e needed for j_ts success in t h e long run. If t h e •I.H •• did 
not succeed i n stimulating ent husiasm for .i!..Urop ean integra-
tion ~nd interest in forei gn policy in general even withi n 
its ovm ran1cs , there vvas little l i kelihood that t h e p arty 
could lead France as a whol e into support for "Europe 11 • 
As we consid er firs t the contrast b etween official party 
policy and the hesitations and equivocations o f ·certain p arty 
leaders in the Government , proper account must be tak en of 
the position of these lea~ers. It is o n e thing to run a r isk 
in wo!Ui n g resolutions at party congresses , and anoth er t hing . 
f or 1' . R . P . memb ers of t h e Gov e rnment to :r•isk acting on such 
r e solutions . Th e func tion of congresses is to preserve party 
d octri n e, and in the case of t he 1-l . R . P . another function was 
t o k eep t h e party nominally at least t o the 11left 11 in its 
forei ~n policy . For example , the i nitial brochure of the 
lvi. R. P . publish ed i n 1945 called a ttention to t h e historic 
struggle f or collective security wag ed by the P . D .• , its 
p redecessor , and announc ed that t h e Ivi. R . P . i·muld "never a gree 
to a policy o f ' b locs' 11 , since b locs were considered to b e 
potentiall y if not fundarnentally aggressive. 45 
It is unlikely that the party "mystique" coul d have sur-
vived unblemished through ten successive years o f p articipa-
tion in the Government . At times some J!.LR . P . leaders were 
/ 45 . Terre Hmnai ne , J Qne , 1952, p . 1 22; Mouvement Republicain 
P opul a i r e, Brochures , 1945-6: lVLR. P ., P arti ..... , pp . 26-7. 
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quick to seize the initiative, in pursuance of t hei r ideology, 
as did S chuman in announcing his P lan in 1950 (one of whose 
purposes was t o make it less necessary for France to adhere 
to the East or t he \vest bloc) . But they usually had to b e 
most circumspect beca use of their positions of responsibility 
in the Government . P~ thou5h , as an editorialist in L ' Aube 
in 1950 , Bidaul t made the observation that one should "row 
against the current" in poll tical affairs, he destroyed some 
of the eff ect of t h is statement when he said that t his ten -
dency in i nd ividuals \vould operate as a balance a gainst t h e 
policy they "must" practice. 46 And in actual practice as 
foreign minister Bidault often followed the current of polit-
ical tradition rather than rowing against it , fi nd i ng hi s -
torical arguments for what seemed often t o be an opportun-
istic personal p o licy . 
Who wishes to be an angel in politics , said the political 
commentator Fauvet , "acts the f ool". Denis , subsequently 
excluded from the Ivi. H. P ., put it another vmy: 110ne doesn't 
ge t out of a thi clcet at a gallop 11 • Fauvet no ted that t h ere 
are tviO types of conflicts in ev5ry political movement, that 
between thought and action, and that between "cadre" and 
"eli en tel e" . "Quand on agi e 11 , he said , "on trah i t un peu . 11 
In 1950 L ' Aube attempted to reassure those on the l eft vling 
of the lv'.i . H. P . who were troubled about preserving the disti nc-
tio n between the whole party and the members in the Government 
46 . L ' Aube , F eb . 10- ll , 1951 , p . 6. 
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·or in Parliament by arguing that parti cipation in the Goverl'\-
ment was a guarantee that r-L R. P . doctrine ·would not be 
neglected by party leadership . 47 
Despite this guarantee , there was at least procrastin a-
tion , if not negl ect , to be laid at the door of the party's 
leadership. Even the _apparently enthusiastic federalism of 
Tei t gen wavered before the 1952 appeal by Spaak of Bel gium 
to the Consultative Assembly for action toward the creation 
of a European poll tical authority. Tei tgen and de Ivi enthon 
did , however, take an active part in t he d rafting of a pro -
posed constitution for an E . P .C. in the fall of the year . 
But with respect to the European Defense Community, the 
cleavag e between official party policy and that expressed 
through E . R. P . leaders in the Government seemed to grow 
during 1952 and 1953. 'rl-1rough resolutions of its congress 
and stand s taken by its National Committee the ~LR . P . had 
supported the E .D .C. as an essential step in European inte-
gration from the time of t he si gnature of the treaty . But 
it was not until October, 1953 that the party announced 
publi cl y that it \Wuld wi thdraiv from the Government if the 
E . D . C. were rejected.48 
47. Ibid., l~'l i}Y 27-28, 1 950 , p. l; Terre Humaine , June, 1952, 
p. 1 22; L'Annee Politi que , 1952, p. 37; Fauvet, op. cit. 
p. 170. 11-Y/hen one acts, one becomes sli ghtly a traitor.r' 
48. N. Y.Times , July 2, 1952 , p . 4:3; July 15, p. 4:4; Mar. 
11, 1953, p . 14:3, 4; Oct. 31, p . 16:2. Fo~ examples of 
stands taken by the National Committee or the congress , see 
Chapter l, pp. 24-25. 
'' 
48 
One month later, in November, .1953, Bidault finally 
took a definite stand as foreign minister in support of the 
E . D .C, He stood up in the National Assembly to say, "V: i th 
out fear of displeasure nor desire for pleasure I speak my 
conscience". The v-mrld had not been promisOO., said Bidault, 
to those who hesitate (the shoe vmuld seem to fit him ~); 
what was needed v1as a policy other than that of a choice 
between two dangers, "folle croisade" or "martelle replie-
ment" . Perhaps the strain of committing himself so clearly 
for the E . D. O. was too much for him, as well as the strain 
of h is work as foreign minister. In any event Bid aul t had 
a fainting spell during h is speech, and when the session was 
resumed Maurice Schuman read the rest of his speech.1+9 
Because of this turn of events, much of the possible effect 
of the ori ginal speech viaS lost on the Ass embly. 
Once Bidault had finally crossed his Rubicon, it ap-
peared t hat the M. R . P . was clearly committed to the E . D . C. 
P flimlin gave it h is outspok en support when he unsuccess-
fully sought the presidency of the National Assembly in 
December . In :D- arch, 1954 the M. R.P . became the first party 
to ask its mewbers in the Government to demand a debate on 
. the .C:: . D .C. without delay . In the spring ele-ction campaigns 
in Beine-et-Oise and in Brittany, party candidates seemed to 
profit from their positive stand s on the E . D .C. Neverth eless, 
49. Journel d es Debats, Nov. 20, 1953 , pp. 5354 et seq. 
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the delays on this issue had been costly for the l•I . R.P ., and 
party leaders in the Government were still inclined in 1954 
to procrastinate in bringing the E.D.C. issue to a head.so 
There was a continuing contrast in early 1954 between 
the official stand of the M. R.P . and the attitude of Bidaul t 
as foreign minister, for instance over the important issue 
of German unity. At the congress of 1952 Alfr•ed Coste- Floret, 
reporting the official party forei gn policy, declared that 
the vi.R . P . was not opposed to the idea of unification of 
Germany, since it would destroy the spirit of irredentism if 
co nsummated , but he insisted that such unity be sought only 
1.-Jithin the "bosom" o f Europe . When Bidault represented France 
as foreign minister at the Berlin conference of February , 1954 
he declared that a unified Germany must follow free elections . 
But Bidaul t went on to contradict the 1952 pr-onouncement of 
Coste-Flo r et when he said that a liberty of choice must be 
extended to a new united Germany, ·which could not be 
manacled by prior commitments of Vv est G-ermany . France d oes 
not, said Bidaul t, "demand as a condition o f <J.erman unifica-
tion the entry o f a united Germany into the European com-
munity, but refuses as well to allow an opposite prior condi-
tion." Regardless of which approach was more realistic, 
t his i s anothe r illustration of the presence of a continuing 
50. N. Y. 'I'imes, Jan . ll, 199~, p . 2:7; Ivlar . 8 , p . 9 :2; lvl ar. 
15, p. 6 :2; also see Apnendix; Time, Jan. 25, 1954, p . 31. 
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dualism wl thin the Ivi . i. . P . 5l 
It is d i f ficult to escape the conclusion that many of 
the leaders of the :VI.H.P . belong to that numerous group of 
individuals in poll tics · that Domenach, e:li tor of Esprl t, 
callei t h e "doub le pens ants" (double-thin_lcers '~, who profess 
one policy while practicing another. t•uch of the r eason for 
t his, o f course, li es in the fact that the leaders who were 
in the Government had to deal directly \vi th ? arlia.ID.ent. 'I'he 
nature of t h e l"ren ch Parliament has not changed much fr·om 
the p i c ture drawn of it by de Tocqueville as it was b efore 
1848: "One must have .lived a long time amid parties •••.• to 
understand how far men r1Iay d rive each other to act agai nst 
their ovm desig.ns and how far the fate of the world may oe 
determined not only by but against t he wills of t hose who 
influence it, as a kite is d riven by the contrary action of 
the wind and its own tall." In June, 1950, on the eve of 
his defeat as p remier, Bidault declared that except where 
a coup d 'etat was involved, every government was necessarily 
a conciliatlon.52 
The 1LR. P . had condemned the Third Republic and called 
itself the "P arty of the Fourth Republic" . But the poll tical 
vlri ter Raymond Aron has referred to the H.R.P. as instead 
51. Or within the "embx'ace" of Europe, Coste-Floret 's expres-
sion mi ght be translated . N.Y. 'rimes , Jan. 21, 1954, p. l; 
Jan . 31, p. 3:1; for further evidence of dualism see, f or 
example, Chapter~' and Chapter 7. 
52. i)ilanchester Gua:rUian vl eekly, Mar . 6, 1952 , p . 8; L ' Aube 
June 1 9 , 1950, p. 4. 
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t h e "Radical Socialists of the Fourthr'. He had told Maurice. 
S chumann in 1948 that the party would have to choose between 
t h e 11l"ifth" and the Third; about two years later, on being 
aske<i by Aron what the choice was, Schumann said the l•I . R . F . 
had chosen the Third . It was quite an achievement, said 
Aron sardonically, to be able to chang e over to t he "dirty 
political game of the Radicals" within five years. 53 
The leaders of the M.R. P . preswned to exclude Denis and 
Ham6n from the party for opposing its foreign policy when in 
part they themselves, although in lesser degree and more dis -
creetly, disregaroe<i it or soft-pe<ialled it. But this is 
only one aspect of M. R.P. dualism. T{le party congr e sses that 
in their resolutions endorsed M. R.P. foreign policy in 
g eneral and the policy of European integration in particular, 
gave as a rule only lip service to these policies. The 
examination that follows will reveal how little attention 
was devoted in the congresses to issues o f foreign policy. 
The "European vocation" of the 11-I.R .P., in particular, v.ras 
preservEd by a relative few of its leaders. In a way this 
was proper retribution; the leaders had t h emselves b rought on 
the situation by constructing such a ic·entralized·:. party. 
It would not be too surprising to find that the rank and 
file in the party outside the congresses gave scant heed to 
matters of forei gn policy. The main programs were developed 
(perhaps ratifiEd is the better word} within, not outside 
53. Einaudi and GoBuel, op. cit., pp. 190-200; also Appendix . 
official party gatherings of sections, federations and 
national congresses. Party policy was one thing, and the 
attitude of t he loyal electorate another. Voters for the 
Ivi .R.P. did not feel bound very much by its pronouncements; 
there was "un pays 1/gal" and · 11 un pays re'el". In 1951 a 
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number of I~I .R. P . mill tants (the most loyal adherents) were 
believed to have voted for the party program supporting 
N. A. T . o . although they were basically opposed to this treaty 
organization. Those who voteci for the party did not neces -
sarily feel "engage~", although they ha.d no alternative 
solution to N. A. T.O. that they coula offer.54 
It was, or should have been, even more d isturbing for 
the party that at the organized meetings themselves there 
was relatively little enthusiasm for matters of foreign 
policy. S~nce 1950 European integration had been the focal 
point not only of M. R. P . foreign policy but of J:v . R . P . policy 
in general. Yet a careful examination o f the proceedings 
of the meetings of the sections, federations, and national 
congresses reveals that t his program of integration, as 
well as foreign poll cy in general, usually took a back seat 
as it yielded to matters of aornestic politics. 'rhis is not 
unusual, of course, in any country , and especially France . 
V/hen the critical issue of Ina o-·China policy was raised, 
for example, in the Peasant Party Congress in the spring of 
19 53, the answer was "No! No! No distractions! 11 Of all \the 
. 54. Vie Intellectuelle, Feb., 1951, pp . 76-80. 
... rench parties it was only the Socialists that paid more 
attention to foreign policy in their party gatherings than 
d id the M. R.P.55 But the important thing is h o w little 
attention was paid to it in I•I . R . P . gatherings , vlhen the 
party sought by various devices to retain control o f the 
foreign ministry for the primary purpose of preserving the 
continuity of its program of European integration. 
Th e four main problems before the I•'I.R . P . Congress of 
1950 were lodging , social security, ful l employment, and 
redistribution of national revenue . In t he preliminary 
preparations for the congress no r e ference seems to have 
been made to foreign policy as such, although only three 
53 
weeks p reviously S chuman had made his sudd en proposal for a 
Franco - German merger in coal and steel . Much a t tention was 
devot ed to the f~lily, and in the federation meetings prior 
to t he congress speakers had dwelt on internal affairs such 
as the problem of rejuvenation of the French economy, with 
scant if any reference to the international factors involved. 
omestic problems were also stressed above foreign problems 
i n d e 'i enthon' s leadersh ip of t he party in the National 
Assembly in 19 50 and 1951. l\1aurice S chuman...n, in his ed.i t-
o rials in the party organ , L ' Aube, had been dwelling on 
55 . Journel des Debats, Nov . 20, 1953 , P»· 5354 et seq; 
Terre Humaine, June, 1952, p . 122; L' Aru1.ee Poli tique, 1952, 
p . 38 . But the motion adopted on t he E.D.c. in the Soci al-
ist ConE::,ress of 1952 was even vabuer than that in the 
Ivi. R. P . Congress . Lond on Ti mes, vi a y 31, 19 52, p . 6c. 
foreign affairs almost daily up until about February, 1951. 
At that time there was a strange and quite sudden reversal 
of form as he d irected his attention subsequently toward 
internal matters . 56 Perhaps it was felt t hat t h is mi gh t 
boost a sagging circulation at a time when t h e days of the 
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journal seemed numbered . P erhaps it was a change i n .p repara-
tion for t h e coming general elections . vi e d o not know; but 
if eith e r o f these suppositions is correct, it is another 
refl e ction of t he relative lack of interest o f lVI . R . · • adher-
en ts in foreign affairs. 
"tt its cone,r ess in Lyons in viay , 1951 the 1I . R . .t? . was 
said by Go gu el to have found a gain the "atmosphere of t he 
party ' s birthi'. If so, the original atmosphere of the party 
was little connected with foreign policy . For no particular 
reference was mad e at the congress t o forei gn affairs, and 
t he resolution on fore:l. gn policy vJas unusually vag,ue . 'rhe 
lvl • • P . was primarily concerned at this t i me \vi th the imminent 
elections . In the political advertisements f o r t h is parlia-
mentary election of 1951, all parti es except the Teutralists 
put their pro gram on foreign policy in small print . The 
French actually voted on the basis of internal policy, which 
gave a d eceptive appearance to the result as far as foreign 
56. From a comprehensive reading of L'Aube by t he author . 
For s pe cific poin ts , see L ' Aube , May 19, 1950 , p . 4; lvi ay 23 , 
pp . 2 , 3; May 24, p . l; May 25, p. 3 ; Apr . l - 2, p . 4; Apr . 
3, p . 4; pr. 17 , p . 4; Apr . 24, p . 4 ; lviay 2 , p . l ; Ivtay 8 , 
p . 4; May 9 , p . 4; May 15 , p . 4; July 12, p. 3 . 
policy was concerned.57 
On t he other hand at the Bord eaux H. R. P . congress of 
1952, coming as it did soon after the National .Assembl y 
d ebate on a European army and t he signature of the E . D . C. 
treaty, considerable attention vras devoted to forei n 
policy . The congress formally expressed its opposi tion to 
the revival of any German national army, and demanded that 
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the b .D. c . treaty be ratified only if it carried vJith it the 
guarantees required by t he National .tlssembly, in particular 
an effective guarantee from the United States and the United 
Kingdom in the event of German 11 secession 11 • However , the 
party was in general preoccupied with its attitude toward 
the P inay Go vernment, and the debate on foreign policy , 
which v-ras h eld on the last day of t he concress vihen many had 
returned to their federations, seemed to some of the mili-
tants to be more academic than those of former years . 58 
vhen the i.vi . R . P . Natj_onal Committee met in January, 1953, 
i n ternal policies d id fi n ally seem to yield fir s t place to 
foreign policy , and the SEune mi ght be said in general for 
t h e discuss ions at t h e Paris co ngress of l'iay , 1953 . But t h e 
fate of the E.D.c. was becoming more problematical with the 
passage of time, and t h e growth of interest with i n the b ody 
57 . Terr e Hurnaine , June , 19 51, p . 119; N . Y . Times, l"~ ay 7 , 
1 9 51, p . 10:5; London ·rimes, Nay 31, 1952 , p. 6c; Esprit, 
Oct. 1 951 , p. 580 . 
58 . Forces Nouvelles, May 31, 1952, pp . ll-12; Lond on Ti mes , 
lv'i ay 31, 1952, p . 6c . 
of t h e li;I . R . P . had app arently come too l ate , _,uring t h e 
spring of 19 54 di scuss ion in t he early federation meetings 
was again devoted p rimarily to internal problems . Fo r ex-
56 
amp l e , when t he presid en t of t he strong S eine federation was 
empo wered to make contacts to build a "ma jo r i te" europ lenne et 
so ciale" , there seemed to be more concern with building a 
political group that was well - knit on social questio n s than 
with finding a unified group on the European pro gr am . v'ihile 
t here was greater attention to foreign affairs in t he later 
federation meeting s i n May , 19 54 , still certain l eaders of 
the Ji. R . P . vvere quite non- committal when they took part in 
t h ese meetings . There was no motion passed on foreign policy 
at the Bouches-du-RhD~e meeting over which d e en t hon p re-
sided, despite hi s o wn recent pronouncement of t h e need fo r 
action . I n the resolutions at t h e meeting of the federation 
of S eine-Infe~ieure, p resided over by S e creta ry- General Colin, 
there vtas no reference to the E .D . C. Although by this time 
close to half of the federati o ns had taken a specific stand 
on the E . D . C. treaty, t he above repres ent si gnificant 
exceptions . 59 
By the end of the party congress at Lille in Ivl a y , 19 54 
t h e £-I . R . P . had taken the position that only a decision on 
t h e E . D . C. '\.vould mak e possible t h e settlement of var ious 
59 . 
46 ; 
27 , 
Ma y 
" Ibid ., Jan . 20 , 1953, p . 5b; L ' Annee Politique, 1953 , p . 
Le lYio nd e, Feb . 9 1 19 54 , p . 6 :4; , Forces Nouv elles , I-1ar . 
1954, p . 6 ; Apr . 10, p . 9; Apr . 24, p . 9; 'l ay 8 , p. 8 ; 
22 ' p . 6. 
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internal problems. Yet the greater part of the attention of 
the congress still seemed to be devoted to domestic issues, 
·which occupied the time of the d elegates d uring Thursday, 
Friday and part of Saturday . After two sessions d evoted to 
foreign policy on Saturday afternoon and Sunday morning, the 
ticklish problems o f the French Union and North Africa were 
handled rather summarily at the tag end of Sunday afternoon. 60 
It is possible that the reason for the lack of much 
attention to such matters a s European integr a tion and r e lations 
"~tl i th t h e l<., rench Union and J.IJorth Africa mi ght have been found 
in t he relative unanimity of the M. R. P . on foreign policy . 
It must be admitted that this unanimity was a refreshing con-
trast to the dissension t h at had risen to a peak lmme:iiately 
prior to this Lille congress in the National Assemb ly. None-
t h eless, t here was also a striking contrast between the 
matter-of-fact acceptance o f the M. R. P . foreign policy pro-
gram and the great and exclusive attention given to foreign 
poli cy at the .special Socialist convention called also in 
May, 1954 to reach a decision on the E . · . c. This relative 
d isregaro for foreign policy by the H . R . P ., claiming a s it 
did a unique "European vocation" , seemed to be a refl e ction 
in mi niature of what Luethy has recently referred to as the 
incredible indifference of the French people to f oreign 
60. Figaro , May 29-30, 1954, p . 11:2. 
a ffairs. 61 With a lack of contacts with the nation other 
than those Frencl)lmen from limited geo graphic areas and vfi th 
particular reli gious inclin ations, the M. R. P . as a party 
vJas stagnated by its own ce!}tralized character to such an 
58 
extent that it could not generate really active and continu-
ous enthusiasm even within its own ranks for its program of 
Europ ean integration. 
61. Einaudi and Go5uel, op. cit., pp. 204-5; Luethy, op . cit., 
p . 408. 
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CHAPTER III 
FRI EI\lD 0 R FOE'? 
The JVI . R. P . and the European JI!Iovement 
The H . R. P ., a "movement 11 itself , placed itsel f at t h e 
front of the movement f o r European integration between 1 9 44 
and 19 54 . The party leaders considered this program of 
integration to be the most distinctive part of L .P . foreign 
policy . They emphasized the need of bringing such a pro gram 
to t h e attention of "every social and spiritual family" •1 
Ho wever, just how all mi ght participate in the pro gra...'11 was 
n ever mad e clear by the IvL R . P . leadership. As things actu-
all y d evelop ed , the only really active friend s of t h e M. R . P . 
in 1 ts pro gram .,of integration were to be found within 
Ca tholic groups. The l\I . H. P . had very slim contacts with 
bus i n ess, v-1here there were many foes of integration, and 
sections of labor run of t h e press were increasingly ali en-
a t ed f rom t h e party . Fi n ally, in some asp ects of Ivi.~ . F . 
fo r ei gn policy the bureaucracy tended to control rather than 
to suppo r t some of the party 's lead ers. 
In supporting in t h eory t h e principle t h at all p e rsons 
are capable of contributing to the d evelopment of poll tical 
1. Forces Nouvelles, ec . 20, 1952, p . 2; L ' Aube, Ivl ay 27- 8 , 
1950, p . 3 . Hannah Arendt has indicated t h at it is not at 
all unusual for poll tical groups to claim to be "above the 
parties" , and t h at "movements 11 have in actual fact tended to 
remain small societies of intellectuals. .Arendt, Hannah, 
Th e Ori gins of 'l'otali tarianism, pp . 250-l. 
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policies, the I"l . R . P . l eaders appear to have taken a distinct-
ly Christian democratic approach as opposed to a social 
Catholic approach. Yet the groups involved in this pro gram 
of European integration were, by virtue of t h eir backgrounds 
as wel l as their political tendencies, more social Catholic 
tha.11. Ohri s ti an demo era tic . 
The disti nction between these two wings of .French Cathol-
icism is one of substa~ce as well of method. Christian demo-
crats, on the political left of Catholici sm , seek to achieve 
reforms through the direct participation of Catholics in 
politics in some form of party organization. Social Gatholics 
believe that hi gher officials of the Church should take in-
direct political action to provide for the masses the amount 
2 
of reform considered advisable by the Catholic Right . 
Adherents of so cial Catholicism favor, then, a hier-
archi cal political organization, with control b eing exerted 
dovmward from the higher levels. The belief is that the 
function of the Church is to inspire the enactment of measures 
for t he masses . Initiative would proceed fro m the top dovm , 
not from the bottom up as is more typical of the methods of 
Christian democracy . Social Catholics are prone to define 
attitudes that others should have, and "paternalism" is 
favored. In contrast to the emphasis on politics by indivi-
dual Christian democrats , the social Catholics give priority 
·to the Church over political considerations.3 
2 . See reference to this cl eavage in L' Aub e, May 20-21,19 50,p.l. 
3. See for example article on De lviun in .c,'ncyclopedia .Americana 
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The composition and characteristics of the European 
"communities" that have been sponsored by t h e l:·i..K . P . as part 
of the program of integration might vary considerably 
according to whether they represented. the ideals of Christian 
democracy or those of social Catholi cism. If the latter were 
the case, there would be less likelihood of direct repre-
sentation of people of national groups in the legislative 
branches of these communities, and greater likelihood of 
influence exerted indirectly by the Pope and other high 
Church officials. 
Included in the groups supporting the principle of Euro-
pean integration, although questioning certain applications 
of it , was the strong Association Catholique de la Jeunesse 
Francaise (A.C.J . F .) which had been from the pet:;inning social 
.!;) 
Catholic rather than Christian democrati c by inclination.4 
This organization, whose federal coun cil is composed of repre-
sen tatives of the J . A. C., J-. E . C., j-. r . c., J . M. Cq and J . o.cq5 
at first steered clear of parties but by about 1946 pushed 
its militants into active support of the r-I . R. P . 6 At the same 
3 . (cont.) 1949. A social Catholic suggested to t he Hriter 
that the P . R.i,. is the party closest ·to his group of Catholics . 
See Appendix A. 
4. Carr~re et al, Manuel des Partis Politiques , p . 137 et seq . 
5 . Youth groups connected with special occupations such as 
farmi~p, e<iucation , the navy, etc. _ 
6. Temoignage Chr;{tien, JYi ar. 26, 1954, p. 5:1; Jan. l, p . 
2:2; Political Science Quarterly, loc. cit., pp . 532-540; 
Guillemin, Les Chr~tiens et la Politique, p . 154; also 
Appendix A . 
time t hat it suppo r ted i nt egration of workers i nto inter-
national communi ti es and improvement of legal forms per-
mi t t i n e; i nternatio n al organizatio n s to be created , the 
j~ . C . J . F . looked askance a t such a s pecific project as the 
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European Defense Community , seeing within it a me:i i um through 
which German ind ustrial combines would be recons tituted .? 
·rhe fact that such Ivi . R . P . leaders as Tei tgen (several times 
president) and Colin (Secretary- General ) had also been 
prominent members of the A. C. J . F . tended to put a damper on 
any enthusiasm they mi gh t have had for any such projects as 
the E .D . C. S 
In additio n to the contribution made by youth group s 
l i ke t h e . c . J· . ~i' . , the Catho lic Church itsel f mad e a contri-
bution t o t h e pro gram of .l!;urop ean i ntegration . Bince t h e 
time of t h e Holy no man Emp i re the appro ach of Catholicism 
h as b een transnational rather than national . rhe Sep aration 
of 1905 in France had brought t h e Church closer both to t h e 
people and t o Rome . As the movement for Europ ean integration 
began to gain momentum in June, 19 50 , French cardina ls and 
archbishops mad e a decl aration that a Christian (mean ing a 
''practicing Catholic 1') does not h av e the ri ght to be d isin-
teres ted. in efforts to build a Europ e. TvJo yea:r•s later the 
Pope put t h e Church offici ally b ehi nd t h e movement for in-
te gration, but pointed out that politi cal ties alone were 
7. L ' Aube, Oct . 9 , 19 50, p . 3 . 
8 . See ~ppenu i x A . 
63 
not enough to sustain the movement . 9 
Political ti es had their value , however , Lead e rs of 
the Catholic parties of Europe _had frequently consul ted to-
ge t her in 'the pas t to harmonize t heir policies . :rhere were 
also i mportant personal contacts among leaders of the 
"Chrl·Stl·a.rl democ.,..."'.tl·c '1 pa"'t l·"'s . Sc-t1uman O.L_.. t h e ·,v; R -.:> 
.L co<. .L v .... . ..... , 
v·Jhile foreisn mi n ister of France, was fortunate in having 
contacts through religion as well as t h roue;h a common lang-
uag e ( German ) with the G-erman and Italia.Il pol i ti cal leaciers , 
Ad enauer ru1d ~e Gasperi . 10 
;r here were various transnational organizations connected 
with t e Church and through it vvi t h the l'i . R. u . which sup -
ported the p rin cip le of ~uropean integration . In f act, it 
appear ed t h at a new type of CJatholic was emergins ·who favored 
participati ng in temporal task s such as that of i ntec;rating 
Europe and was at t he same time turning away from integrism 
(the policy of seeking sufficiency within one ' s own religion ) 
wh ich h ad tended toward paral ysis o f t he Church in Jiurope . 11 
.:.. ctivel y as so ci ated with these Cathol i c orga.r1izations were 
such 1-.:: . · •• · • leaders as ~1illot, Bichet , :3 acon and Farine . 
ualified btlt specific support for projects o f :Suropean 
9 . L'Aube, June 20, 19 50, p . 3; N. Y. ·rimes , Sep t. 1 4 , 1952, 
p . 1:8 ; Le e . 25, 1953~ p . 1:1; u ec . 27 , IV~ p . 5:1 . 
10. Philip , Le P robl eme de l ' Gnion ~uropeenne , p . 1 8 3; 
Journal of Hodern History , Bept ., 1952 , p . 27 2 ; 'h ite , Q.Q. 
cit . , p . 241 . · 
11 . Bee L ' Aube , 5/29/50 , p . 3; 10/17, p . 4; 8/24 , p . 1; 
8/12-13 , p . 4; ll/20 , p . 1; 2/10- 11/51, p . l; 3/3- 4 , p. 5; 
3/22 , p . 3 . 
integr ation was continuousl y e;iven b y the i nfluential Nou-
/ 
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velles Equipes Inter national es , whi ch was the f irst ::Uro p ean 
organization after 19 45 t hat took the i n itiative t o includ e 
Germans . Bichet, M. R. P . member of t he National ssemb l y , 
served. as pres i dent o f t h e L £ . I . un til 191+9 and t hereafter 
as secre t a r y- general . l2 
Helations wi t h Labor and Bu s ines s 
The s oci a l Catho lic or rightist Catholic co mpos i tion of 
mos t o f t h ese o rganizations supporting Europ ean integration 
r e sulted in an alienation of a consiQerabl e portion of t he 
Catholic labor f orce in Franc e from this p ro gram . he Con-
f(d /ration Frarljaise des Travailleurs Chrttiens, which h ad 
9 00,000 members in 19 48 includ ing various l eaders of t he 
M. R. P . , was frequently at odd s with M. H. P . l ead e r s hip , and by 
1 9 52 was be coming alienated as well from the Church . 1 3 Hence 
it was little inclined to follow ~i rectives of Church l eaders 
requiring support for European integration . It ·was on thi s 
very issue of i n tegration that a split occurred i n t he ranks 
of t h e 0 . F . T. C. in 19 54 . 'rhe resu l ting left wins ·roup vras 
qu ite pointed i n its cri t icisrn of various phases o f inte e;ra-
t ion , and even t he ri eht wi ns r efused to take a sta:..r1d in 
12 . Philip, ou . cit . , pp . 183- 4 ; L 1 Au b e, 4/22- 23/50, p . 3 ; 
11/l, p . 3; 1173, p . 3; 11/7, p . 3 ; 11/6 , p . 3; 1 2/4, p . 2; 
12/18 , p . l. Also Jeune Europe , no. 23, p . 7 et seq . 
1 3 . Marabuto, Les Partis Poli tiques et les Mouvements, pp . 
63 , 320- 33; CornmonHeal, July 22, 1949, p . 359; Es p_rit, J une , 
1953, p . 949; Reporter , Bept . 1 6 , 1952, p . 7; Carr~re, op • 
. cit., p . 1 37 . 
'.SUppo rt of t ne s pecific p l a tl fo r a European Defense Com-
muni t y .14 Other Catholic workers' organizations, specifi-
cally the l•iouvement de Liberation d u Peuple and t he li.louve -
ment de Li beration Ouvri~re , too k similarly critical stand s 
on particul ar phases of European integration. 1 5 
At the same time t h at t he M. R , P . was attemp ting to 
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ral l y t he support of various Catholic groups, i n clud ing l abor 
groups, to the cause of integration, it \vas strangel y uncon-
c e rned about its failu.r e to es tablish adequate ties Hi th the 
l<' r ench business world and the bure aucra c y , which were 
d ire ctly concerned, respectively , with the e co nomic and the 
political aspects of integration . 
Lack of bus i nes s suppo r t for a party in Fran ce is not, 
it is true, as unusual as it mi ght b e in the Unit ed 5tates . 
• s Pflimlin of the J:.I . R . P . ind icated, 16 it is a refl e ction 
of t he intellectual app roach to politi c s in Europe comp ared 
to the p ractical approach in the United States. It is 
p robable that 1:-l . R . P . party d octrine had an effect o n t h is 
relation vri th the business world . Acco rd ing to p arty d oc-
trine impersonal economic problems are considered as 
14. Pi garo , April 4- 5, 1954 , p . 2 :4; see also quo tatio n s in 
L 1 ' ube , Iay 23 , 1 9 50, p . 2; Oc t . 1 0, p . 3; Hay 26, p. 3; l"lay 
27- 8 , p . 1; also s e e Appendix A. 
15 . Esprit, Sept . 1951 , pp . 372- 4; Terre Humai ne , f1 ay, 1953 , 
pp . )7-48 ; Le ]tlonde, J?eb , 6 , 19 54 , p . 5:1; T~oie.:nar;e 
Chreti en , Apr . 9 , 1954, p . 3:1; also see A~oD endix A and no t es 
of Delfosse re Scission du I~ . L . ? . 
1 6 . t) e e _. pp end i x .:.· • 
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d j_stinctly secondary a.YJ.d subominate to the importance of 
human relations. The l'i . H . P . d oes not at all support a 
policy of laissez-fai re, vrhich is still essentially t h e 
policy of much of the French business world . 
On the other hand , rench businesses often seek to in-
sulate themselves a gainst the natural consequences of such a 
laissez- faire policy . In i ts foreign policy doctrine, the 
r·l . :t . P . stresses the need for economic pro gress as a reflec-
tion of the growth of economi c and social democracy . Fren ch 
business groups are v ery frequently oppos ed to the increase 
in competition that results from efforts at international 
economic progress . Finally , although the Ivl.R . P . in its 
domestic policy has opposed the increase of bureaucracy and 
has favored the re - esta blishm ent of initiative an1ong business 
executives , it wou l d appear that in practice t h e i mplementa-
tion of the !v1 . R . P . program of European integration would l e ad 
to a considerable extension of bureaucracy . French business 
exe cutives have unp leasant memories of bureaucratic control 
during the period of the second World 'rfar . 17 
·rhe only post-war business group cons idered without 
question by the l1l.R . P . leadership to be close to the party 
is of a social Catholic tendency . 18 In contras t, s ome of 
the most influential French business organizations have been 
17 . Einaudi and Goguel, QQ . cit., pp. 123-1 32 , 143- 5; 
Commom·real, July 22, 1949 , p . 360; also Appendix A (statement 
of Bosson) . 
18 . This is the Cercle du Patronat Chre'tien . See Appendix A. 
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opposed to the !vi . R . P . pro gram of l!.;uropean integration. The 
Conseil National du P atronat Franjais appears to be "afraid 
of ~urope" (in the words of a business s p ecialist i n t h e 
' ' ' I I . R . P . l e adership), and the Confederation Generals des P etits 
et Ivioyens Entreprises is even more conservative, not wanting 
t h e modernization of industry that is lik ely to follow inte-
~ t ~ 19 gration OL wes ern ~urope. 
-
S chuman had reassured members of the l'LR . P . that the 
European Coal and Steel Community v·iould not be controlled by 
vested interests. This possibility is exactly v;rhat troubled 
many leaders of l«.., rench industries . The French steel manu-
facturers were intensely annoyed at the Schuman Plan from 
the beginning , first because they had not been consulted, 
and secondly because many of t h em could only think of it in 
terms of a government cartel. It would seem that they pro-
jected their own cartel complex on the framers of t h e E. c. s . c . 
The chief manufacturers' association in France soon began to 
vmrn a gainst leaving control in the hands of 11 technicians 11 , 
and L 'Usine Nouvelle published the complaint that nations in 
t h e Plan would have to adjust themselves to German cond i tions~0 
19. Le Monde, J·an. 26, 1954, p. 5:4. Also Appendix A. 
20. L 1 Aube, I•Iay 11, 1950 , p . 3; Manchester Guardian Vieekly, 
May 25, 1950, p. 8; June 22, p. 3; Pickles, ~rench Politics, 
p. 207; For~ign Affairs, Apr., 1953 , p. 353; Chroniques de 
Politique Etrang~re, July-Sept., 1950, p. 523. 
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· ttacks by industry on t h e Schuman Plan continue<l inside and . 
outside the National Assembly from early 1951 to 1954. 21 
'rhe usual method of French pressure groups is not to 
oppose directly a Government that seems to be i n fri nging on 
its vested interest, but to wait and 'o.ppose it on some t h ing 
else . Si mil arly, industrial leaders were charged by Pflimlin 
of having cond ucted a press campaign a gai nst his 11 green pool" 
for a griculture in order indirectly to und ermine the S chuman 
P lan. Opposition to t his Pflimlin Plan for integration of 
European a griculture was at times either contradictory or 
unwarran ted . Commercial interests feared t he subordination 
of a griculture to a new bureaucracy at the srune time that 
oth er ind ustrial leaders oppos ed the special protection that 
t hey thought farmers would get. Others attacked the antici-
pated "omnipotent" hi gh authority which was no part o f 
P flimlin 1 s P.lan.22 
After the second iiorld \Var part of t he d omestic policy 
of t h e Ivl . H . P . had been to oppo se the increase of bureaucracy . 
Ho wever, the relations of the party with the powerful bureau-
cracy at t he llinistry of Foreign Affairs ( ~uai d 10rsay) 
appeared at times to be those of subservience rather than 
opposition . This was most evident in the development of 
, 
21. N. Y. Times , Sept. 21, 1950 , p . 16:2 ; Journel d es .iJ ebats , 
Nov. 20, 1953 , p . 5304; J:t..,orces Nouvelles, l-'I ar. 27, 1 9 54, 
pp . l' 6. 
22. Zs n rit, June, 19 53, pp. 8 27-8 48 ; Forces Nouvelles, 
supplement to no. 53, Jan. 2, 1954, pp . 22-3; Terre Humaine, 
June-July , 1953, pp . 108-113. 
M. R. P . policy toward. North Afri ca, but at certain points, 
specifically i n the fall of 1953, it was evident in the 
l\·: . R. P . support for European integration. When Bidault was 
on his vacation from his post of foreign minister in Septem-
ber of that year, a substitute draft for the European Poli-
tical Community, which minimized its supranational features 
and reasserted J?rench sovereignty had been prepared by 
permanent officials at the ~uai d 'Orsay. ·rhis "wrecking 
operation" failed not through the efforts o f the Ivi. R . P . 
leaft ers but through the action of non-M.R.P. Frenay. P erhaps 
by chance, perhaps not, M.R.P. leaders had nothing particular 
to say about this incident. 23 
M. R. P . Influence in the Press 
If the ties of the M. R. P . with labor and business groups 
were somewhat tenuous , they were as much so with the "Fourth 
Estate 11 , that is, the press. Communist parties usually have 
the advantage of a good "communication system"; 24 the same 
could not be said for the IYI . R . F . during the years within 
whi ch it was most actively seeking European integration. 
This was especially unfortunate for the :tvl.R . P . in view of 
its claim to be a movement, with the resultant need of exten-
sive contacts vlith the molders of publi c op inion that are to 
be found within French journalistic circles . 
23. N. Y. Times , Sep t. 27, 1953 , p . 1:5. 
24. Almond , 'rhe Appeals of Communism, p. 385 . 
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The newspap ers at one time d irectly connected wi th the 
l·L . P . i n cluded La Vie Catholique , L ' Aube ( edi t ed by Bidaul t 
in the 1930's), and the organ o f the p arty secretariat, 
Forces Nouvelles, vlh ich still appears b i-weekly. Other 
journals h aving had some aff inity with the party before 1 950 
, "" were Carrefour, La Tribune Economique, and Temoignag e Chre-
tien , a s well as the lvl . R. P . -insp ired review Poli tique, the 
last surviving until about 1948 . T&ffioignag e Chr~tien is 
sti l l close to t h e left wing of t h e H . R . F ., although its 
editors d isclaim allegiance to any party . Offsetting t his 
last journal is La Croix, with ri ght-1.ving affiliat ion. The 
newspaper most d irectly connected with t h e I1 . R . P . was L ' Aub e. 
Af ter h aving strongly resist ed t h e Nazis and Fascists in the 
1930's under t h e Eilitorship of Bi dault, it d ro pped in circu-
lation from 230,000 in 1946 to 45,000 in 19 51, and dis con-
tinued publication in July o f that year . The very imp ortant 
policy statements mcii. e by X-LR . P . l eaders in this journal 
fai l ed to have mu ch effect because of its small circulation 
in the last years of its life. 25 
The Parisian circulation of the 1-I.R. P .-o ri ente:i press 
· b lined after 1950, but the party fared better in the 
provinces, being represented especially by Ouest- France in 
, 
Brittany and Nord-Eclair at Lille. The fonmer was s t rong 
25. Havard de l a lvfon tagne, 2.2.. cit. , p . 202; !Jlarabu to, on . 
cit., p. 76. At its Pari s headquarters , 7 rue de Poissz, 
the ivi . R .F . also i ssued a journal for militants, I-1 . R . P . a 
l' Action. 
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:fina.Dcially and grew in circulation t o 516 , 000 in Au gust, 
1953. Otherwise a general regression of the M. R .• press had 
set in by 19 54. At the time of t h e expiration o f L 1 ube in 
19 51, critics were of the opinion that the newspaper h ad tied 
itself too closely to Government policy, and t hat the mili-
tants of the l• . R. P . were undermining its influence in seeking 
to p reserve t heir freedom of action a gainst t he p arty 
"dirigeants 11 in the Government coalition. 26 Af t e r a d etailed 
examination of L ' .Aube for t h e year prior to its demise, t he 
author would agree t h at the journal did appear to be quite 
uncritical of the Government , in contrast to other P arisian 
nevlspapers. It is especially fashionable in ..tt ranee to 
criticize the Government. 
In contrast to the Communists, the lvl.R . P . has been weak 
in h aving no newspaper organ in close contact with the 
farmers . The short-lived f..I. R . P . journal Terre Humaine, 
edited by Borne, had no connection with a gricultur e despite 
its name . First published in 1951, it met ru1 untimely death 
in 1953 wh ich was symp tomatic of the trouble t h e French p ress 
was having . Prices had risen , the number of newspapers h ad 
d oubled since 1944, and there was little ad vertising to pro -
vid e a source of income. The "free press of t h e Li beration 
26. Einaudi and Got;uel, 212.· cit., p. 163; Fauvet, QJ2.. cit., 
p . 194; Esprit, Apr ., 1954, pp . 593- 602; L ' Aube, f•I ay 19, 
19 50, p . 2; Ivl ay 22, p. 4; Au g . l, p . l; Terre Humaine, Sept., 
19 51' pp . 14-19. 
h ad succumbed to the implacable lo gic o f profit-and-loss 
accounting . 27 By 1954 M. R. P . influence in such centers of 
journalistic and intellectual activity as Paris was fast 
declining . The party was subjected to many attack s in the 
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very influential journal Esprit , whose acid-tongued editor , 
Domenach, chargEd the Terre Hum.aine staff with supporting 
too close contacts with 11imperialist Ameri ca". E.'ven the 
l'I.R . P . leaders app eared to give scant attention to t his 
temporary journalistic organ of theirs. 28 
One 1;1ay to make up for this decrease of influence in 
t h e realm of ideas as reflected through the press mi ght have 
been for ·.the party to carry on an a ctive campai gn to d evelop 
a politi c ally energetic citizenry ·on the local level that 
would b e sympathetic to the party program . This would have 
b e en in line 1;1i th the M. R.P . 's claim to be a movement. But 
by 1954, in the opinion of an earlier l eader of the f.1 . R . P ., 
Francisque Gay, one of the greatest weaknesses of the party 
was its failure to maintain direct contacts with pub lic 
o p inion and to stress t h e "civic spirit". 29 
In order for the I11I . H. P . to accomplish its purposes in a 
foreign policy so dynwJic as was its policy of Europeru1 
integration, so delicate as was that of relations with ussia 
28 . Reporter, Sept. 16, 1952, p. 9; Terre Humaine, Feb ., 1951 , 
pp . 35, 65-6; L' Aube, Feb . 13 , 1951, p . 1; Esprit, Oct.-Nov., 
1953, pp . 658- 660 . 
29. See footnote 25 in Chapter II on the Structure of the 
Ivl . R . P . 
and the United States, and so difficult as was its policy 
to v·rard the French Union and North Africa, the party needed 
many supporters. The N . ii. . P . was, it is true, at t h e center 
of a series of active groups in the Catholic orbit. But 
besides h aving the disadvantag es of bein6 a regional party, 
it lack ed prop er contacts with business, and viaS progress-
ively losing contact with labor and with the press during 
the period under consideration. 
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PART II 
EU.ttOPEi1 . N I l"rEGHATION 
Four Plans of Integration 
Between 1950 and 1954 four plans were either s p onsoi•ed 
or developed by the iv- .R.P. in its pro gram of European inte-
gratlon. ·rhese were the S chuman Plan, materializing in the 
European Goal and Steel Community, the Pleven Plan which led 
to a draft treaty for a European Defense Community, the pro-
posed plan for a European Politi c al Community, and finally 
the Pflimlin Plan for a 11 green pool 11 of European agricultural 
markets . Only the first mentioned plan , the E. C. B. C., has as 
yet been put i n to effect. It is problematical how familiar 
even the most enthusiasti c supporters of integration were 
with the d etails of these plans . Nevertheless, the Ivi . R . P . 
was committed to the principle of European integration, and 
to a greater or lesser degree to each o f the plans above. 
Hence it is necessary to be familiar to some extent with the 
· structures contemplated by t hese plans. 
1. The European Coal and Steel Community 
A fifty-year treaty providing for a European Coal and 
Steel Community was signed on April 18, 1951 and was ratified 
by the last of the six members ( France, the German Federal 
_Republic, Italy, Belgium , The Netherlands and Luxembourg) 
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in June, 1952. Five separate agencies were providEd for, a . 
High Authority, a Common Assembly , a Council of Minister-s, 
a Court of Justice ru1d a Consultative Co~nittee. The nine 
members of the High Authority are chosen directly or ind irect-
ly by the Council of :Ministers, and serve for six years. 
Actions o f the Authority are tak en by majority vote, and 
i n cluded in i ts functions are the issuance of directives to 
firms in the Community, securing access to records, initiating 
borro·wing and lending in the n ame of the Community , exacting 
punishments and fines for violations of its rules, and 
raising taxes. 
The lee;islative branch includes the Common Assembly and 
the Council of £linisters. The firs t is composed of 78 
members , with equal representation from t ranee, Viest Germany 
and Italy. Memb ers are named by the states from t h eir re-
spective parliaments, and meet in Luxembourg. The As sembly 
may by a. two-th iros vote censure the Authority or comp el it 
to resi gn . Recommendatio ns of the Authority mus t be approved 
by at least a. five-sixths vo t e of t he Council o f Ministers, 
who must concur especially for the granting o f loans or 
admission of a new indus try to the area. . "rhe Council gener-
ally acts by a. ma.jori ty vote, quali fied by the provision that 
the majority must include either France or Germany . If there 
is a tie vote with ~ra..nce and Germany on opposite sides , t he 
one i n clud i ng Germany will prevail. 
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The Court of Justice is 5iven the ri ght to nullify 
decisions of the three agencies already mentioned . Appeals 
may also be taken to the Court on t he basis o f errors of 
omission of the Au t hority. ·:rhe seven members o f the Court 
are appointed to a six- year term by at;reernent of the member 
governments . al l o f the judgments of the Court are execu-
tory, requiring for their effect further action of member 
governments . 
The Consultative Committee is aO. visory in c apacity and 
repre s ents in equal numbers three e conomic group ings: 
producers, labor, and consumers . 
The principles o f the trea ty, which applies specifi cally 
onl y to t h e European territories of its members, i nvolve the 
development of a common market in coal and steel to reduce 
costs to producer and co n sum er, anCi. elimination of restric-
tive practices 1llhi ch can lead to the closing o f the most 
i neffi ci ent plants . The Hi gh Authority has powers to provide 
ne\v i nvestment, and it must help to readjust Horkers who have 
been affected adv ers ely by the force of competition. It must 
approve of mer gers, can act to prevent dumping , and can exert 
pri ce controls in p eriods of "manifest crisis 11 , with maximum 
prices and consumption priorities in periods of s hortage , or 
production quotas i n peri ods o f' surplus . It cannot, howeve r , 
actually clo se mines nor compel investments . 
Transition periods were p rovided for the pur'Pose of 
e liminating tariff restrictions grad ually and equalizing cost 
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eonditions in t h e member countries . 1 
2 . ·rhe European Defense Community 
On ,. ay 27, 19 52 the same six nations that are members 
of the E . C. cl .C. si gned the European Defense Community Treaty . 
The r.rreaty, also of fifty years duration , co nte nplated a 
common procurement of suppl i e s by JI; .D . C. authoriti es , and a 
co mmon military com..rnand iJy t he SHAPE official s o f IT . A . '.r . o . 
r ~ ational u nits were to be no larger t h an d ivisions . Until 
the f o rmation of a European ~~.rmy , voting was t o be equal 
between France , Hest Germany and Italy , which to ·ether had 
over three- fifths of all votes . 
Four a3encies were to b e created by t h e trea ty, a · 
Co illiil issariat , an Assembly , a Counci l and a Court of Justice . 
The Commissariat of nine with a six- year tenure woul d handle 
admi nistration, but would also be a supranational aut hority 
acti ng by majority vot e , and controlling all military 
appointments above m.ational unit commanders. 
The Assembly v1as to be the same as that o f t h e E. c . s . c . 
with t h e additio n of t h ree mor· e rep resentatives from t he 
three larger states . It mi ght by a two t h irds vot e d ischarg e 
t h e Commissariat . ·:rhe Council, compos ed of one gover·nmental 
representative of each member stat e , was to issue directives 
1 . i•Iaterial based. on a paper of the writer 1.vhi ch in turn was 
based on: Office of the High Commissioner for Germany , 9th 
Heport on Germa."ly , p . 4; The Economist , Jul y 5 , 1952 , p . 28 ; 
In t e rnational Organization, Au g ., 1952 , p . 464 e t seq .; 
Commonweal, Mar . 21 , 1952 , p . 588 . 
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to t h e Co mmiss ari a t. In case of a tie vote, a p rovi sion \vas 
mad e t hat t h e sid e that represented two - thi rd s of t he total 
contributions would wi n . The Court of Justice was t o be t he 
s ame as t hat under t h e ~ . c . s . c. 
This defensive treaty p rovid ed for t h e stationing of 
forces in t h e "territories in Europ e that li e within t h e 
region d efined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic •rreaty". 
F . .A . T . O . gave the embryonic E .D .C. a guarantee t h at an armed 
attack on a member of t h e E . D . C., or in t h e a rea co ver ed b y 
Article 6 of t h e North Atlantic Treaty, would au tomatically 
call into eff ect rticle 5 of t h e latter. The Senat e o f t h e 
United States ratified this in July, 1952 . In add ition, the 
United Ki nsiom gave the E . D.C. a separate ~uarantee t h at while 
it was a member of N. A. 'r. o . it would support t h e Europ ecm 
Defense Community under the p rovisions of Article 51 of the 
Uni tea. l.Tations Charter. 
The military provisions of the treaty contemplated a 
to t al force of 55 divisions at the end of three y e ars. Of 
t h e stand ing 40 divisions, France was to have fourteen, ~'i est 
2 Germany tv1elve and Italy eleven. 
3. The Europ ean Political Co~nunity 
Article 38 of the European Defense Community 'rreaty pro-
vid ed t h a t at t h e end of six months (after ratification) the 
2 . IJiaterial bas ed on a paper of the writer Hhich in turn was 
based on: Summary of ti'eaty in N. Y.Times, May 28 , 1952, p . 
14. 
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¥ .D . C. Assembly s hould make specific proposals for a Europe~ 
po litic al authority with a permanent democratically elected 
assembly , whose main function would be to coo.niinate defense 
po licy . lluring the fall and ·winter of 1952- 3 a twenty-six-
member pre-cons tituent commi t te e eng a ged in draft i n g a char-
ter for a European political community such as cont emplated, 
and the basic plan \V'as rea~y by March . 
Al l the terr i tory belonging to the six nations that vrere 
to be members of t h e E .D .c. was to come under the jurisd ic-
tion of t he 11 European Community" unless exemp tions were 
declared at t he time o f ratification. The l egi slature was to 
be composed of t wo houses with five-year t e rms , the lo wer 
chamber t o be chosen by d irec t election, employing propor-
tional representation. France was to have t he maximum seats 
for any member (70) with Ital y and \''lest Germany follo-vring 
with Sixty-three each. The Senate would be composed of t he 
national members of the six states i n t h e Consul tative Assem-
bly of the Council of Europe , would have a veto po wer, and 
also would elect, b-iV · absolute majority vote, the 11president 
of £urope". In turn he would choose a six member cabinet, 
subject to the app roval of both houses, and sitting with this 
cabinet or council would be the president o f the High Author-
ity of t he E. c.s .c. and the c h airman of the .~!. . D . C . Commiss ariat. 
Wide powers were provided for the Community in the field 
of foreign affairs, 1'11 th respect to the appointment of diplo-
matic rep resentatives and the negotiation with non-memb ers 
and vrith other international organizations. A special 
protocol provided for an annual report to the Council of 
"'urop e . 'ii th reference to economic matters , provision was 
made for the gradual removal of economic barriers. For t h e 
first year of its existence no initiative would reside in 
t h e l!..;uropean Community, but in t h e following five years 
b arriers could be removed by unanimous consent o f the Com-
mittee of national ministers t h at was to be an ad junct of 
t h e Community , and subsequently by their majority vote plus 
a t wo-thirds vote of both houses of the legislature.3 
4. The P flimlin Plan 
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'rhe P flimlin Plan existed in a state of susp ended anima-
tion for several years without ever taking definitive form. 
In June, 1950 P ierre P flimlin suggested a European a gricul-
tural pool . Early in 1951 , ur~er the sponsorship of t h e 
Council of Europe, a conference was held on t h is proposal in 
P aris. Not much was accomplished, part+y, , from the French 
standpoint, because of rising concern over how this would 
a f fect the farm subsidy system. 
In IV arch of 1952 another 11P reparatory Conf e rence on the 
Or ganization of European Agricultural Mark ets 11 was attend ed 
b y sixteen European states to consider two proposals, that of 
3 . ~ aterial based on paper of the writer wh ich in turn was 
bas ed on: Boston Herald , Dec. 21, 1952, p . 16; N. Y.Times, 
Fep.lo, 1953, p . ~;.Feb. 16; Feb . 18; Feb. 27, p. 9; Mar. 2; 
Mar. 10; ~ar. 6; Mar. 7; Mar . 11, 1953. 
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Pflimlin and a Dutch proposal. The forr..1er, being the J:t.,rench 
Government plan put into a somewhat definitive shape by 
Pflimlin in I~:l ay, 1951 , contrasted with the Dut ch plan in 
limiting a gri cultural integration to four commoditi es (wheat, 
vline , sugar, and dairy products), and in mal-\:ing the reduc-
tion of economic barriers subject to equalization of cost 
condi tions in the various countries. The utch proposal 
would have had reduction and equalization go hand in hand . 
The objectives of both were to rais e the standard of living , 
lo wer prices to consumers, eliminate impediments to trade, 
and expand specialized production. In June of 1 950, when he 
developed his plan , Pflimlin based i t on the argu1nent that a 
European organization of agriculture would support a modern-
ization program for industry by establishing confid ence in a 
continuing foreign market . 
The conference o f larch, 1952 approved the ideas implicit 
in the French and Dutch plans, and created a )forki n g P arty to 
prepare for a conference in the autumn to determine the 
constitution and powers of such a community as they would 
necessitate. One problem was Vlhether such a community would 
have supranational features. The previous year Charpentier 
(also of the i•I . ~ . P .) had presented a rather complete project 
to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe at 
Strasbourg. It was similar to the Pflimlin Plan but \"Tent 
beyond it to provide for a 11 high authority" such as that in 
the E .C.B. C. In commenting in 19 54 o n the failure of the 
governments concerned to take any further positive steps 
to\vard an agricultural pool, Pflimlin sugges ted to the 
writer that opponents may h ave confused the Charpentier 
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plan with h is, which he said contained no such supranational 
4 features . 
F . R. P . Suppo rt for Integra tion 
The principal purpose of the ··..r. . P . program of Europ ean 
integration was to solve the d i fficult Ger man proble,,~ . The 
party sou~~t to convince France , in particular, and western 
Europe in general, that a greater security could be achieved 
through the construction of a "Europe" . In t his way the 
party related its pro gram of integration t o what had at times 
approximated an almost pathological search for security. In 
supporting the Schuman Plan the M. R. P . emphasized t hat two 
objectives would be a ch ieved, one political and one economic . 
Europe would be freed. of the old feud between France and Ger-
many . At the sarn e time the incrustations on France 1 s national 
economy would be broken and the level of living would be 
raised in France as well as els ewhere.5 
4 . L ' Aube , June 24- 25, 19 50 , p . 3; June 13, p . l; i\f . Y. 'rimes, 
Mar . 29, 1952 , p . 3:7; Hanchester ·Juardian i' eelcl v , .Ap r . 3, 
1 952 , p . 9; L ' Aube , l111ar . 30, 19 51 , p . 1; 'I'erre Hum aine , IVJ.ay , 
1952, pp . 54- 64 ; Foreign Affairs , Oct ., 1952, pp . 106-113. 
5. L ' Aube , Ivi ay 27- 28, 19 50, p . 1; Dec . 11 , 1950 , p . 1; 
Luethy, Herbert , France Against Herself' , p . 335 . For a 
survey of the suc c ess of the E.c.s .c. five years after its 
official inception , see N. Y. 'I'imes, March 10, 1 9 58 , p . 33 . 
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P rior to the announcement of this S chuman P lan of 1950, . 
a new attitud e towa:cd Germany was actually quite slow in 
d eveloping even within the ~ . R. P . At its con6ress of 19 45 
emphasis was placed on the need of k eeping Germany strictly 
within bouncis . 6 Even in early 1950 many M .~ . P . leaders 
seemed to desire no closer accord with Germany than .ttrance 
had with other countries of Europe. The "Atlantic Hi gh 
Council" proposed by Bid aul t at t h is time was to be open to 
all European countries, including ~ ussia. Its purpose was 
apparently to provide a fr ame into which r ·est Germ~11.y co uld 
be brought without admitting her directly to N. A. 'r . 0 . Robert 
Schuman had come closer to a new approach to t h e German prob-
lem vv-hen he declared in 1948 that the Ruhr problem must b e 
solved on a European basis . It was he who seized the initia-
tive as French foreign minister ·when in l'-i ay, 19 50 he pro-
posed an economic union between France and Germany in the 
production and distribution of the two basic commod ities of 
coal and steel. 
The suddenness of this step provided France with a 
tactical advantag e .7 The objective was also quite practical 
and realistic in contrast to the vagueness of many N . H . P . 
doctrines , although such vagueness is typical of parties in 
6 . Mouvement Republicain Populaire , Brochures, 1945-6; 
Motions, pp . 6-13 . 
7 . Manch ester Gua:D:1ia:n lleek ly, Ivl ay 18, 1950, p . 9; Forces 
Nouvelles,Dec. 20, 19 52, p . 6 ; N. Y. Times , Iviay 10, 1950, 
p . 1:8; L 1 Aube, pr . 3, 1950, p . 1; Apr . 18, p. 2. 
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France. 8 If the choice of coal and steel seems an arbitrary 
starting point for Europ eru~ integration, it must be remembered 
t h at the demand for steel is tied to investment policies, and 
the lat ter in turn h av.e a psycholo gi cal effect on the relative 
o p timism of business. French business needed a boost which 
was unlikely to come from any program of national economic 
integration within France alone, since in the past co nsol i-
d a t ion o f business in France h ad tended to preserve inef'fi-
cient units a gainst competition rather thru~ lead to greater 
efficiency.9 
ifficulties were of course involved in s etting suppo r t 
for t h e S chuman P lan . The very possibility of more efficiency 
resulting from the Schmnan Plan was partly respo nsible for 
the opposition to i t , De Gaulle, for example, oppos ed any 
organization composed of what he called "technocrats". Yet 
one o f the primary purposes o f the S chwnan Plan had b een to 
create an organization that would be ind ependent of French 
business group s, or rather would represent equally the 
interests o f employers, employees ru~d conswue Ps . S chuman 
had reassured the delegates at the N . rl . · • Co n L<:ress of 1950 
a gainst fearing control of the new h i gh authority by vested 
interests . 10 
8 . Neumann, Sigmund, Modern Political P arties , p. 117. 
9 . Terre Humaine, Feb . , 19 51, pp . 8 -22 . 
10. I'-'I a.nchester Guardian lieekly , J.I.Iar . 5 , 1953, p . 1; L 1 Aube, 
May 22, 1 950, p. l. 
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lfuen in turn the Plev en P lan for a 8urop ean army cmne 
up for discussion , diffi culties were immediately foreseen 
by various H . R. P . l eaders . In a National Committee meeting 
in October, 1950 Scherer referred to t h e legal problem of 
reanni ng a country still technically an enemy . l•1e ck argued 
that atomic po wer had transforme:i the whole nature of the 
German problem . There was also some confu sion about t h e 
d istin ction bet ween demilitarization and neutralization o f 
GeFillan y , as possible alternatives t o rea1~runent. 11 
Al t hough a charac teristi c: o f a "movement" is the r el a-
tive ab senc e o f individual s t ars , 12 this cannot be said for 
the ~I . H . P ., at l east in respect t o its pro gram of European 
integration. It may be true that in its d omestic policy 
t h ere Y.T ere no parti cularly outs tanding leaders , but ind i -
viduals we1"e closel y associated with mo st o f the phases of 
integration. Schuruan \'l as t h e spo nso r of the E C S C l3 . . . . ' 
P flimli n of the " green poo l 11 , and 'rei tgen vms t he most 
enthusi asti c backer o f the E . P . C. As an exception , no one 
in the lv1 • .H. . P . was particul arly e a ger to be come i d entified 
with the European Defense Community . 1 4 
11 . L ' Aub e , Oct . 23 , 1950 , p . 4; Oct . 24 , pp . 1, 4 . 
12 . Neumann , QQ. ci t., pp . 139- 140 
13 . But non- party man Monnet worked out the d etails . He was 
said by t h e N. Y. 'r i mes to have been t h e o ri ginator o f t h e i dea 
of an E . D. C. as wel l (Jan . 12, 1953 , p . 6:2 . ) . 
14 . L ' Au be , Jan . 15, 19 51 , p • 1 • 
86 
Robert S c11Uman of the l\ . R . P . i s a "special caserr . A 
devou t Catholi c and a bachelor, he is the most reli gious man 
in a religious party . Born in Lorraine , he had not become 
French until the time o f the Treaty of Versailles . Schuman 
had one "passionate dream" , whi ell was to end the Li'ranco-
German feud . In a tribute in 1950 to Be ch , foreign minister 
of Luxembourg , he said that "we people o :f the frontiers" 
were predestined to understand and resolve international 
problems . As an idealist , S chuman d iscounte:i part y or class 
considerations in his search for Franco-German understand ing. 
Although some found "nothing of ths revolutionary about this 
dry , p h le5ffiatic lawyer from Lo rrai ne 11 , an opponent said of 
h im d uring a debat e o n the S chuman P lan i n the r ational 
J1.ssembly : 
ones" .1 5 
" ·rhe greatest revolutionaries a r e the soft-sp olcen 
The seasoned po li tical o b server Raymond Aro n mad e the 
rather harsh observation t h at the whole Suropean policy of 
t h e •l.rt . F . was an "accident ". rhis seems to be inaccurate 
at least with respect to the 3 chu..rnan Plan . ' .. ,e have seen 
that the f-1. R .P . had been considering some such step f or some 
time. The situation was d i fferent , however, in the case of 
the proposal for a European · efense Community . ·ere, perhaps, 
:1-LR . P . support for the plan might be said to have oPi ginated 
15. ;:ihite , '.i'. H., Fire in the Ashes, pp . 261 - 2; L ' Aube, l\i ay 
30, 1950, p . 3 ; Catholic ·~rorld, J·an., 19 51 , p . 250 . ?or 
brief bio t;raphies of other l eaders , se e .Appendix B . 
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-\-n an· 11 accl· u.r1 en+" . 'nh -- r tv s l l tt d th t t ' 
..._ o, "' .L c· pa " a a i.V"lo e r>ec;rc; e a ne 
i s s ue had be en rais ed , a t l eas t a s early as 1950. S chuman 
d e cl a r ed. l a t e r , in June , 1952, tha t it wa s \.Yrong t o b e l i eve 
that t he .l!. . D . C. I.Yas an " es s en ti a l of Eu r opean i nte gr a t i on" . 
It \'laS r ather to have b e en t he f inal sta g e , but had been 
u nd ertaken s ooner t h an d es i red by the :L•LH .• P . 1 6 
Ev en i n t he c a s e o f t he E . D . C., howev er, c ertain I·' . R . P . 
l eader s had had a h and i n t he prelimi n a r i es . ~s e a r l y as 
Au 3us t, 1 9 50 Tei t gen and Bi dault had suggested step s to wa rd 
a comm.on d efense of wes t ern Eu r ope , and S chuman had s t ood 
a lo n e i n S ep t ember a g a i n s t t h e p ropos al b y other N. A . T . O . 
17 Cou n cil members f o r - German n a t i onal rearmamen t. 
I t was a t t h is t i me , in S ep t ember , 1 9 50 t h a t General d e 
Gaull e h ad become t he c a t a l y tic a gent f o r t h e d evelopmen t o f 
a Eu rop ean Political Communi t y vvhen h e a s k ed, " Ho \•r can one 
s e riou sly co n c eive of a European army wh en Europ e d oes not 
exi st? "1 8 H . R . P . l ead ers co n c eded t hat t he adop tion of t he 
E . D . C. alone wou l d h a ve p u t the cart befo r e t h e ho r s e . !-I enc e , 
if t h e E . D . C. vras an a ccident i n M: . H. P . f orei e;n pol i cy , s o 
vra s t h e E . P . C . .And prior to the fall o f 19 52 party l eaders 
1<rer e in no p a r ticular hurry i n c reating such a :90li tical 
commu ni ty . l9 
1 6 . See Append i x A; also Fo r c e s Nouvell es, J une 5 , 1 9 54 , p . 7. 
1 7 • L ' Aub e , Au .. • 2 5, 1 9 50 , p • l ; Aug . 26 - 7 , p • l ; S ep t • 20 , 
p . l . 
1 8 . l'L. Y. 'r i mes , .Sep t . 21, 1950 , p . 5 :5; Oc t . 26 , p . 8 : 4 . 
1 9 . I b i d . , Dec . 31 , 1951 , p . 1 :1; Lond on ·r i mes, No v . 6 , 1951 , 
p . 5b ; Le e . 1 , p . 6 g ; .. 'orces J.'Jouvelles , Ivia y 30 , 1953 , p . 8 . 
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One other project in the program of European integration, 
the Pfl1mlin Plan, is if anything even more clearly iden-tified 
w1 th the M.R.P. leadership than \'laB the Schuman Plan. Schu-
man is from Lorraine; the originator of the 'green pool" for 
agriculture, Pierre Pflimlin, is from neighboring Alsace. 
The retention of the ministry of agriculture in French Gov-
ernments between 1947 and 1951 had given Pflimlin a chance to 
become familiar with the subject. In 1947, referring to 
France's status as an international debtor, he argued that a 
European plan should be quickly drafted to create a "favor-
able" climate for exporters (but the -unfavorable climate ror 
French exporters was very much the result or the system of 
French quotas and tariff walls). 
This European plan for an agricultural pool was not 
quickly drafte9,; in fact, we have seen how it petered out 
after having been considered in two conferences by some six-
teen European states. At the M.R.P. congress of 1954 it was 
Pflimlin who recalled the attention of' the delegates to the 
economic phase of the construction of Europe, especially to 
his "green pool''. Not only had the party recently given 
scant attention to the Pflimlin Plan, but it had also begun 
to soft-pedal proposals within the M.R.P. for support of the 
Dutch Stikker Plan for a common European market. Aa early as 
July, 1950, Schuman had declared that this Stikker Plan would 
not conflict with the Schuman Plan. But throughout the years 
~ince then, reference to such a scheme for a common market 
in M.R.P. circles was conspicuous by 1 ts absence. 20 
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There may be two reasons for this. First, it is to be 
remembered that the Pflimlin Plan was diametrically opposed 
to the Dutch Plan in contemplating integration of only a 
few agricultural commodities and in favoring reduction of 
trade barriers only after costs had been equalized inter-
nationally (are they ever?). Secondly, the plan for an 
E.P .a. included provision for gradual movement toward a com-
mon market; perhaps M.R.P. leaders were reluctant to see it 
developed outside of the shel taring wings of that community. 
Pluralism in European Integration 
In its leadership of a congeries of groups in the 
"European movement" the M.R.P. applied, consciously or uncon-
. 
aciously, its own doctrine of pluralism, however imperfectly 
M.R.P. leaders may have agreed upon the definition of this 
doctrine.21 One of the most internationally-minded of these 
groups, the N. E.I., explicitly pronounced itself in favor of 
pluralism in every domain. Bidaul t declared in 1951 that 
there is a need for defense against the growth of interna~ional 
/ 
20. Politique, Aug.-Sept., 1947, pp. 595-6; Journal des Debats, 
Nov. 20, 1953, pp. 5354 et seq.; Forces Nouvelles, June 5, 
1954, pp. 3, 7; Le Monda, June 1, 1954, p. 6:4; N.Y.Times, 
July 4, 1950, p. 20:5; Feb. 21, 1957, p. 3; see also Appendix A. · 
21. To Pflimlin, there was only an ideological significance 
to the term pluralism, that is, it implied a mutual recogni-
tion of conflicting ideologies in a positive sort of coexis-
tence. Borne understood pluralism to imply the "free confron-
tation,. of all groups. See Appendix A. 
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,monism, which would lead to the concentration o'£ power within 
a " si~gle group. 22 But the "European movement" with which the 
M.R.P. was so closely connected was limited in any efforts to 
develop pluralism by the inadequate contacts of the M.R.P. 
with business, labor, and intellectuals. As one examines the 
leadership of the various Catholic or quasi-Catholic groups 
involved in this movement, he is also struck by the recurr-
ence of the same relatively few individuals in positions of 
importance. Hence the breadth of influence essential for 
e'£fective operation of the European movement was limited by 
an "interlocking directoraten type of control found w1 thin 
it, especially since there was no outstanding leader among 
the group of interlocking directors in at least the M.R.P.-
oriented fraction of this movement. 
To the extent that pluralism was not reflected in the 
1•I .R.P. program of European integration, party practice was 
inconsistent w1 th party doctrine. On the other hand, to the 
extent that pluralism ~ present, it provided a particular 
obstacle to successful development of the program. For 
pluralism attacks the sovereignty of the state in the process 
of obliterating its uniqueness among human associations. 23 
The idea of sovereignty had been developed by the Frenchman 
Bodin; sovereignty had reached its zenith under the Sun King, 
22. Le Monda, Jan. 14, 1954, p. 1; Jeune Europe, no. 23 
(num. sp.) p. 7 et seq.; L' Aube, Jan •. -15, 1951, p. 3. 
23. Readings in Recent Political .Ph1losophy, pp. 528-537. 
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~ouis XIV. Time after time, in debates on European integra- . 
tion, members of the National Assembly were admonished by 
orators to protect French sovereignty. Charges of treason 
were leveled against M.R.P. sponsors of the supranational 
communities that were being considered. This was especially 
true in the case of the E.D.c., whose supranational features 
have been summarized above: 24 
In an attempt to counteract these attacks, M.R.P. 
leaders reminded their hearers in the National Assembly of 
the party's record in the Resistance. The party president, 
Tei tgen, also argued that France's mission had always been 
to undertake "crusades"; her mission today was · to make a 
"Europe". Bidaul t declared, in the same National Assembly 
debate of February, 1952, that France was in line with her 
oldest tradition in supporting a European Defense Community. 
There are three things for which men die, he said: a ''coin 
de terre" (piece of land), their nation, and an idea. 25 
24. Journal des Debats, Nov. 17, 1953, pp. 5187-5193 ("You 
are French", one speaker told his hearers "in al~ the _ fibers 
of your being, protect your nationality!"~; .L' .Annee Poli tigue, 
1952, p. 342; Terre Humaine, Nov., 1952, .p. 108. In August, 
1954 the "grand old man 11 Herriot was one of the only two 
speakers allowed bef'ore .. a final vote on the E.D.c. "On the 
threshold of death", he said, "let me tell you .. that E.D. 0. is 
the eni of France". New Yorker, Sept. 11, 1954, p. 80. 
25. Ouest-France, Apr. 6, 1954, p. 1:1; Journal des D~ats, 
Feb. 131 1952, pp. 677-683, also p. 695, Beb. 12, pp • .. 573-6. Tei tgen s reference to "croisades" was an .unfortunate choice 
of' words, since at the time the idea of' a "crusade" to 
liberate Eastern Europe was particularly distasteful to the 
French. Bidaul t' s reference to a ''corner of land" appealed 
to the property-conscious French, ever fear:ful of . losing 
some o:f their land to Germany again. 
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By his o:rU~r of priority, Bidaul t demonstrated that nation-
alism was superior to other considerations in his own mind. 
In France the state, in its growth, has tended to choke 
off rivals for power such as the Church. 26 It could be that 
the M.R.P. adopted pluralism with the underlying if uncon-
scious purpose of counteracting this tendency in the inter-
ests of the Church. It was relatively easy for the party to 
sponsor pluralism in the program of European integration 
because of its close contacts with the transnational com-
mun1 ty of the Catholic Church. But the narrowness of J.1 .R.P. 
group contacts on the domestic scene aggravated its diffi-
culties in trying to develop this program. 
Functionalism 
Although M.R.P. leaders did not directly connect the 
party doctrine of pluralism with the program of integration, 
pluralistic qualities were to be found in the functionalism 
implicit in three of the four plans in the program. Emphasis 
on functionalism was found in the Schuman Plan, which mater-
27 ialized into the E.c.s.c. For functionalism involves the 
creation of a new and separate center of control over a par-
ticular field of economic, political or social activity. It 
26. Occidente, yol. 1t• no. 5, 1955, p. 411. 
27. Politique Etrangere, Nov., 1952, pp. 321-332; Revue de 
Paris, Apr., 1951, p. 6; L' Aube, Aug. 16, 1950, p. 1; Aug. 
18, p. 3. The Schuman Plan represented a decisive choice of 
method, ani the only practical one, since it was clear that 
Europe could not be made over at once. 
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1s the functional approach to set up some such high authority 
as was founi in the E.c.s.c. which is not subordinate to the 
sovereignty of any particular state, and which is oriented 
about the performance of a parti cular political, economic or 
military function. A prime objective of functionalism in 
the international field, as also of pluralism, is to cut down 
the centralized control of states. 
The Pleven Plan for an E.D. C. haP. been an expression of 
functionalism in that it contemplated only the creation of a 
common army w1 th sui table consultative machinery or controls 
such as a legislative body. But this necessitated a common 
foreign policy, and eventually a provision was incorporated 
in the E.D.C. Treaty, which had been drafted under the gui-
dance of Schuman, to the effect that within six months of 
ratification steps were to be taken to create such a politi-
cal community. 
At first it seems difficult to detect functionalism and, 
therefore, pluralism in the M.H.P. project for a European 
Political Community. If a common European foreign policy 
was the goal of the E.P.C., the project seemed to be closer 
to federalism, with its division of power in the broader 
sense between different levels of gpvernment. Moreover, if 
a common European foreign policy was supposed to be created 
through such an organization, this development would seem to 
lead toward monism, with its centralization of power, rather 
than toward pluralism. As far as party doctrine is concerned, 
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,the M.R.P. would appear to have been contradicting itself in 
its support for the E.P.C. However, M.R.P. leaders sought 
in some instances to eliminate the element of a common 
foreign policy from the competence of an E.P.C., thus mini-
mizing the monistic characteristics of this plan and at the 
same time bringing it closer to the functional approach. 28 
In fact, Pflimlin argued that a common foreign policy could 
not exist in an organization comprising nations some of 
which had, and some had not, w1satisfied territorial claims. 
Therefore he contended that the E.P.C. would be neither 
federation nor confederation, e1ince both types of political 
organizations require the presence of a common foreign 
policy. 29 
The multiplicity of plans of integration, one coming as 
it were on the heels of another•, created in itself an ob-
stacle for the M.R.P. Instead of providing for "too little, 
too late" the party subjected itself to the criticism of 
seeking too much, too soon. Especially in a unitary state 
like France where there is distaste for any quasi-federal-
istic arrangement, if the M.R.P. had confined itself to more 
practical functional plans in the proper sense like those of 
Schuman and Pflimlin (ani Stikker), the party might have been 
more successful in the long run. Less than three years after 
28. Journal of Political Econo~, v. 61, Apr., 1953, p. 169. 
29. See Alpendix A. Considering Pflimlin's rising status in 
the party by 1956 he had risen to be party president), his 
opinion was likely to bear considerable weight. 
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,the M.R.P. congress of 1954, six western European BPVernment~, 
including that of France, agreed on a common market and also 
on an atomic energy community. The structure of these two 
new communi ties is to be patterned to a great extent upon 
that of the M.R.P.-sponsored E.c.s.c., which the former is 
to absorb. 30 
Strategic Retreats 
M.R.P. doctrine as reflected in party publications made 
much of the disregard by the M.R.P. for electoral success or 
failure in the pro cess of sponsoring certain "values" in 
politics. It was the belief of party leaders that some of 
these values were to be achieved through the program of inte-
gration. But these leaders had continuously to conciliate 
other political groups within France in order to participate 
in the Government and thereby to maintain the continuity of 
this program. This participation of the Ivi .R.P. in poll tical 
leadership of France between 1944 and 1954 was quite unusual. 
Credit for the greatest frequency of appearance in some 
government post under the fourteen relatively permanent 
Governments between 1946 ani 1953 SPes to Schuman (twelve 
times), Bidault (eight times) and Buron (seven times), all 
of the M.R.P.31 Furthermore, for the ten years after 1944, 
with the exception of one month, a member of the M.R.P. was 
30. N.Y.Times, Feb. 21, 1957, p. 3. 
31. Yale Review, Autumn, 1953, p. 2. 
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in charge of the Foreign Ministry. 
Not only did M.R.P. leaders conciliate other groups in 
domestic policy in order to preserve the chance to achieve 
their goal of integration, but they had to compromise as well 
within this area of their foreign policy.32 In fact the 
support of the European Defense Community in itself repre-
sented such a compromise. The Pleven Plan of October, 1950 
for such a community had been devised as an alternative to 
the German national rearmament which had been supported by 
all participants at the recent N.A.T.o. Council meeting 
except French Foreign Minister Schuman (M.R.P.). Many mem-
bers of the M.R.P. disliked this plan for a military com-
munity, and did not agree with their president Teitgen when 
he argued that the creation of an E.D.C. would be a continu-
ation of a "leftist" policy. It appeared to them that the 
-
party was being forced continually closer to the political 
"right" in France. 33 In turn, the European Poll tical Com-
munity represented a compromise by M.R.P. leaders, since it 
was to many of them an unwanted child of the E.D.C., having 
been called into existence because of the incongruity of the 
32. A detailed consideration of these compromises will appear 
in the last chapter. ,_ 
33. L'Aube, Feb. 17-18, 1951, p. 3; Nord Eclair Jan. 12, 
1954, p. 1:1 • . Bidault later credited the Quai d'orsay with 
a principal hani in the formulation of the policy of European 
integration. If that was true, the permanent officials there 
imposed, if anything, "rightist'' checks on the program. 
Le Monde, Apr. 24, 1954, p. 4:4. 
attempt to create a common army in the absence of any 
machinery to create a common f()reign policy for Western 
Europe. 34 
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It is striking to observe the transition from an unusual 
willingness of some of the M.R.P. leaders to compromise in 
the earlier stages of the program of European integration to 
a peculiar degree of inflexibility in the later stages, 
especially after the beginning of 1954.35 In general there 
appeared to be a doctrinal preference by M.R.P. leaders for 
conciliation rather than compromise. In other wol'is, rather 
than to 11 give in" on certain points, they were inclined to 
"hold back", to procrastinate, to bide their time until the 
mood of others had been changed, in order to allow the party 
to achieve its original purpose. But time was not working 
in favor of the M.R.P. Although the patience and tenacity 
of this self-styled "party of t.omorrow"36 in a series of 
coalition Governments reflected its desire to conciliate, it 
also resulted in a degree of tolerance which was unusual in 
the realm of politics ani probably unwise from the party's 
stanipoint because of the effect upon 1 ts own foreign policy 
program. 
34. N.Y.Times, Mar. 11, 1953, p. 28:2. 
35. See last section of the last chapter. 
36. L'Aube, May 27;8, 1950, p. 3. 
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Obstacles to Integration 
In the context of contemporary European politics and 
power relations the M.R.P. objective of European integration 
is quite realistic. Such a conclusion presupposes, however, 
some agreement that even in power politics there is a certain 
"safety in numbers". In other words, a balance of power is 
more precarious when it is confined to a balance between only 
two large powers, such as the United States and Russia. If 
western Europe could develop into a third "power" through 
some appreciable development of integration, then it might 
exert a moderating influence on the other two. This is the 
meaning of the statement that the M.R.P. policy of integra-
tion was realistic. 
Despite the failure of three of the four Ji-i.R.P. -sponsored 
plans, party success lay in the preservation of the idea of 
integration, at least, through the E.c.s.c. until such time 
as later plans like Euratom and the European common market 
could materialize. Perhaps the idea of integration wa.s a.s 
potent a.s the fact of further integration might have been. 
For one thing, the project for a. European Defense Community 
pushed Russia and the three western powers together at least 
to the extent of carrying on extensive negotiations in 1954.37 
At least some of the M.R.P. plans for integration appear 
to have been adopted by accident, or else as an escape from 
37. Forces Nouvelles, June 5, 1954, p. 3; Commonweal, Dec. 
11, 1953, p. 249. 
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difficulties existing within France. 38 Moreover, politician~ 
might well have been the most ardent supporters of the "con-
struction of Europe", since the resultant development of an 
international bureaucracy and international legislatures 
would provide them additional employment~ But whatever the 
motives or whatever the origin of the program of integration, 
members of the M.R.P. were very closely connected with it at 
least until 1954.39 Although critics might be inclined to 
compare this pertinacity of the "Catholic Party" to the 
Catholic approach toward elements of the "dogma", this would 
-
be inappropriate criticism since well-reasoned arguments 
supporting such programs as the E.D. C. were developed by 
party leaders in answer to the ·t.elling points made against 
them by the unconvinced within as well as outside the M.R.P. 
The I"1:.R.P. certainly had tc> meet considerable opposition 
in supporting its program of integration. Besides the busi-
ness groups already referred to, there were other opponents, 
such as the National Committee :t'or the Defense of France and 
the French Union, inbluding two hunired members of the French 
Parliament, and another "International Conference of Countries 
Concerned in the European Defense Communi tyn. The tactics of 
the latter were illustrated by their "one belief in common: 
38. Vie Intellectuelle, Apr., 1950, pp. 408-417; also Appen-
dix A. In his recent book Luethy asked whether a new type of 
entrepreneur will spring up, if it is accepted that the solu-
tion for economic troubles is European union. See review in 
Occidente, loc. cit., p. 414. 
39. Wh1 te, Q!l. cit., p. 277. 
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anything is better than war; the E.D. C. would lead to war; 
- 40 hence anything is better than the E.D. C. In a way the 
opposition of some such groups as the above was an indirect 
compliment to the M.R.P., in view of the party's economic 
and political objectives in the program of int~gration.41 
No particular constitutional obstacle stood in the way 
42 of the M.R.P. program. But there were many other diffi-
culties. Some of these were found in the haste to build a 
bulwark against communism, the fear of a resurgent Germany, 
and the uncertainties as to what type of "Europe" and how 
large a "Europe" should be built. Some M.R.P. leaders 
-
recognized that considerable time was needed to revamp a 
French foreign policy which prior to 1940 had been oriented 
around preservation of the status quo. 43 Unfortunately, 
time was not running in favor of the M.R.P. 
One of the main reasons for the party' a program of Euro-
pean integration was the need to enfold dangerous Germany 
40. N.Y.Times, Aug. 29, 1953, p. 4:3; Mar. 21, 1954, p. 12:3. 
41. For detailed examples of Communist, Socialist and Gaul-
list opposition to the M.R.P.t see: N.Y.Times, July 4, 1950, 
p. 20:5; Sept. 13, 1951, p. 1~:3; Feb. 26, 1953, p. 9:4; May 
16, 1951, p. 17:1; May 24, 1950, p. 13:1; L'Aube, June 9, 
1950, p. 3; Oct. 28-9, 1950, p. 1; Jan. 8, l_S51, ~· 3; Esprit, 
Dec. 1951, p. 855; Chroniques de Politique ttrang~re, July-
Sept., 1950, p. 522; Manchester Guardian Weekly, Dec. 18, 
1951, p. 3; Politique Internationale, Jan., 1952, -p. 19; News 
From France, Jan. 15, 1950, p. 1. 
42. With resp~ct to the question of constitutionality, see: 
Journal des Debate, Nov. 20, 1953, pp. 5363-5, and p. 12 of 
a special pamphlet on Bidault'a speechjf this time; N.Y.Times, 
Feb. 20, 1954~ p. 3)2; Mouvement European, Douze Lettres sur 
la Communauter de Defense, 1954, espec. pp. 57-60. -
43. Manchester Guardian Weekl;y:, Mar. 30, 1950, p. 15; Foreign 
Affairs, Apr., 1953, p. 356. 
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within some sort of European framework. Germany had always 
needed a ''myth", said Tei tgen of the M.R.P. to its Congress 
of 1953; give her one, therefore, in that of "Europe". But 
the myth of German unity was gradually replacing the myth of 
"Europe" in the minis of many Germans. 44 
The fear of Germany penetrated many political groups in 
France, including the M.R.P. itself. M.R.P. leaders devel-
oped elaborate arguments in party periodicals demonstrating 
how much less dangerous Germany would be if incorporated in 
a. European community; But these arguments did not reach the 
ears of enough people. M.R.P. leaders in Parliament did not 
speak up clearly enough nor frequently enough to overcome 
fears engendered by the frequent warnings of other political 
leaders against Germany. 45 Elderly M.R.P. leaders like Schu-
man were aware of the dangerous parallel between the develop-
ment in Franco-German relations after 1945 and that of the 
1920's. But even within party circles they did not present 
this lesson of history frequently enough to the attention of 
younger members of the party. 46 
As important as the haste and the fears was the uncer-
tainty within the M.R.P. over what Eu:rope should be con-
structed. Was it to be one of six nations or of more, one 
44. Forces Nouvelles, May 30, 1953, p. 8; L'Aube, Apr. 8-9, 
1950, -P· 1. ·· - L 
45. N.Y.Times, Nov. 20, 1953, p. 8:4; Journal des Debats, 
Nov. 18, 1953, pp. 5242, 5247; Nov. 20, pp. 5354 et -seq. 
46. See Appendix A. Also L'Aube, Nov. 17, 1950, p. 1. 
There was also, of course, the fear of a "crusade" against 
communism. 
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}ncluding Engl. ani or not, one with general powers in the 
field of foreign policy or only with specific functions, and 
if the latter, which? Europe meant different th~ngs to 
different people. 47 
An especially difficult problem for the party was 
whether Englani should be counted as part of this Europe. 
Maurice Schumann of the M.R.P., troubled by England 1 s refusal 
to join France in developing the Schuman Plan, commented that 
one wonders sometime whether England is European. The only 
way to find out, he concluded, was to make a Europe. Bidault 
told the National Assembly in November, 1950 that they could 
not wait forever for the British. The latter might follow 
after; it was France's experience, said Bidault, that the 
-
British are "the ••• readiest to assume responsibilities that 
. 
are not theirs". The Labor Government in Great Britain had 
been concerned about the lack of socialist representation in 
the drafting of the Schuman Plan. If there were an attempt, 
said Bidaul t, to make a socialist Europe, a liberal Europe, 
or a Christian democratic Europe, there would never _be one. 
"Let us aA.vance", he concluded,, "with those who choose to 
foo llo w us. u48 
47. In his journals written soon after the end of World War 
II :Mauriac, who was at first a member of the M.R.P., reminded 
his readers that the Germans had 4istorted for the French the 
idea of .. 'Europe". "When a FreJ::tchman said 'before everything, 
I am a European!, we knew that it meant, 'I have chosen to be 
a traitor'" Journal, vol. 4, p. 42. Time, Jan. 10, 1955, 
p. 19. - . 
48. L'Aube, June 22, 1950, p. 3; Nov. 16, p. 1; Nov. 28, p.3. 
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Of course Christian democrats would be clearly in a 
minority in a Europe that included either England or Scandi-
navian states. But even if this had been a consideration, 
definite handicaps existed in disregarding Great Britain 
while creating a Europe of "Six" such as was founi in the 
E.c.s.c. Without Great Britain, said de Menthon of the 
M.R.P., a Europe of Six would not only run the risk of German 
hegemony but also would be relatively weak in controlling 
supplies of raw materials from overseas territories. Al-
though M.R.P. leaders were agreed that they must start with 
a Europe of Six, Te1 tgen ani de Menthon in particular sup-
ported the Eien Plan providing for close ties between England 
and the Council of Europe, which in turn was to be linked 
with the "Six". 49 
Within France, the M.R.P. leadership had to seek ways of 
reconciling the pluralistic implications of the program of 
European integration With the dema.nis of the staunch defen-
ders of French sovereignty. In November, 1953, for example, 
Bidault argued equivocally that a new formula must be found 
for the European Political Community, providing for "sov-
ereign states exercising supranational functions". Thus he 
49. Terre Humaine, June-July, 1953, pp. 51-6; Forces Nou-
velles, May 301 1953, p. 8; Dec. 20, 1952, special no. 3; Nouvelles de 1 Europe, nos. 29-30, Sept.-oct., 1952, p. 21; 
Report of Speech, P .H. Tei tgen a·t Venice, Apr. 29, 1953, pp. 
6-7, 21-3. With respect to Eden's appeal that the fullest 
use be made of existing institutions, Schuman said, "What a 
typical British anxiety, and how I wish it were more .often 
a French anxiety!" London Times, Sept. 25, 1952, p. 4d. 
saw the E.P.C. as expressing some sort of a combination of 
functionalism and nationalism; in fact at this time he 
specifically rejected the interpretation of the E.P.C. as 
either a federation or confederation.5° 
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Besides being very cautious about injuring French sensi-
bilities on the question of rights of sovereignty, the M.R.P. 
had to be very careful about prospective relations between 
the European Political Community and the French Union. 
Should the French Republic {the French Union minus Inio-
China) be admitted to the E.P.C. in its entirety? Taitgen 
alleged that this would prevent a split in French Overseas 
territories which was being fostered by Anglo-Saxon propa-
ganda for a ''Uni tad States of Africa". The final draft of 
the E.P.C. treaty provided that the French Republic itself 
could arrange for the progressi va participation of its compo~ 
51 nent parts in the E.P.C. 
France is paradoxically caught between nostalgia for 
the past and a search for new solutions. During the debate 
on foreign policy at the M.R.P. Congress of 1950 Bidault 
struck a typically French note when he said, "There is soma-
-
thing against which one is never right ••• the nation" {N.B.-
not the "Government"). Hourdin of the M. R.P. commented elsa-
where that although a Frenchman. refuses to accept the idea 
50, N,Y,Timas, Sept. 27, 1953, p. 1:5; Nov, 21, p. 1; 
U,S,News, Nov, 20, 1953, p. 64. 
51, Forces Nouvelles, May 31, 1952, pp. 8, 11, 12; May 30, 
1953, p. 12, 
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of "Right or Wrong, My Country" in internal affairs, the idef!. 
was . doubtless well accepted as - to ttexteriors ",52 
The M.R.P. took its most nationalistic stand toward the 
troublesome Saar problem, In 1952 Schuman had told the 
executive body of the E.c.s.c. that "of course the French 
will never accept a pure and simple return of the Saar to 
Germany". In his bid for the premiership in June, 1953 
Bidaul t made a prior agreement on the status of the Saar a 
condition precedent (the French word was 11prlalable") for the 
settlement of the E.D.C. issue. Not until the Lilla Congress 
of 1954 did Schuman criticize the "sabotage" that had been 
-
carrie::l on by permanent officials of the Quai d 'Orsay to pre-
vent any alteration of the status of the Saar. 53 It was 
typical of the M.R.P. leadership not to attack such demon-
strations of nationalism until well after the event, if at 
all, 
It iS quite evident that there was a clash between the 
emphasis in M.R.P. doctrine on pluralism and a pluralistic 
internationalism and the nationalistic attitudes of certain 
members of the 1-'I.R.P. leadership, The doctrinal approach may 
have been the result of the close contacts of the M.R.P. with 
the transnational community of the Catholic Church. The 
ublini spats" of some leaders such as Schuman on the issue 
52. Occidente, loc, cit., p. 369; Terre Humaine, Sept., 
1952, p. 74. 
53. Nouvelles de l'Europe, S~t.-Oct., 1952, p. 9; N.Y,Times, 
June 11, 1953, p. 1:4. See also Appendix A. 
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of the preservation of aoverei~ty with respect to the pro-
~..-J 
gram of integration were partly due to the fact that they 
were in closer contact with this transnational community 
than other leaders. They were also partly due to the one-
eyed earnestness of these leaders in the program. For them, 
at least, integration was no "escape into Europe", but was 
an attempt at a positive and constructive solution of 
existing problema, especially that of Germany. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE M.R.P. AND THE COLD WAR 
Introductory Statement 
Besides its objective of European integration, a second 
principal objective of the M.R.P. was to maintain continuous 
contact between Russia and the West. According to party 
doctrine France• s proper role was that of mediator between 
the two blocs; to be against communism was too negative a 
stand. In the process of maintaining a bridge between East 
and West the Il.f .R.P. leaders re:fused to dramatize disturbing 
incidents, and sought to be patient but to negptiate with 
either side :from a position of strength. NeBPtiations also 
with China were :favored on the theory that this would keep 
Russia and China :farther apart. 
Its ideological opposition to blocs brought the M.R.P. 
close in some respects to the position o:f the "neutralists". 
In fact prior to 1951 an influential member of the M.R.P. 
was a leader of the neutralists. Yet the M.R.P. leadership 
:found it necessary to disavow neutralism especially because 
of its deleterious effect on the program of European integra-
tion. 
Despite the hints of neutralism within party ideology 
and despite personal ties with the neutralists, the ~I.R.P. 
was such a consistent supporter of United States :foreign 
policy that it was called the 11American party'' in France. 
In actual :fact it maintained at the same time quite an 
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independent and critical position toward the tenor of Ameri-
can policy. Especially did the M.R.P. oppose the idea of a 
"roll-back" policy or a 'brusade" against Russia. At the 
same time, however, the leaders of the M.R.P. were philoso-
phically opposed to compromises by France itself w1 th the 
Communist powers. For example, bargains were not to be made 
with them in Asia to facilitate the program of European inte-
gration. Strictly speaking, it was the policy of the party 
to conciliate (mollify, gain, win) rather than to compromise 
-(make a settlement by concessions). The M.R.P. leaders, 
guided by the belief that one compromise inevitably led to 
others, sought to reduce friction between East ani West and 
await the moment when their foreign policies might more 
easily be achieved. 
The M.R.P. Seeks a Middle Way 
In classifying French parties, one is considerably justi-
fied in placing the M.R.P. beyond the Radical Socialists and 
the Communists rather than between them. For M.R.P. ideology 
opposes capitalism as well as communism on the ground that 
both stress material values over human values. Individual-
istic liberalism, said the M.R.P. intelectuals Gilson and 
Gortais, had provoked a concentration of economic power. As 
a result of the inadequacies of such "liberalism", a philo-
sophy of collectivism had arisen. But the collectivism of 
the Communists is just as foreign to the temperament of the 
M.R.P. intellectuals as is individualistic liberalism. To 
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their minis there is something insulting in the word "mass". 
Both materialism and individualism, said Robert Schuman, are 
generators of egoistic divisions in society and of social 
injustice.1 
Within France, the M.R.P. was consistent in its opposi-
tion to the tactics of the Communist party. But in replying 
to Communist attacks, M.R.P. leaders sought to employ reason 
rather than emotion. In early 1950 Premier Bidaul t had let 
the Communists show their colors in their strikes against 
Marshall Plan arms shipments. The M.R.P. was aware that per-
secution of the Communists usually worked to the latter' a 
advantage. But the ~i.R.P. was also aware that more effort 
was needed to publicize the democratic way, as well as to 
show up the inconsistencies of the Communist tactics. Atten-
tion was drawn by the party in 1950 to the similarity between 
the Communist attack on the "imperialist" war in Indo-China 
'· 
and its attack on the "imperialist" war against Hitler be-
-
tween 1939 and 1941. Earlier in the 1930's the Communists 
had supported collective security against Hitler. In fact, 
Bidaul t had been called a Franco-Russian by non-Communist 
groups in France for seeking such a common front. And now 
after 1950 he and other M.R.P. leaders were being called 
Franco-Americans by the Communists for working with the 
1. Einaudi and Goguel, QQ. cit., pp. 123-130; also L'Aube, 
May 26, 1950, p. 3. 
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United States toward collective security. 2 
The M.R.P. was not satisfied w1 th being against commun-
ism; it sought instead to be for something constructive. 
The party was criticized by the R.P.F. in 1948 for not 
joining the anti-Communist front. In reply the M.R.P. de-
clared at ita annual congress that communism springs from 
the bad conscience of society. A positive program was 
needed, W1 th a struggle against misery rather than communism. 
French politics had need of a third choice, ani the peoples 
.. 
of Europa and the world needed a third solution, other than 
those of capitalism or communism. 3 
The M.R.P. took an optimistic approach to international 
problems that were related to the conflict between the cap-
italistic world and the communistic world. In addition it 
steered unusually clear of attacks on personalities. Again 
and again L 1 Auba repeated the party slogan: "La M:.R.P. sart 
la paix; il na s' an sart pas 11 , meaning that the M.R.P. sought 
a policy of peace for its own sake, not for the advantage it 
might g1 va the party. 4 
Through its posi tiona of leadership in the government, 
the M.R.P. sought to keep Franca constantly in contact with 
Russia as wall as with the United States. It was the theory 
2. Currant History, Jan., 1951, p. 14; also L'Aube, Apr. 5, 
1950 pp. 1, 3; Apr. 15-16, p. 3; Aug. 14, 1950, p. 3; Nov. 
18-19, p. 6. 
3. Politiqua, Oct., 1947, pp. 673-676; also July-Aug., 1948, 
pp. 611-626 
4. L'Auba, Nov. 11-12, 1950, p. 1, a. g. 
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of the party, from the time of its origin, that France held 
a position at the crossroads of the world. Therefore 
France's normal function was that of a conciliator rather 
than that of a satellite. But acting as a conciliator, she 
should at the same time make her voice heard, as she had 
done in the initiation of the Pleven Plan. An interesting 
distinction was made by Simon, an :C.i .R.P. intellectual, be-
tween the Orient, the Occident, and Europe. The Easterner, 
he said, lives in the bright and confounding light of the 
past, and the American in the present and future. It is only 
the "\' estern European, he said, who possesses a true sense of 
history and culture. Simon linked the European spirit with 
"mature conciliation". This display of ethnocentrism meri ta 
some consideration, although it is too much of a generaliza-
tion. For instance, unless one were to distinguish meticu-
lously between compromise and conciliation {as the author has, 
in other connections}, it should be noted that the French 
resemble the Chinese in significant respects, and compromise 
has also been typical. of the Chinese. 5 
Objectives and Methods of Maintaining a Bridge 
The M.R.P. was justified in representing itself as the 
most determined supporter of the traditional French pacifist 
/ 5. Mouvement Republicain Populaire, Brochures; {1945-6) 
I•I . R.P., Parti ••• pp. 26-7; also Terre Humaine, Jan., 1951, pp. 
38-53, and Feb., 1951, pp. 79-80, and .. March, 1951, p. 15. 
movement. In France under the Thi:rU Republic, it is true, 
the only program common to all French parties was to avoid 
war in Europe. But a.f'ter 1950 the M.R.P. stood out above 
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the others for its persistent efforts to keep a bridge open 
to the East. In their tactics the party leaders in the 
Government sought to avoid high-hanied methods and dramatic 
actions. At the time of the ·rrieste incident of' October, 
1953, Foreign Minister Bidaul t declared privately that France 
would not associate herself' with the high-handed treatment 
of' Italy by the other Western powers.6 
The policy practiced by L 1 Aube, the party organ, illus-
trated the teniency of the M.R.P. to de-emphasize interna-
tional incidents. When an American plane was shot down by 
the Russians over the Baltic in 1950, L'Aube purposely re-
frained from playing up the incident. ''The conflagration 
-
can be, must be, shall be avoided 11 , said its editor Maurice 
Schumann. Wars, he said, do not develop from incidents but 
from the relation between them and a general resignation to 
the fatalism of conflict. Again L' Aube hardly mentioned 
the singing of 11Deutschlani Ueber Alles 11 at a German meeting 
in April, 1950, although the American press made much of 
this demonstration of resurgent nat1onalism.7 
6. Howard, QR. cit., p. 151; N.Y.Times, Oct. 30, 1953, 
p. 4:2. 
7. L'Aube, Apr. 13, 1950, p. 3; Apr. 20, p. 3; May 5, p. 3. 
113 
Besides exercising restraint, the M.R.P. was patient. 
There should be no closed list of possible agreements, said 
Bidault in 1950, nor accusations that another country was 
seeking a thiN. 'world war. In November, 1954, when Soviet 
Russia proposed a Big Four meeting, Bidaul t continued to 
exhibit his patience. He said he did not believe in turning 
down automatically any bid for a conference. At the same 
time the M.R.P. opposed aggression "whether it be red, black 
-
or brown". "We shall never sell our souls to the devil", 
said Bidaul t in the dark days of 1950 at the outbreak of the 
Korean conflict. But while diplomacy did not eliminate the 
need for defense, Bidaul t believed that the need for de:fense 
did not and should not prevent diplomacy. He demonstrated 
his_ ties w1 th the "old school." of diplomacy when he expressed 
confidence that all difficulties with Russia could be solved 
by regular diplomatic means, or at least through present 
governmental organization. At this time and at others Bidaul t 
indicated a preference for secret diplomacy. If there should 
be "open covenants", at least, in Bidault's view, more progress 
would be achieved if they were not "openly arrived at". In 
his preference :for the use of regular diplomats, as in other 
respects, Bidaul t dif:fered from Robert Schuman. 8 
While Ivi.R.P. leaders attempted to maintain a bridge to 
the East, they realized that only :from a position of strength 
8. Ibid., May 8, 1950, p. 1; Sept. 7, p. 1; Feb. 24-25, 1951 
p. 6; also N.Y.Times, Nov. 15, 1954, p. 1; Le Monda, Jan. 30, 
1954, p. 2:2. 
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could a useful ( "libre 11 ) discussion with Russia be held. 
Tei tgen quote:i Marx to the affect that Russia was a large 
beast that negotiated only with a larger one. To negptiate 
with the Russians, said Bidaul t, it was necessary to "faire 
. 
facen (stand up to them). On the other hand, the M.R.P. 
eotild appreciate Russia's concern for the security of her 
borders. Maurice Schumann, as representative to the U.N., 
suggested in a public speech in late 1953 that the West 
guarantee Soviet borders against aggression to reassure 
Russia.9 
In March, 1952, Russia had proposed to the West a treaty 
of peace with Germany, which would be diplomatically neutral-
ized. and authorized. to have a national army. This seems 
contradictory on the face of it, unless it was meant to be 
an "army'' for internal policing only. What Russia was 
doubtless moat concerned about was that there be a prohibi-
tion of any military tie between Germany and Western Europe. 
Borne of the M.R.P. doubted. the seriousness of Russia' a pro-
poaal of neutrality. But he said that this might be the last 
call for an understanding on Germany. Peace, said Borne, is 
otherwise callei Patience (but he did not seem to be patient 
in thinking of this as the nlast call"). The motives for the 
Russian proposal and the M.R.P. reaction to it were not all 
9. N.Y.Times, Sept. 26, 1953, p~l:6; Vital Speeches, Nov. 
1, 1953, pp. 41-7; Journal des Deoats, Feb. 13, 1952, pp. 
677-683; Terre Humaine, Mar., 1952, p. 118. 
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apparent on the surface. Russia was seeking an alternative 
to the nearly completei European Defense Community. Ani from 
the standpoint of the M.R.P., negotiation with Russia would 
prolong the political minority of Germany. It would also put 
off the time for bringing into effect this unwanted child of 
European integration, the E.D.c. Schuman's continual attempts 
to keep the way open for negotiations on German un1 ty retarded 
German rearmament. Here is a clear example of the contradi c-
tion between ~i .R.P. words and deeis. The party did support 
the E.D.c., and yet party leaders, even Schuman, would have 
been happy to have found an alternative to it.l0 
There was another reason for the :£1-i.R.P. 'a insistence 
that France should not close any door in her relations with 
Russia. During the second world war Maurice Schuman had 
pointed out that Germany had recovered so quickly from her 
defeat in World War I because the equilibrium of Europe had 
been broken by the exclusion of Russia. If the West and 
Russia could establish solidarity, he said, domination of 
the continent by Germany would be impossible. So it was 
Germany, not Russia, that the M.R.P. feared most. 11 
The most persistent M. R.P. campaign for keeping the door 
open between the East and the West was carried on in the 
pages of L'Aube. In July, 1950, its eclitor declared that 
10. Terre Humaine, Apr., 1952, pp. 118-121; July-Aug., 1952, 
pp. 150-151. See Chapter VII for extended discussion of party 
contradictions. 
11. L'Aube, May 2, 1950, p. 1; May 15, p. 4; May 22, p. 3; 
also Esprit, Feb., 1954, p. 256. 
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!'even in the new circumstances of today" (Korea) the alivan- . 
" ' 
tages of the Schuman Plan should be offered to the whole 
world without distinction or exclusion. 'tlhen the Korean war 
had broken out, L' Aube favored allowing China to send a rep-
resentative to the U.N. Security Council meeting. Mao, as a 
"codisciple" of Stalin, could thereby serve to keep the West 
in touch with the Russian dictator. Moreover, China might 
eventually stand up as an equal to Russia. 12 
Although some of the Russian proposals for a Big Four 
conference were seen to be bluffs to influence German public 
opinion, the M.R.P. maintained that no occasion should be 
lost for an East-West negotiation. Borne argued that Russia 
did not want total war, although she was . still concerned with 
her old search for sea outlets, and also in inciting revolu-
tion in other lands. The chief danger lay in a "hardening 
of arteries" between the East and West. At the M.R.P. Con-
grass of 1952 the rapporteur on foreign policy ~eclared that 
one of the e.ssential eois of M.R.P. foreign policy was to 
renew the East-West "dialogues". There was a need, he said, 
for a specific interchange of ideas and gpods between civili-
zations, rather than the triumph of one idea and one civiliza-
tion over another.13 
12. N.Y.Times, July 27, 1950, p. 6:1; L'Aube, Sept. 13, 1950, 
p. 3. 
13. L 1 Aube, Oct. 30, 1950, p. 4; Nov. 6, pp. 1, 3; Terre 
Humaine, Oct., 1951, pp. 1-6; Aug., 1952, pp. 98-106; Forces 
Nouvelles, May 31, 1952, pp. 9-12. 
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M.R.P. representatives in the Government sought quite 
continuously to put this party doctrine into practice. In his 
proposal for an Atlantic High Council in April, 1950, Bidault 
indicated that this might make possible the reopening of 
contact with Eastern Europe. Cnly the unsuccessful results 
of a four-power conference, he said in 1952, would finally 
convince the French people of' the need for the E.D.C. "I 
. 
don't see anything diabolic in i tn, said Bidaul t about such 
a conference (at a time when some did think it diabolic). 
With so much at stake, "no additional demonstration (of 
failure) can be superfluousu. He persuaded Dulles not to 
postpone a four-power conference until after the ratification 
of the E.D.C. treaty, and set out for the Berlin Conference 
of February, 1954 11w1 th great patience but little hope". In 
Bidault's opening speech there, he stressed the preliminary 
need for a general understanding on the limitation of arma-
ments. But when Molotov proposed a world arms talk, Bidaul t 
threw up his hands; this was too general. To one who preferred 
the older style of diplomacy, there was little chance of ac-
complishing something at such a widely attended meeting as 
Molotov suggested.14 Bidaul t preferred the quieter way of 
14. L'Aube, Apr. 18, 1950, p. 3; N.Y.Times, July 16, 1953, 
p. 1:4; p. 7:1; Dec., 1953, p. 1:1; Jan. 21, 1954, p. 1; Jan. 
26, p. 4:2; Jan. 29, p. 1:1; June 26, 1953, p. 4:8; U.N.Wor1d 
Sept., 1952, p. 41; Esprit, Feb., 1954, p. 260. 
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negotiation, during which France would stand as mediator be-
tween East and West, preserving always for itself, in the 
event that Russia proved intractable, the chance to publicize 
the negotiations in order to convince a stubborn French public 
opinion that a new balance must be sought through European 
integration. 
Within the M.R.F., Bidaul t was more inclined than other 
party leaders toward bilateral negotiations with Russia. In 
1953 de Gaulle had argued that France was in the best position 
of any Western state to negotiate with Russia. "France is 
qualified par excellence 11 , he said, since she had a treaty 
with Russia and maintained embassies in the satellite coun-
tries. The treaty referred to was the Franco-Russian Fact of 
1944, which had been negotiated by Bidaul t and de Gaulle 
while the former was foreign minister under the Provisional 
Government of de Gaulle. In 1945 the M.R.F. had referred to 
this treaty as none of the imperatives of the peace". vlhen 
Russia protested in 1950 that the proposed European army plan 
was a violation of the Franco-Soviet Pact, Schuman replied 
that the plan was purely defensive, and that France would 
strongly oppose any use of Germany as a base for aggression.1 5 
15. M. R.F., Brochures ( 1945-6): Ivl. R.F., Farti ••.• , p. 27; 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, Nov. 19, 1953, p. 2; L'Aube, Dec. 
29 , 19 50, p • 3 ; Jan. 8 , 19 51 , p • 1 • 
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The M.R.P. and Neutralism 
In the eyes of the M.R.P. leaders France stood at the 
crossroads of the world. In 1945 the M.R.P. as a party had 
expressed hostility to the idea of any antagonistic blocs of 
nations. It was in this year also that Bidaul t said, "We 
shall never give our consent to a policy of 'blocs' more or 
less hypocritically opposing one another". The following 
January Maurice Schumann, in a speech to the Constituent 
Assembly, referred to the M.R.P. as the symbol and guarantee 
of exterior equilibrium for France between equally valuable 
alliances. Yet w1 th the coming of the cold war in 1947 the 
M .R.P., in continuous control of the foreign ministry, \'las 
unable to maintain for France this neutral position of 
balance.16 
The path of the M.R.P. was all the more complicated 
since at least one of its important members was an avowed 
"neutralist". It is a common saying in France that nat heart 
~ . ·-
every Frenchman is a neutralist". But during 1950 and 1951 
especially, there were in France a few outspoken advocates 
of neutralism who were like the exposed t3;p of an iceberg. 
They believed that coeXistence of the communist and non-com-
unist worlds was possible, and that Western Europe should 
serve as an international mediating :f'orce. M.R.P. ideology, 
with its stress on the need of a "third force", seemed to 
16. M.R.P., Brochures, loc. cit.; also Report of M. Schumann, 
p. 3; Einaudi and Goguel, QJ2.. cit., pp. 149-150. 
120 
have much in common with these principles. Many neutralists, 
in turn, favored the M.R.P. -sponsored Schuman Plan. Among 
the journalistic outlets of the neutralists were Le Monde, 
L 10bservateur and Esprit, and their principal leaders were 
' .. . . . "/ .. ' . . ~ 
Beuve-Mery of Le Monie, Bourdet of L 'Observateur, and Etienne 
Gilson, . one of the intellectuals and founiing fathers of the 
1-i.R.P .17 
Many neutralists were Catholics, and most were anti-com-
munist. In fact, the paradox of the time was that Catholics 
in France were inclined towards conscientious objection to war 
while Communists were developing a theory of "just 11 wars. 
Although Communists were violently opposed to neutralism, 
party leader Duclos welcomei neutralists to ttfight to defend 
peace at the side of the Soviet". Neutralism was a house of 
many mansions. The theme of many speakers was: "I am not a 
neutralist, but ••• ". Although the Neutralist party was badly 
defeated in the June, 1951 elections, it may have been ignored 
rather than rejectai. When the M.R.P. organ Terre Humaine 
declarai that many of the newly elected deputies were basic-
ally neutralist but did not dare expose their inner thoughts, 
1 t may have been speaking of many of the M.R.P. members as 
well.l8 
17. Nation, Mar. 17, 1951, p. 247; Esprit, Mar., 1951, p. 
375 et seq., p. 411; International Conciliation, June, 1951, 
pp. 285-303. 
18. Esprit, Mar., 1951, pp. 326, 382, 455 et seq; L'Aube, Apr. 
6, 1950, p. 1; International Conciliation, June, 1951, 1oc. 
cit.; Nation, Mar. 7, 1951, p~ 5; Terre Humaine, Nov., 1951, 
p. 109; International Affairs, Jan., 1952, pp. 4-7; Current 
Kiatory, Feb., 1953, p. 94; New Yorker, Oct. 10, 1953, p. 89. 
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M.R.P. policy was directly af'fectei by the growth of 
neutralism. For the success of its policy of European inte-
gration, the M.R.P. needei to create the conviction of a 
strong Europe. 'There was a definite handicap to this in the 
danger of a revival of neutralism, the "Scandinavian disease". 
The M.R.P. itself was too closely connected with neutralism. 
Gilson had been an i'I .R.P. member of the Council of the Repub-
lic. Beuve-:tv16y had originally been on the boaro . of Politi-
que, an early Journalistic organ of the M.R.P. Both of these 
leaders of the neutralists did not even approve of N .A. T .0. 
But Gilson was too high in M.R.P. circles to suffer the fate 
of Boulet, another neutralist who had been excluded from the 
party for voting against the North Atlantic Pact.19 
Some of the M.R.P. leaders did take a definite stand 
against neutralism. Robert Schuman declarei in 1950 that 
France could not and would not be neutral. Maurice Schuman 
called neutralism the oldest and most pernicious form of 
despair. And Bidaul t saw more danger in the neutralists' 
propagand.a than in that of the Communists. Yet he said that 
the most dangerous of all were those who acted like neutral-
ista and claimed not to be. In the eyes of Bidaul t, the 
neutralists had a "Solomon complex", feeling above the battle 
and oversimplifying problems. For example Gilson had rea-
soned that the real victor of the future would be the nation 
19. Esprit, Mar., 1951, p. 382; Manchester Guardian Weekly, 
June 1, 1950, p. 3; L' Aube, May 19, 1950, p. 4. 
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~r nations that conserved their strength rather than those 
that fought. But the weakness of the neutralist position was 
that it supposed an unrealized co:ndi tion, that is, the auto-
nomous force of Europe. It was this force that the M.R.P. 
solitht to create through European integration. 2~ 
There were contradictions implicit in the disavowal by 
most M.R.P. leaders of neutralism. They had opposed Gilson's 
main thesis that fear of Russia was exaggerated, and yet 
L'Aube's main charge against the neutralists was that they 
rested their case on a tacit resignation to the inevitability 
of war. Again, Schuman sought to distinguish carefully be-
tween neutralism and the willingness to nesotiate with the 
East. Borne, in his turn, sought to draw a line between the 
more objectionable neutralists and those who did not want a 
new "crusade" to develop, or who were "realistic" enough to 
see the conflict between the need for social justice and 
remili tari zation. Here again a direct parallel can be drawn 
between neutralist principles and M.R.P. ideology, which 
stressed the search for social justice. Party leaders found 
it difficult to deny neutralism without at the same time 
denying some of their own principles.21 
20. L'Aube, Sept. 21, 1950, p. 1; Oct. 30, p. 3; Nov. 2, p. 
1; Dec. 14, p. 3; Dec. 16-17, p. 6; Esprit, Mar., 1951, pp. 
327-8; Terre Humaine, July-Aug., 1952, p. 15; U.N.World, 
Sept., 1952, p. 25. 
21. L' Aube, May 24, 1950, p. 3; Esprit, Mar., 1951, p. 455 
et seq; Terre Humaine, Feb., 1951, pp. 1-6. 
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Gilson's neutralism was largely based on a distrust o-r 
the improvisations of American foreign policy. It was for 
this reason that he opposed N.A.T.o., although he had not 
opposed the construction of Europe as such. The Atlantic 
Pact had been a turning point, he said. Now the Europeans 
feared the obligation to support America in a. war. This was 
the reverse of the situation that had formerly existed, when 
America feared that 1 t would be dragged into the troubles of 
Europe. Gilson pointed out that some American journalists 
most devoted to the "holy war" against Communism were the 
same ones who had, in 1939, favored a policy of neutrality 
toward Berlin and Rome. 
One useful service of the neutralist movement was that 
it guarded France against "vassaldom" in its relations with 
the United States. But on the other hand neutralism brought 
grist to the mill of American isolationism, and in the opin-
ion of Borne it tended to drive the United States toward a 
reactionary capitalism and chauvinism. 22 
The "American Party" 
M.R.P. foreign policy, especially the policy of European 
integration, was handicapped not alone by the neutralism of 
certain Catholics within the party and by a neutralistic 
ideology. Paradoxically enough, the party's foreign policy 
22. L'Aube, Jan. 13-14, 1951, p. 6; Mar. 17-18, 1951, p. 6; 
Terre . Humaine, Feb., 1951, p. 1-6; July-Aug., 1952, p. 15; 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, May 4, 1950, p. 2; May 11, p. 15; 
June 1, p. 3. 
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was also haniicapped by the M.R.P. 'a consistent support in 
actual practice for American policies. In fact, the M.R.P. 
was given the paeud.onym of the "American party" by ita critics, 
and as a result it a~ftered indirectly from the extensive 
opposition in France to anything resembling a "crusade" 
" -
against communism. Many Frenchmen feared that such a crusade 
was being contemplated by the political leaders in the United 
States. 
The course of events after the beginning of the cold war 
in 1947 forced France to choose between East and West. 
Through ita chief spokesmen, Schuman and Bidaul t, the I~1.R.P. 
thereafter favored close cooperation with the United States 
and Great Britain. Schuman called this cooperation the 
cornerstone of French foreign policy. Bidaul t aaid that 
Europe could not save herself without the United States, but 
no more could the latter maintain herself without Europe. 
Through frequent articles in L'Aube the M.R.P. sought to 
familiarize the French with the purposes of the Marshall 
Plan. A cardinal purpose of this American aid, said L'Aube, 
was to discourage aggression, so that the United States 
should not again have to liberate Europe.23 
The M.R.P. was consistently friendly yet critical in 
ita approach toward the United States. The friendliness 
23. News From France, no. 16, 1946, p. 1; L'Aube, Apr. 8-9, 
19 50, p • 3; Apr. 14, p • 3; Apr. 18 , p • 1 ; Apr. 26 , p • 3; 
May 3, p. 1; Sept. 14, p. 3; Oct. 19, p. 1.; !-1ay 25, p. 3; 
July 29-30, p. 4; Nov. 17, p. 3; Jan. 27-8, 1951, p. 6; 
Jan. 29, p. 3. 
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laid the party open to frequent charges that it was subser-
vient to the Americans. The author hea:rd derogatory ref'er-
ences to the M.R.P. as the "American party" during his stay 
in France in 1954. 
. / 
When Beuve-Mery was temporarily replaced 
as aii tor of Le Monda in 1951 by M.R.P. deputy Dupraz and by 
Oatrice, the publisher of L 1 Aube, charges were made by the 
aii tor of Esprit that a conspiracy against the vigorous inde-
pendence of Le ,llilo:nde had been stimulated by the demands of 
the American ambassador. Again in March, 1954, when Bidault 
was still in charge of the foreign ministry, Herriot of the 
Radical Socialists was opposing early consideration of the 
E.D.O. treaty in the National Assembly. He disclosed a copy 
of a "time-table" prepared in American Ambassador Bruce's 
office and given to French off'icials. Herriot publicly de-
clared that "we cannot be threatened" by the United States. 24 
As can well be imagined, it was the Communist leader 
Duclos who was most virulent in his charges of' American in-
fluence on the M.R.P. foreign ministers. In March, 1953 he 
had called the E.D.C. treaty and the cooN.inate Bonn Pact 
/ 
"treasonable agreements which surpassed the treason of' Petain". 
At that time Duclos had levelai no direct attack at the M.R.P. 
But a year later he charged that the eulogy of Bidaul t at the 
Berlin conference by the American secretary of state, Dulles 
should be dishonorable to a .:·Erench foreign minister worthy of' 
24. Esprit, June, 1950, pp. 1004-6; Sept., 1951, p. 375; 
N.Y,Times, Mar. 21, 1954, p. 3:1, 
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his title. Communist tactics were typified by Duclos' quota~ 
tion of an unnamed American banker to the effect that Hitler 
haP. been right in his plan to unify Europe. Bidaul t was 
called by Duclos the "messenger-boy of American policy-makers". 
Other critics were not as personal in their attacks. But 
much of the criticism follt>wed the pattern of that of a 
writer in Esprit who complained that once the French Govern-
ment had accepted the "American policy" of military resistance 
to the Soviet, it could not effectively refuse to accept 
German rearmament. M.R.P. leaP.ers haP. striven to emphasize 
that the E.D.C. project of armed defense was from the 
beginning a French, not an American policy.25 
There is no denying that M.R.P. members of the Govern-
ment kept in close contact w1 th the United. States. Letour-
neau and Bidaul t had accompanied Mayer to Washington in 
March, 1953, and Bidault was again in Washington in July at 
a meeting of the three foreign ministers of the North 
Atlantic powers. At the Berlin conference of February, 1954, 
Molotov proposed a European treaty relegating the United 
States to the status of an observer. Bidault quickly de-
clared that the "French people have no desire whatsoever to 
sever their tried and trusted friendship with the United 
States". A position of leadership was accorded to Bidaul t 
at Berlin by the American delegates. Rather than altering 
25. Democratie Nouvelle, :Z.lar., J.953, pp. 131-4; Mar., 1954, 
pp. 1~1-4 (sic); Esprit, Jan., 1951, pp. 102-121. 
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the French reluctance to accept the E.D.C., however, this 
American favor might well have been the "kiss of death" for 
Bidaul t. 26 
The critics who charged the M.R.P. w1 th subservience to 
the United States might well have taken into account the 
party's frequent demonstrations of independence from American 
influence. There were definite points of irritation against 
the United States; all was not sweetness and light. L 1 Au be 
had been irritated _ at the initial silence of the United States 
when the Schuman Plan was broached, suggesting that America 
wished to recall the attention of France to the cold war. 
Later in 1950 L'Aube attacked the isolationist stand of 
Herbert Hoover. It was Bidault's opinion that the only way 
to convince the isolationists of their error was to make a 
Europe strong enough to help itself. "One loans only to the 
rich", he said. Then Europe could speak to the United States 
as an equal. The leaders of the M.R.P. pointed out that the 
critics of Schuman' a policy of European integration sought 
national independence from American domination. Yet they 
simultaneously opposed the construction of a Europe which 
would pave the way for that very independence. 
While supporting European integration, then, the M.R.P. 
sought at the same time as much independence from Americ·an 
26. N.Y.Times, Mar. 29, 1953, p. 12:3; July 17, p. 6:5; Feb., 
1954, IV, p. 1:1; Le Monda, Feb. 6, 1954, p. 2:3; Apr. 24, 
p. 1:4. 
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-influence as could be achieved at the moment. In early 1951, 
when Premier Pleven visited the United States, M.R.P. leaders 
were disappointed at his failure to affirm such an indepen-
dence. Borne struck a typically French note when he casti-
gated Truman for having referred to Louis XIV as one of the 
earlier dictators. The "uncultured politician who rules in 
Washington" could not appreciate the Sun King, whom Borne 
rather puzzlingly called a "true lover of libertyu. 27 
Criticism had been growing in M.R.P. circles of the ten-
dency to put the destiny of Europe at the mercy of the tem-
peramental ani nervous changes in American public opinion. 
"Everywhere in Europe", said Borne late in 1952, "opinion 
. .. 
yields to the impatience and bad humor of the United States". 
America seemed to be intent on encouraging Moslem nationalism 
and the renaissance of Germany. In early 1953 relations be-
tween France and the United States certainly were not improved 
by a "terrific blast" at France in Life, which was soon fol-
lowed by Dulles' warning through N.A.T.o. of a possible 
"agonizing reappraisal" of American p6119Y toward Europe if 
the European Defense Community were not ratified. Bidaul t 
talked back vigorously to Dulles at this late 1953 N • .A.T.o. 
Council meeting. Later Bidaul t told the French cabinet that 
27. L'Aube, Dec. 22, 1950, p. 3; May 16, p. 3; Jan. 11, 1951, 
p. 3; Feb. 6, . p. 1; Esprit, Apr., 1951, p. 629; Forces 
Nouvelles, Oct. 11, 1952, p. 1; Report of speech, P.H. 
Teitgen at Venice, pp. 6-7, 21-23, (Apr. 29, 1953). 
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:the United States hai ''demanded" ratification of the E.D.C. 
Treaty.28 
In 1953 the British correspondent Werth hailed the 
"passive resistance to Americanization" bY the French. "Many 
will say that France's greatest service to humanity over the 
past years has been precisely in this passive resistance ••• 
There is a certain method in its madness". A poll taken in 
that year revealed that while the French generally liked 
Americans, they distrusted American policy. Bidault had 
taken a serious view of French-American misunderstandings in 
1952. He criticized the loud opinions of American mass media 
of communication, and inflammatory articles such as the 
recent story in Collier's of an imagined war between the 
United States and Russia. He also attackai angry outbursts 
such as that of Senator Connally over foreign aid, The re-
sult of these, said Bidaul t, was an "instinctive human 
reaction" among the French, who were also worried at the 
haste of the Americans, 29 
The M.R.P. Opposes a Crusade 
Notwithstanding the frequent criticisms of the United 
States voiced by M.R.P. leaders, the party was still regarded 
28, Terre Humaine, Feb,, 1951, p. 4; Nov., 1952, p, 4; New 
Statesman and Nation, Feb, 7, 1953, pp. 143-4; Boston Herald, 
Dec. 14, 1953,. p. 1. The French word "demander" only means 
11 to ask" • , 
29, New Statesman and Nation, Feb, 13, 1954, p. 183; ~ 
World, Sept,, 1952, p. 25; N,Y, Times J!..1ag., Oct, 4, 1953, p. 
9. 82% of those queried in the poll knew no Americans. 
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in France as pro-American, and lost a certain standing there~ 
by among the nationalistic French. After June 1950, Bidault 
was careful to g1 ve credit to the United States :for the 
e:ffort made in Korea. He also supported Eisenhower strongly 
when he arrived in early 1950. At the time of the short-
lived Paris demonstrations against Eisenhower, Bidaul t said 
that the greatest misfortune would be a break between the 
United States and Europe.3° 
There was, however, one particular fear as common to the 
members of the M.R.P. as it was to most Frenchmen. Not 
enough emphasis has been placed by the recorders of the his-
tory of this period upon the opposition of Europeans to 
Eisenhower's "roll-back" poli oy. The French wanted no part 
of a "crusade" to liberate the satellite states of Eastern 
Europe. The possibility of this provided fuel for the f'ire 
built by the opponents of the E.D.C. The M.R.P. opposed 
also the development of a crusade against the Chinese Commun-
ists in Asia. In early 1951 Bidault commented that if' the 
United States sometimes suspected the resolve and strength 
of Europe, so also Europe suspected t..ile consistency and 
wisdom of the United States. 
In supporting N.A.T.O., M.R.P. leaders accepted it as a 
purely defensive alliance, and stressed its economic aspect. 
And in supporting United Nations intervention in Korea, they 
nevertheless expressed fears that such intervention might 
30. L'Aube, Dec. 23-4, 1950, p. 6; Jan. 25, 1951, p. 1. 
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develop into an armed crusade. A resolution had been passe<i -
at the meeting of the influential M.R.P. federation of the 
Seine in October 1950, which expressed clear opposition to 
the idea either of a preventive war or of the inevitability 
of war. At this time Teitgen declared that all policies of 
collective security must depend on a distinction between 
wars of aggression and defensive wars. Towam the end of 
1950 M.R.P. leaders opposed any bombing operations across 
the Yalu River by U.N. forces in the Korean war. 11I am not 
sure the capitalist nations have clean hands", said the 
M.R.P. intellectual Simon, as he opposed. the idea of a 
crusade.31 
The complications involved in the idea of a preventive 
war were demonstrated in a commentary made by Borne in 1952. 
The occasion for his article in Terre Humaine was a state-
ment made by Monsignor Ancel that preventive war, na custo-
mary cloak for aggression", is abominable to God and to the 
Christian conscience. Before finally supporting the stand 
taken by Ancel, Borne demonstrated. the dilemma in which some 
of the M.R.P. members found themselves. He compared. Ancel 
to the conservative Goethe in that both preferred injustice 
to disorder. Had one the right, asked. Borne, to be resigned 
31. Ibid., May 19, 1950, p. 3; Oct. 26, p. 1; Nov. 1, p. 4; 
Dec. 2-3, p. 1; Terra Humaine, Mar., 1951·, p. 15. F.S.D. Nor-
throp has emphasized the reaction of Western Europa .against 
u.s. pressure for an E.D.C. and apparent u.s. support for a 
"crusade'' in his book, European Union and Un1 ted States For-
eign Policy, MacMillan Co., N.Y., 1954 -(not part of the . 
"Qi blio graphy) • 
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·.to injustice because of the horror of war? Evan St. Thomas 
. ;' 
Aquinas had conionad morally justifiable wars, and Paguy had 
declared that the will for justice is never pacific. How-
aver, Borne pointed out that the assailant today always pre-
sents himself as a ''liberator". At this point he referred 
. . 
to the possible "roll-back" policy of the Uni tad States. 
Monsignor Ancel's statement might be distortad by the Com-
munists, but a stand, he said, was not good or bad according 
to who praised it or who condemned it. It does seam, how-
aver, that Borne as well as other Frenchmen exaggerated the 
significance of the roll-back policy, inasmuch as "libera-
tion" was a campaign slogan of Republicans in 1952 and it 
was fairly obvious there was no intention to use force to 
"liberaten Eastern Europe.32 
-
In 1954 M. R.P. voices were still being raised against a 
crusade. Hutin-Desgr~s, writing in the influential Ouest-
France, said the strictest controls should be placed nowadays 
on the concept of a "just" war. The most pernicious groups, 
he said, are those that would set in opposition civilizations 
or ideologies. Bidaul t said in the spring of 1954 that the 
French goal in Inio-China was defense, not a crusade. He 
believed that lines of demarcation are necessary for coexis-
tence, which he thought unavoidable in the present world.33 
32. Terre Humaine, Feb., 1952, pp. 1-7. 
33. Ouest-Franca, Apr. 18-19, 1954, p. 1:1; N.Y.Times, Mar. 
10, 1954, p. 1:6. 
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But the support of M.R.P. leaders such as Bidaul t for coexia.-
tence brought them hazd up against a principle that was at "" 
the core ·of M.R.P. foreign policy ideology. This principle 
was that one world problem could not ba treated apart from 
others. That is, as M.R.P. leaders were fond of saying, 
"peace is indivisible". 34 
This was part of M.R.P. ideology. But what was its 
practice? To determine that, we must turn to a detailed 
examination of M.R.P. policy towazd the North African protec-
torates of Tunisia and Morocco (now independent in 1958)35 
and towazd Indo-China, for it was there that Bidaul t met his 
Waterloo as foreign minister. 
34. This stand that peace is indivisible was quite Ln contrast 
to neutralist Gilson's (:M:.R.P.) theory of "selective secur-
ity". By this Gilson meant that France should only be con-
cerned with situations where French national interests were 
directly involved. See Le Monda, Aug. 2, 1950; International 
Conciliation, June, 1951, pp. 285-303. 
35. Despite the fact that Algeria is covered specifically in 
the scope of the N.A.T.O. treaty (and thereby is indirectly 
involved in French foreign policy), it is not in the purview 
of this dissertation, baing part of metropolitan France. 
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CHAPTER VI 
M.R.P. POLICY TOWARD 
THE FRENCH UNION. AND NORTH .. AFRIOA 
France in a World Role 
If the M.R.P. could have devoted its full attention to 
the French position in Europe, it could have taken a much 
clearer and more consistent stand on European integration, 
and also it would not have got i taelf involved in the dis-
heartening Indo-China affair. But, like all French parties, 
the M.R.P. had to give constant attention to France's rela-
tiona with the anomalous French Union aa well as with the 
former North African protectorates. Letourneau, the party 
leader moat directly involved in the Indo-China war, declared 
to the M.R.P. congress of 1950 that France could not play its 
role in foreign policy unless it were a world role. 1 
Although the average Frenchman would not agree that re-
lations with the French Union or with North Africa fall with-
in the realm of foreign policy, there is no denying that 
problema arising from such relations were inextricably inter-
woven w1 th those of general foreign policy. For instance, 
France was very careful to see to the inclusion of Algeria in 
the area to which the North Atlantic Treaty applies. Moreover, 
from a technical standpoint the relations of France with all 
parts of the French Union except those in the "French Republic" 
~· L'Aube, May 22, 1950, p. 1. 
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(such as Algeria), and w1 th the former protectorates in 
North Africa, were foreign relations even before 1954. The 
status of the protectorates prior to 1956 was frequently 
confused with that of the Associated States. The protec-
torate over Morocco dated from 1912, and that over Tunisia 
from 1881. In Indo-China, treaty arrangements provided for 
the original French ties with Laos and Cambodia. But a 
decree of the French Government in 1948 integrated them into 
the French Union in the capacity of Associated States. An 
agreement with Bao Dai provided the same status for Viet Nam 
in 1949. This was the situation at the time that the M.R.P. 
became seriously involved in French Union and North African 
affairs. 2 
In contrast to the internationalism of its program of 
European integration, the keynote of the party's policy to-
ward these areas was the preservation of French national 
culture along with a reluctance to recognise the incipient 
nationalisms of the colonial areas. In its relations with 
the French Union and the protectorates, the M.R.P. fell quite 
in line with French tradition. France, a centralized state, 
has kept alive a consistent national culture, and has ex-
tended the principle of centralization to the colonial area. 
But attempts by "colonials" after 1945 to take over French 
formulas of nationality have been met with reactions varying 
/ 2. Malezieux, Q.:Q.. cit., p. 81. The "French Republic" 
included Algeria and various overseas . territories in Africa 
and elsewhere. 
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from suspicion to derision. When an Algerian deputy sought 
in a moderate manner to invoke the principle of nationalism 
before the National Assembly, a deputy of the H.R.P. chimed 
in with others to scoff at such "unheard of l~guage". 3 
Assimilation or Association? 
The lo~I.R.P. • s nationalistic approach towaro the French 
Union and North Africa not only contradicted its internation-
alistic approach towaro European integration but also contra-
dicted its own doctrine of pluralism. The pluralists favor 
division of:ipower among many groups and decentralization of 
control. But the Iv1.R.P. sought continually to preserve the 
central authority of metropolitan France (the 11m(tropole n) 
against the growing pretensions of the Associated States or 
the protectorates. As early as 1945 the party had favored 
building the proposed French Union from above rather than 
from below; any structural changes would be directed by the 
/ 
"metropolet• rather than stimulated by local nationalists. 
But the strong tactical position of the Algerian Nationalists 
who held the balance in the Constitutional Committee of the 
Constituent Assembly, militated against this plan. The 
Iv1.R.P. was especially embarrassed in the spring of 1946 when 
even De Gaulle favored a plan of decentralised. federalism 
for the French Union.4 
3. Luethy, Herbert, France Against Herself, p. 224; Occidente, 
v. xi. no. 5, 1955, pp. 367, 413. 
4.European Political Systems (ed Cole), pp. 646-8; Wright, 
QR. cit., pp. 186-204, passim. 
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At the second party congress in 1945 a distinction was 
made between a policy of assimilation for the former colonies 
and one of association for the other territories. The 
"personalities" of the terri toriea should be respectei, since 
the organization of the contemplated new "community'' of the 
French Union did not imply uniformity. On the other hand, 
no part of the Union could have an international life separ-
ate from France nor an iniepend.ent legislative power. By 
this stand the M.R.P., despite its delightful new terms, sup-
ported maintenance in principle of French sov~reignty intact, 
with many legislative controls to be reserved exclusively to 
the "me'tropole". 5 
Since the M.R.P. chose to use sociological terms such as 
11personali ty" and "communi ty 11 , "assimilation" and "associa-
' 
tion", it is fair to examine the full meaning of some of 
these terms. Assimilation is a fusion of two or more cultures, 
and is a two-way process. This does not seem to be the mean-
ing of the word to the M.R.P. when reference was made to for-
mer French colonies, since the intent as abundantly expressed 
in party circles was to extend all the benefits of the French 
culture to the colonies, and there was little consideration 
of a possible contribution in reverse. Secondly, association 
, 
5. Mouvement Republicain Populaire, Brochures (1945~6): 
U.R.P. Parti •••• report of Dr. Aujoulas, -p. 19. It was the 
practice in party congresses of the M.R.P. for the chosen 
speakers to voice general party policy, subject to subse-
quent ratification by the congress. 
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.implies the joining together of equals whether they be 
societies or iniividuals. As iniicated above, this was not 
the intent of the M.R.P. either. Finally, since the M.R.P. 
had used the term "community" in proposing institutions for 
European integration, it certainly assumed the presence of 
political equality among the members. But the French Union 
and North Africa were intenied to be special preserves of 
France. 
As a matter of fact, the M.R.P. was as a rule either 
non-committal or vague in the stands it took on the status 
of the French Union. Back in 1945 the motion on what was 
called "colonial" policy was very vague and equivocal. By 
the time of the Nantes party congress of 1950 there had 
been no improvement in this respect. In the meanwhile Paul 
Coste-Floret (M.R.P.), Minister for Overseas France, had 
confessed that although the French Union was a magnificent 
idea, "he was not sure just what it was or how it ought to 
be built". This confusion was also typical of other M.R.P. 
leaders, and obviously it militated against the effectiveness 
of party foreign policy. However, at the Lyons congress of 
1951, the long speech of Paul Coste-Floret, although having 
nmore blah to the minute than usual", did reflect at certain 
points an attempt at constructive thinking with respect to 
Inio-China. 6 
6. M.R.P., Brochures (1945-6): Motions, pp. 6-13; Nation, 
June 3, 1950, p l 548 et seq.; .New Statesman and Nation, May 
12, 1951, pp. 526-7; European Political Systems (ad. Cole), 
pp. 646-8. 
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Inconsistencies in North African Policy 
In North Africa the M.R.P. was always 11late with an 
idea", and judging from a review of party meetings and pro-
nouncements of leaders, the ideas were vague, few and far 
between. The party opposed any attempt to impose Europe on 
Africa and supported some modification of the status of the 
protectorates, Tunisia and Morocco. But when Foreign 
Iviinister Schuman ( wbo mistakenly considered Tunisia as part 
of the French Union) declared independence to be the long 
term objective of members of the French Union, it was only a 
matter of days before he had to eat his words. 7 Although 
unorthodox members of the party were irked at such examples 
of equivocation, no real forwa:rU step was taken by the M.R.P. 
toward French North Africa. 
The M.R.P. bpposed any intrusion of the United Nations 
into the problems of this area. 8 Also, ever since October, 
1951 there had been special resentment in party circles at 
the .'!interference" of the United States in North Africa 
particularly because the discussion on Tunisia in the U. N., 
supported by the United States, had coincided with French 
need for more economic aid :from America. At the Bordeaux 
congress of 1952 a resolution on Morocco provided that there 
should be no more delay in "common preparation" for a new 
7. Forces Nouvelles, May 22, 1954, p. 6; June 5, p. 3; L'Aube, 
June 10-11, 1950, p. 4; June 13, p. 1. 
8. Vie Intellectuelle, May, 1952, pp. 69, 74-80; L'Aube, 
:Mar. 19, . 1951, p. 4; Jan. 15, p. 1; News From France, June 
15, 1951, p. 1; L'Ann~ Politigue, 1952, pp. 199, 230. 
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, 
future "respectant lea personnali tea marocaine et francaise''. 
In other words France and the protectorates should develop 
reforms by themselves; let no one else interfere. It was in 
the fall of 1953 that Maurice Schumann, as French represen-
' 
tative to the U.N., invoked the "domestic jurisdiction" 
clause of the U.N. Charter and announced that France would 
not participate in the U.N. debate on Tunisia ~d Morocco.9 
Even the party specialists on North Africa, Le Brun 
, 
Karis (on Morocco) and Vignes (on Tunisia), were not always 
at one as to what steps should be taken. The Bordeaux party 
congress of 1952 had heard Alfred Coste-Floret admit the 
strategic importance of the protectorates but declare that 
nimaginationu should be demonstrated by France along with 
authority. The congress then went on to adopt a motion re-
~ fleeting suggestions made by Le Brun Karis. He had sought 
reforms leading to internal autonomy for Tunisia and the 
creation of a Tunisian legislative council. An act of asso-
ciation should be substituted for the present treaty with 
Tunisia, but the legislative council should not be allowed 
to prevent the inclusion of French in official positions in 
, 
the Tunisian government. This plan of Le Brun Keris was 
similar in many respects to the idea of "co-s<;~vereignty" 
which was popular at the time. But Vignes, the other 
I 9. L'Annee Politique, 1952, loc. cit.; N.Y.Times, Oct. 9, 
1952, -p. 4:3; Oct. 18, 1953, p. 5:3. Robert Schuman had 
taken the same line ~n Nov., 1952. See Annex to Bulletin 
Quotidian no. 2325, Nov. 15, 1952. 
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specialist on North Africa in the party, opposed such co-
sovereignty since he thought it would limit the basic goal 
of internal autonomy for Tunisia. He also thought it inop-
portune to make adhesion to the French Union a co:nd.i tion for 
granting reforms to Tunisia.lO 
Relation Between European Integration and 
Development of the French Union 
One of the most difficult problems for the M.R.P. 
leadership was to determine exactly what relations there 
should be between the contemplated European Political Com-
munity and the French Union7 which might according to their 
planning include the North African protectorates. Nota 
should f'irst be taken of the fact that Algeria hai been care-
fully included in the defense area of N.A.T.o., while the 
drafters of the Schuman Plan had explicitly limited the ap~li­
cation of the European Coal and Steel Community to European 
terri tor1es, although at least the overseas "departments" 
. . 
are constitutionally part of France. Thus the French, and 
specifically the M.R.P. leadership in the Government, sought 
to maintain France's sovereignty in Africa and insure its 
defense while accepting limitations on French sovereignty in 
Europa. In the case of the E.P. C., Le Brun Kfris drafted a 
public letter in January, 1953 recommending entry of the 
French Republic (the Union minus the Associated States of 
Indo-China) in its entirety into the Community. Otherwise 
1.0. Forces Nouvelles, May 31, 1952, pp. 8-9. 
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there would be constitutional complications, and also there 
would be a danger of widening the gap between France Over-
seas and metropolitan France. The overseas territories 
might listen more intently to the idea of a "Uni te:i States 
of Africa". As for the Associated States, L~ Brun Ke~is 
held that France should persuade them to adhere to the E.P.C. 
If Morocco and Tunisia took on that status under new treaties, 
the agreements with them might incorporate provisions for 
such adhesion.11 
Although Bidaul t ha:l approved in principle the admis-
sion of the "French Republic" as a unit into the European 
Political Community, in practice he favored only a gradual 
process of engaging in this E.P.C. those peoples of the 
French Republic who had not as yet the right to vote. Other 
prospective members of the E.P.C. had agreed that France 
could regulate the degree of inclusion of her overseas terri-
tories. But the Quai d'Orsay (meaning the permanent personnel 
of the foreign ministry) did not want the Republic in the 
E.P.C., and in his capacity as foreign minister Bidault was 
strongly influenced by this bureaucracy.12 
Considerations of national security and defense directed 
11. Vie Intellectuelle, Jan., 1952, pp. 79-82; Letter of Le 
Brun KE:Gis, Jan. 25, 1953, Relations of European Union with 
France Overseas. See also Plan de Travail (M.R.P.); REna-
tiona de l'Union Europdenne et Outre-Mer, as well as a:;-
Menthon1s article in Chroniques Sociales, 1953, p. 348. 
12. Letter of Pflimlin, Mar. 19, 1953, L'Europe et L'Union 
Franca1se; also see Appeniix. 
. ::5 
143 
-the attention of the I~ .R.P. to the question of priori ties. 
Which should come first, Europeanization or the rationaliza-
tion of the French Union? Paul Coste Floret, in his capacity 
as Minister for Overseas France, haP. said that if France 
-
wished to build "Africa 11 , she must first build "Europe". On 
'• .. 
the other ha.ni his twin brother Alfred argued in 1952 that 
France would have to enter a Europe as the French Union, 
since there would be no place in it for trusteeships or 
colonies. Hence he sought an acceleration in the 11Stabil-
ization" of the Union before entry into the E.P. C. Some 
' 
critics questioned whether an E.D.c. or an E.P.C. could pro-
vide for proper defense of the Union, as required by Article 
62 of the French Constitution. Bidaul t, alternately hot and 
cold over European integration, supported the E.P.C. at this 
point, declaring that its purpose was to improve national 
defense. N.A. T.O., he said, extended only to Algeria, and 
the E.D.C. could extend no further within the Union. The 
E.P.C., then, would fill the gap. But he did not make clear 
just how the E.P.C. was to handle defense problems.l3 
The M.R.P. did not really know what it wanted. It had 
got caught in a spider web of organizations which was to a 
considerable degree of its own making. One of the bitterest 
critics of the party was Senghor, a deputy in the National 
13. See article, of Paul Coste-Floret in Poli tique, May, 1948;. 
also Politigue Etrangere, Nov., 1952, pp. 321-332; Discours 
de Bidault devant le Conseil de 1a Republigue, Oct. 19, 1953, 
p. 19. 
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Assembly from Africa, who hasi previously ha.d close ties with 
the M.R.P. He underlined the contradictions between the 
group led by Teitgen and the bureaucracy of the foreign min-
istry. Teitgen had supported integration of France Overseas 
into the E.P. C. But the "seigneurs du Quai d 'Orsay", who 
. 
"traced their lineage'' to Descartes, had sabotaged this step 
of Teitgen's. Sengbor was particularly critical of Bidault's 
stand. If the integration of the whole French Republic \'Tare 
impossible, said Senghor, France must choose for the French 
-
Republic over Europe if she didn 1 t want France Overseas to 
secede. Neither the French Government nor Parliament, he said, 
was entitled to relegate the French Africans to the "stable". 
If forced to choose between "Europe" and the French Union, 
many M.R.P. leaders, including de Menthon and ~!aurice Schumann, 
ma.de it clear they would choose the Union. The world respon-
sibilities of France came first. If the E.P.C. treaty were 
signed on behalf of the French Republic, France should ac-
cording to these leaders limit her engagement, and decisions 
of the E.P.C. could take effect only through the organs of 
the French Republic. When the chips were down the M.R.P., 
party of internationalists, favored national interests above 
European integration.14 But to avoid thereby demonstrating 
the contradiction between their words and their deeds, M.R.P. 
leaders preferred maintenance of the status quo, which would 
eliminate the need of a choice. 
I 14. Journal des Debats, Nov. 18, 1953, pp. 5248-5252; Nov. 
20, p. 5354 et seq. 
Preserving the Status Quo 
The problems arising in North Africa and also in the 
French Union presented an acid test for the sincerity and 
effectiveness of the ~1.R.P. political philosophy, which 
stressed "human values" and the development of a higher 
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international level of living. The party did emphasize the 
need for economic and cultural development in these areas, 
but this was partly to compensate for foreign minister 
Schuman's disregard for them in his concern for the integra-
tion of Europe. In fact his demand in May, 1952 for an 
American guarantee of support for French policy in Africa. 
and in the nEmpire" (!) was a belated attempt to rearrange 
priori ties as French parliamentary and. public opinion wanted 
them. 1 5 
The M.R.P. was very circuitous in fostering the politi-
cal development of the French Union and the protectorates. 
lilian it sought "independence within the French Union", the 
party placed more emphasis on the "within" than on the 
''independence". Bidault did not even favor a commonwealth 
status for the Associated States of Indo-China. Common-
wealths had the right to secede, he said in August, 1953 
(perhaps thinking of the events of the month in Morocco); 
no such right could be recognized in the French Union. As 
Goguel saw it, one of the missions of the M.R.P. was to stani 
15. L'Aube, July 17, 1950, p. 1; International Organization, 
May, 1953, p. 203. 
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opposed to the "internal and selfish foreign pressures" con• 
16 
tributing toward dissolution of the French Union. 
By 1954 the M.R.P., nationalistic i ts·elf in this area 
of its policy, had demonstrated a crucial lack of comprehen-
sion of the dreams of nationalism among the peoples of North 
Africa and the Associated States. Most party members sought 
to retain France's centralized control over "colonial" 
. 
affairs. (French individualism in political theory is coun-
teracted by a worship of unity in administration!) In the 
fall of 1953, Maurice Schumann admitted., in his capacity of 
French representative to the U.N., that France had the duty 
to help Moroccan and Tunisian democracies to come into being 
rapidly. But he declared that a complete rupture w1 th the 
metropole would be a "death sentence" for France. Speaking 
•· 
before an economics club in Detroit, S chumann emphasized the 
French economic investment in Tunisia and Morocco. Despite 
this, over 90% of the cultivated land belonged to Tunisians 
and Moroccans. Besides the economic stake that France had in 
these areas, Schumann warned that independence for them w1 th-
out interdependence would strike a fatal blow at the "Atlan-
tic Community". t.f .R.P. leaders seemed to be better prophets 
than planne~s ~ 17 
16. L' Aube, May 24, 1950, p. 2; also May 20-21, p. 2; Common-
weal, July 22, 1949, p. 360; Einaudi and Goguel, QR. cit., p. 
148; N,Y.Times, July 3, 1953, p. 1:6; July 4, p. 3:2; Aug. 9, 
p. 22:5. See later developments in Ibid., Oct. 23, and 
Newsweek, Nov, 2, 1953, p. 31. . 
17. New Statesman and Nation, Feb, 7, 1953, p. 144; Esprit, 
Feb., 1953, pp. 177-9; Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 9, 1952, 
147 
The M.R.P. Stand on the Strasbourg Plan 
Since the M.R.P. professed to be concerned about the 
economic development of ~rica, it is interesting to examine 
the party's attitude toward a plan for such development for-
mulated in the Council of Europe in 1952 (especially in the 
light of 1957 French plans for Eur-African economic coopera-
tion). Le Brun Klris, party specialist on North Africa, had 
previously criticized a Bri tiah proposal for a 11Un1 ted States 
of ~rica", and in the party congress of 1952 he had warned. 
of the danger of a new colonialism under the color of a Eur-
African plan which was to be discussed at Strasbourg in Sep-
tember. The "Strasbourg Plan" (recommeniation no. 26 of the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, September 25, 
1952) was a project that contemplated a European organization 
for the development of Africa, including an investment bank, 
a preferential system, and long-term contracts on the pur-
chase of raw materials from Africa.18 
"Beware of European neo-colonialism!" warned Le Brun 
I Karis. Only colonial powers like France, he argued, can 
become truly anti-colonial. This seemed to be a case of the 
pot calling the kettle black. Thinking primarily of Germany, 
Le Brun K«fris appeared to reason that each power had to pass 
through a "colonial" stage. If it had no colonies, 1 t was 
.. .. . 
17. {cont.) p. 15; Vital Speeches, Nov. 1, 1953, p. 44; 
0 c cid en te, -lo c. cit. , p. 406. 
~ 18. Forces Nouvelles, May 22, 1954, p. 9; May 31, 1952, pp. 
8-9; L'Aube, Aug. 16, 1950, p. 1; also see Appendix A. 
148 
~ooking for them. Non-colonial powers such as West Germany · 
predominated in the Consultative Assembly. It was the same 
old problem of the struggle between the "haves" and the "have 
nota", but beside this Le Brun Klris saw -handi~aps to prl vate 
investment as (such in the proposal of a European investment 
bank. Pflimlin was also disturbed about this Strasbourg Plan. 
He called to min:i the European propaganda during the period 
of the German occupation of France and declared that Semlar, 
a West German supporter of the Plan, had been in the past a 
champion of German colonial expansion. When Italy raised the 
possibility of emigration to Africa under the Plan, Pflimlin's 
reaction was that France was concerned with "civilizing" the 
Africans themselves rather . than emigrants from other lands. 
/ Le Brun Keris pointed out that the M.R.~P. had always required 
that the French delegation to the Consultative Assembly in-
clude some Africans, so that they could safeguard themselves 
as far as possible against such schemes as this one. 19 
Vignes, the M.R.P. specialist on Tunisia, repeated the 
warnings against the Strasbourg Plan in his report to the 
Assembly of the French Union in December, 1952. He was es-
pecially critical of the Plan for its failure to provide for 
a double preferential system (preference in customs duties 
to a European political community and within that, a second 
preference to the French Republic). Vignes considered such 
19. Forces Nouvelles, Oct. 11, 1952, p. 5; also Pflimlin, 
_L 'Europe et 1 1 Union Franjai s e, p. 6. 
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a system necessary for the protection of French ''infant 
industries"(!) in Africa. Here again a spokesman of the 
party demonstrated the contradiction between woros and deeds 
in the M.R.P. leadership, as he supported extreme protec-
tionism as against the party's philosophical support for , 
economic internationalism. 20 -
The reasoning of M.R.P. leaders was at times quite cir-
cuitous in attempts to preserve French independence of action 
in North Africa. Both Vignes and Pflimlin supported integra-
tion of the whole French Republic in a European political 
community for three reasons. First, France would thereby 
avoid a special authority for Overseas France, which was 
definitely unacceptable to the M.R.P. Secondly, they thought 
France would thereby avoid the risk of a separate Strasbourg 
Plan. Finally, the risk of U.N. control over "dependent 
areas" would no longer be present since French Africa would 
be "integrated II into the E.P. a. 
Despite this assumed integration of French Africa, 
Pflimlin said at another point that France Overseas in 
Africa should not be considered as the "common property" of 
Europe, but should enter the E.P. 0. as the "private property" 
of France! In contrast to this, as far as the North African 
protectorates were concerned, Paul Coste-Floret had resisted 
the suggestion to include them in the E.P.C. He said France 
20. 
·no. 
Annex J.o Proc~s-verbal, Assemblefe de 1 'Union Fran~aise, 
458, seance de Dec. 18, 1952: report of -Vignes, Co~seille.r, 
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-had no right to bring as dowry to a new Europe these f'iefa 
whose titles she did not possess. How manifold are the 
advantages of human reasoning power! For the organized 
economic development of French Africa the alternative to 
inclusion o.f the area in an E.P.C. was the development of 
something such as the Strasbourg Plan. But the M.R.P. had 
raised various objections to this, and in early 1954 Pflim-
lin said in addition that the framework of the Strasbourg 
Plan was too narrow and too rigid f'or developing long-term 
overseas markets. A party that had gone all out for the 
Schuman Plan ror Europe now was playing a "dog in the manger" 
-
game in Arrica. It may well be that there were various de-
fects to the Strasbourg Plan, but the general impression one 
gets is that the M.R.P. sought the help of all types of 
arguments to preserve the status quo for France in Africa in 
both the economic and political fields.21 
' The M.R.P. Against Mendes-France 
At the Lille party congress of 1954 the ivi.R.P. adopted 
a motion on general policy which made it clear that the party 
clung tenaciously to the doctrine that internal economic 
expansion, integration of Europe, ani development of the 
French Union and the protectorates were inextricably bo~ 
21. Pflimlin, Q£. cit., p. 6 at seq. also see notes by 
Poisson (M.R.P.), member of the Consultative Assembly, on 
Economic . Relations with Overseas France, Sept., 1952; Forces 
Nouvelles, suppl. to no. 53, Jan. 2, 1954, pp. 22-3. 
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together, and hence indivisible. The previous year Assistant 
Secretary-General Fontanet attacked Rightist critics who said 
. 
"Europe first" when one spoke of Indo-China, ani "Indo-China 
. . 
first" when the attention was upon European problems. A 
"policy of choices", he said, is an alibi for cowa:rdice. 22 
This doctrine of the indivisibility of France's problems 
was almost a direct attack upon the thesis of Mend.~s-France 
that . to "govern is to choose''. When the M.R.P. lost control 
.. 
of the foreign ministry in June, 1954 over the Indo-China 
issue, it was primarily the result of the efforts of Mend~-
France, who then succeeded Laniel as Premier. The basis for 
the categorical opposition to Mend~s-France by the M.R.P. 
leadership is found in a general principle which directly 
affects relations between internal and external policy. 
'\ For long a deputy in the National Assembly, Mendes-France 
had become well-known upon the publication of his booklet, 
"Gouverner C' est Choisir" (To govern is to choose). The 
idea that choices must be made, that alternatives must be 
taken, comes into direct conflict with the M.R.P. principle 
that "peace is indivisible", and that France' a three main 
problems must be solved together. Mend~s-Fr~ce consistently 
maintained that France needed first to insure her own mona-
tary and economic recovery. Being an economist, he did 
22. Forces Nouvelles, May 30, 1953, p. 12; June 5, 1954, 
p. 7 • . 
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approve of the Schuman Plan, but was indifferent to the fate · 
of the French Union. 23 
Although a large proportion of the M.R.P. deputies in 
the National Assembly disregarded the leas:iership and sup-
ported Meni~s-France in 1953, the bulk of the influence in 
the M.R.P. was against him. Buron, for his part, maintained 
that it was wrong for Meni~-Fra.:nce to deny that the construc-
tion of France and of Europe, as well as of the French Union, 
were indissolubly linked together. In behalf of the Ivi.R.P. 
thesis Goguel reasoned that excessive conservative resistance , 
in France would prevent internal economic revival without 
solving economic problems on an international scale.24 
The abstention of certain former cabinet ministers, in-
cluding M.R.P. leaders, was crucial ih the defeat of Mendes-
France in his bid for the premiership in June, 1953. Never-
theless he had with him the younger members of the M.R.P. as 
well as the youth in other parties. They liked his refusal 
to iniulge in "ruses et fui tes davant le ventn (ruses and 
"running with the crowd"). They also liked his stand that 
"not on diplomatic conferences but on economic vigor" is a 
23. N.Y.Times, Oct. 12, 1953, p. 5:4; Reporter, Dec. 22, 
19 53, pp. 20-21. 
24. Terre Humaine, Aug., 1953, PP• . 53-6. Also see Appendix 
A. C~guel drew a historical parallel in citing the example 
of free trade imposed upon France by Napoleon III in 1860, 
which had the effect of needling vested interests to such 
an extent that by 1869 it was an accomplished fact. (~here 
was a difference for Frenchmen, however, between the 
imposition of an economic regime by a French ruler ani by a 
supranational authority.) 
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great nation built. '\'/hat the llti.R .P. leadership opposed most 
' in Mend es-France was his "neutralism", and his support for a 
cease-fire in Indo-China. Even more important than this, 
M. R.P. leaders believed that :r-I end~s-France had no basic phil-
osophy. ~aey considered him fundamentally static ani conser-
vative in his economic theory and policy, while the M.R.P. 
ideology constituted a dynamic system, as they saw it. 25 
' The bitter opposition of M.R.P. leaders to Mendes-France 
was most clearly demonstrated at the time of the votes on the 
Paris Pacts sponsored by him as Premier in late 1954. 
Bidaul t was said to be playing a "cat and mouse" game, to 
force Mend~-France out after he took an unequivocal stand 
for German rearmament. "The night is ours", said Bidaul t, 
coming out of a three-hour party conference prior to the 
first vote. "We have decided to deal with you later", said 
. 
- " de Menthon to Mendes-France prior to that. The M.R.P. pur-
- '-pose was to chasten M.endes-France; by a mis,calculation, their 
opposition vote led to defeat of the Paris Pacts the first 
time. Some caustic comment was that the party supposed to 
be most experienced in foreign affairs opposed the Paris 
Pacts on the basis that since t h e E.D.C. gpt only 264 votes, 
no substitute should get more. "It is a question of knowing 
25. Reporter, Dec. 22, 1953, p. 20-21; Terre Humaine, June-
July, 1953, pp. 153-4; Contemvora~y Review, July, 1953, p. 6; 
Esprit, July, 1953, p. 132; L Ann§e Politique, 1953, p. 48; 
also see Appendix A. 
if the deputies, by their hatred of one man •••• are going 
to break the Atlantic solidarity." 
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Yet it must be remembered that there were no suprana-
tional features to the expanded Western European Union, as 
contrasted with the E.D.c. And on the second vote the sup-
- ' port of Schuman and Pflimlin for the Mendes-France project 
.. 
plus that of sixteen other M.R.P. deputies helped in the 
final affirmative vote for the Paris Pacts. Nonetheless, 
Buren and Juglas were on their way out of the M.R.P. when 
they joined the Mend~s-France cabinet in early 1955. 26 
"Peace is Indivisible" 
The idea that problems must be handled on a world scale, 
that is, that "peace is indivisible 11 was clearly a part of 
M.R.P. ideology rather than of practical politics. And yet 
party leaders made much of it. In frequent editorials in 
L 1 Aube during 1950 Bidault stressed the wider significance 
of the Korean war. It was the Russian foreign minister of 
the 1930's, Litvinov, whom Bidault quoted when he said that 
peace is indivisible. At first the maxim was used to support 
collective security measures in Korea. If the Korean test 
proved uncertain, said Bidault, others would follow, for 
communism observed no frontiers. Later the principle was 
applied differently as the U.N. troops approached the 
26. Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 27, 1954, p. 1:8; 
N.Y.Times, Oct. 10, 1954; Nov. 15, p. 11; Dec. 26,IV, p. 
1:1; Dec. 28, p. 1:6, 8; Jan. 21, 1955. 
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Manchurian border. The forces of peace must not uasiventure", 
and military leaders like MacArthur must realize that theirs 
if only part of a political affair. Hance policy, too, was 
indivisible. The usa of an atomic bomb would affect other 
nations besides the United States, which therefore had the 
right to give advice to the latter. "Peace is in:liviaible 11 
.  27 
was an all-purpose doctrine for the M.R.P. 
M.R.P. leaders. ware puzzled as to just what attitude to 
take when U.N. troops were approaching the 38th parallel. 
Schuman favored a restoration to the status quo ante once 
the parallel was crossed. Bidaul t supported the advancing 
troops more strongly, Collective security involved collec-
tive sanctions, he said. He remembered well the Hoare-Laval 
negptiationa over the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, and he 
said the ventura of the North Koreans must be made costly to 
them. For weakness encourages. aggressora. 28 
This measurement of problema on a universal scale was 
typical of Ivl .R.P. foreign policy. Since the religious factor 
is very strong in the makeup of the party, and since Cathol-
icism i taelf is inclined toward a universal approach to prob-
lema, one might be led to believe that this aspect of M.R.P. 
foreign policy is derived from the Catholic character of the 
party. But M.R.P. policy toward relations between East and 
West was conciliatory rather than dogmatic. While the 
27. L'Aube, Oct. 7-8, 1950, p. 1; Dec. 2-3, p. 1; Dec. 9-10, 
p. 1. 
28. L'Aube, Sept. 7, 1950, p. 3; Oct. 7-8, p. 1. 
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Catholic Chureh has taken a consistently strong stand against 
communism, the M.R.P. leaders during the period under consid-
eration contemplated some sort of coexistence. It may be 
that the party's support for European integration verged on 
dogma, but this did not extend to East-West relations in 
general. The M.R.P. sought to steer clear of both extreme 
optimism and extreme pessimism in developing its policy to-
ward Russia and the United States. 
To the extent that the M.R.P. tried to handle problems 
on a world, rather than a regional, scale, it inclined in 
its foreign policy toward strategy rather than tactics. 
Schuman illustrated this in 1949 when he said, "If we can 
succeed in solving the German problem, we shall thereby solve 
the Russian problem as well". It was also illustrated by 
Bidault's statement that the lesson of Korea was that the 
West must not let the enemy determine the place of attack. 
When one must say "no", he said, one should say it quickly 
and specifically. The M.R.P. leaders took a courageous stand, 
but it was a difficult and at times a hypocritical one. No 
crusade, they said; resist only the aggression of the Com-
munists, but resist it everywhere.29 
A superficial study of M.R.P. foreign policy would lead 
one to believe that the party concentrated on the integration 
of Europe to the exclusion of concern for Asian problems. 
29. Ibid., Sept. 9-10, 1950, p. 1; Sept. 30-Qct. 1, p. 1; 
Pickles, QR. cit., p. 195. 
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But the Bidault foreign ministry finally found its stumblin~ 
block in early 1954 in the tenacity with which it sought to 
hold on to French posi tiona in Indo-China. Letourneau, who 
had been generally responsible for Indo-China policy, opposed 
a policy of ''choices''. He asked how the \'lest could hope to 
defend Europe after abandoning Asia. In his turn Lecourt, 
parliamentary leader of the M.R.P., asked those who saw an 
iron curtain falling over part of Asia how they intended to 
resist the danger. If they disregarded it, he said, history 
would repeat itself. Fifteen years before, there had been a 
step-by-step approach to the catastrophe of Nazi invasion. 
The Indo-China outpost of Dien-Bien Phu was strategic in the 
psychological rather than in the military sense, said Letour-
neau. If Indo-China fell to the Communists, he said, South-
east Asia would follow. Eventually the Communists would have 
all of Asia. How, then, could Europe erect a defense against 
. 30 
these vast reserves of raw materials? 
When to negotiate and when to resist in Asia proved a 
complicated problem for the M.R.P. The editor of L 1 Aube 
expressed the belief in November 1950, before the informal 
entry of China into the Korean af'fair, that China should be 
allowed to attend discussions in the Security Council. 
France wished, he said, to restrain the impatient ones who 
would "snuff out the glowing embers" or crush under foot the 
30. N.Y.Times, Jan. 11, 1954; Le Monda, Apr. 29, 1954, p. 
3: 5; May 25, p. 7:2. But de Chevignef, M.R.P. minister of' war 
·had advised abandonment of Dien Bien Phu in February, 1954. 
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.ubroken reed" of international understanding. Yet his suc-
cessor, Maurice Schumann, emphasized that a position of 
strength was necessary from which to negotiate. The folly 
was now clear of those who had held that Hitler would cease 
to be dangerous once he had a free hand i~ the East. 31 
There were those in the party who continued to stress 
negotiation over resistance. With respect to China, the 
line of reasoning was that China should not be assimilated 
to Russia. l.foreover the prediction was made (and was borne 
out by events) that if the \vest got involved in negotiations 
with China, they would be long, for "such is the pace of 
. 
things in China". The M.R.P. leaders themselves, however, 
assimilated China with Russia to the extent that they con-
sidered French defense of Indo-China to be part of the world 
struggle against communism. And Ivi.R.P. leaders promoted long-
winded negotiations with China when they sought to include 
the Indo-China question in any conference that was held for 
the negotiation of a Korean set~tlement. The basis for this 
stand was the party principle that Asian problema were indi-
visible from those of Europe, just as "peace is ind.i visible'! 32 
The M.R.P. Against Itself 
This world system of the M.R.P. made the party particu-
larly vulnerable to attack by ita critics. Any group or 
31. L'Aube, Nov. 22, 1950, p. 3; Jan. 15, 1951, p. 3; Jan. 
16, p. 3. 
32. L'Aube, Sept. 28, 1950, p. 3; Mar. 31-Apr. 1, 1951, p • 
. 3; N.Y.Times, Feb. 12, 1954, p. 2:2. 
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individual that takes a long-run approach to problems, rath~r 
than seeks to solve them one at a time, is equally subject to 
attack, although not subject to the charge of opportunism. 
Certainly the M.R.P. approach would seem impractical. How 
can all things be done at once? How could France rebuild 
itself economically, take a major part in integrating Europe, 
and at the same time retain its position in the disintegrating 
French Union? 
I The stormy petrel of the M.RieP., senator Leo Hamon, had 
said as early as 1950 that it was foolish to try to do every-
thing at once. Of the alternative paths to be taken, he 
believed priority should be given to rebuilding the French 
internal economy. When interviewed by the author in 1954, 
he clung to the same opinion. Peace is in:livisible, he said, 
but it should not lead the party to go to extremes in cri ti-
cal situations. In fact he believed that "Gouverner C' est 
Choisir" was a commonsense approach to politics. Even an 
outside supporter of M.R.P. foreign policy began to be criti-
cal of the party's "subtle complaint" that peace is a whole, 
and being a strategy, must be left to specialists, such as 
the diplomats. He said it was necessary to distinguish be-
tween short ani long term objectives, but choices must be 
made. 33 
33. L'Aube, Oct. 23, 1950, p. 4; Oct. 24, pp. 1, 4; Esprit, 
Jan., 1953, pp. 81-7; also see Appeniix A. 
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The tactical disadvantages of the doctrine that peace 
is indivisible were considerable. The party sometimes took 
on the appearance of being all things to all men in its 
foreign policy. More than that, its members were not con-
sistent themselves. Bidault had indicated the need of a 
choice, when he said in 1950 that one must not proclaim two 
contradictory imperatives; the first imperative is the sur-
vival of liberty. ' In contrast to Mendes-France' s insistence 
that the Indo-China war was incompatible with French author-
ity in Europe, Bidaul t warned in 1953 that by being bogged 
down in "Europe", France might founder ( "sombrer 11 ) there. 
She would then risk impairing her world mission. Elsewhere 
he defined France's policy as the making of Europe without 
the Y!!IIlaking of France. A choice must be made, therefore. 
But Bidaul t and Schuman would not have made the same choice. 
In an ext.remi ty, Bidaul t would have chosen the French Union, 
and Schuman European integration.34 
There were other choices that the M.R.P. had made. Al-
though it had opposed "blocs", it was forced to make a real-
istic choice between blocs after 1947. Thereafter the party 
claimed to combat communism with social and economic reforms. 
In fact, in supporting the E.D.C., it chose to sacrifice 
economic objectives to military objectives. It is rather 
34. L'Aube, Dec. 30-31, 1950, p. 6; Nation, Mar. 15, 1952, 
p. 249; N.Y.Times Mas., Nov. 1, 1953, p. 13; Spectator, 
Mar. 13, 1953, p. 302. 
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>ironic that a party professing that peace is indivisible was-
led into supporting a project of so limited a scope as the 
E.D.c. There were some critics of the M.R.P. who believed 
that N.A.T.O. was opposed in spirit to the creation of a 
"Europe". The Gaullista saw N.A.T.O. as a forerunner of a 
German-American alliance. If this were true, support for 
European integration would represent a choice between that 
and N.A.T.o.35 
However, the choices that were most crucial for the 
M.R.P. were made by the party in ita policy towa.ci Indo-
China and North Africa. The M.R.P. had sought to avoid 
incidents between East and West and to keep the doors always 
open for negotiation. Yet when French national interests 
were directly involved as they were in Indo-China the M.R.P. 
outdid some of ita political competitors in stressing resis-
tance rather than negotiation. On the other hand, in North 
Africa, despite continual doctrinal support for a greater 
degree of independence for the protectorates, the M.R.P. 
failed to resist the pressures of the French bureaucracy and 
other special interest groups. When the M.R.P. leadership 
had a chance thra-g.gh. their position in the Government to take 
action, submission to these pressure groups was the order of 
the day. 
35. N.Y.Times, Nov. 12, 1952, p. 14:3; Manchester Guardian 
Weekly, Oct. 23, 1952, p. 7; Vie Intellectuelle, Mar. 1952, 
p. 95. 
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Resistance in Indo-China 
It appears that the M.R.P. took the simple way out of 
the North African situation, in accepting the status quo. 
But the party would not accept the simple way out of all 
problems. Critics of its policy toward the Far East charged 
that the French burden in Asia was too heavy, and argued 
that France must choose between Asia and Europe. The clamor 
arose in the National Assembly: "You can't do everything; 
you must choosen. This argument, said Bidaul t in early 1951, 
is by its very simplicity pernicious and demoralizing. There 
is nothing more dangerous, he said, than clear, false ideas. 
Which should be saved, liberty in Europe or liberty in Asia? 
Bidaul t maintained that arguments similar to those of the 
party's critics had been advanced against France's conduct 
of the Seven Years' v/ar, (Note: whose liberty was being saved 
then?) ani they had also been raised by Georges Bonnet in 
1939 with reference to Nazi expansion. How long would the 
French Union last, asked Teitgen, after Indo-China was given 
up? In such a case he foresaw (quite accurately) a chain 
reaction which would run through the other French territories. 
To choose one responsibility among several, said L'Aube, 
often leeds to the abdication of all. 36 
Little attention was given by the M.R.P. to the possi-
bility of negotiating a settlement with the enemy in Indo-
36. Forces Nouvelles, Oct. 11, 1952, p. 1; L'Aube, Jan. 8, 
1951, p. 3. 
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China. The heretical proposal of Denis in 1951 for negptia-
tion w1 th Ho Chih :r.tinh, leader of Viet Minh, was quickly 
squelched by the party leadership. 
, 
Later Le Brun Karis did 
contemplate the possibility of negptiating with Communist 
China, and Paul Coste-Floret (formerly Minister for Overseas 
France) suggested French support for the admission of Com-
munist China to the U.N. in return for Russian tolerance of 
the entry of Bao Dai' s Indo-China. Also his proposal for an 
international conference to solve the problems of Southeast 
Asia was ratified by a motion of the 1952 M.R.P. congress. 
But the M.R.P. was opposed to internationalizing the conflict 
itself. Coste-Floret and others were at this stage "dead 
set" against the sending of U1 N. troops to Indo-China. An-
oth~r Korea· should be avoided. 37 It would appear that the 
M.R.P., believing that U.N. assistance would mean u.s. assis-
tance, and self-conscious about its status as the 11American 
party", bent over backwards on the surface at least to oppose 
this development. 
So far it would seem that negptiation had its proper 
place in the formation of M.R.P. policy. But when it came to 
implementation of that policy by party members in the Govern-
ment, a different picture developed. Letourneau, Minister 
for Overseas France for a long time and thereafter High 
37. New Statesman and Nation, May 12, 1951, pp. 526-7; L'Aube 
Oct. 23, 1950, p. 2; Forces Nouve11es,May 31, 1952, pp. 8, 
11, 12. 
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Commissioner to Indo-China, haQ. to bear the brunt of' the 
Indo-China war. He frequently called attention to the 
"imperious necessity'' of keeping French troops in Indo-
China to protect the latter against anarchy ani to provide 
a rampart against totalitarianism. But Letourneau concen-
trated too much on making war (often quite ineffectively) to 
the exclusion of attempts to negptiate a settlement. If' 
Schuman as foreign minister referred to independence as a 
final objective for Indo-China, Letourneau and La Brun KEfris 
argued that membership in the French Union would guarantee 
the "independ.ence" of the Associated States. 38 
When doubts were cast by Nehru on the sincerity of the 
French gpal of independence for Viet Nam, the M.R.P. answer 
was that the Vietnamese feared above all else the departure 
of the French. Moreover, France was also fighting for India. 
Was not the road from Moscow to Paris, aooo:rUing to Lenin's 
prediction, through Peking and Calcutta? Bidaul t and Letour-
neau agreed that the Indo-China war was equal in importance 
to that in Korea. ''The cause is the same, and so is the ad-
versary", said Bidaul t. Even if all the 150,000 French 
soldiers were returned from Ind.o-China, Western European 
security would still not be assured and on the other hand all 
southeast Asia would be open to Soviet expansion.39 And yet, 
38. L'Aube, and. Forces Nouvelles, loc. cit.; also see Appen-
dix A; Manchester Guardian Weekly, Apr. 20, 1950, p. 15; 
L'Aube, Apr. 11, 1950, p. 2; June 10-11, p. 4; June 30, pp. 
1; 3. 
,39. L'Aube, Oct. 11, 1950, p. 1; Oct. 14-15, p. 1; Jan. 19, 
1951, p. 3; Jan. 18, p. 3; Jan. 23, p. '· 
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·for reasons already not~, the l-1.R.P. wanted no outside help 
which was likely to menace France's special position in 
Indo-China. This put the party in an impossible impasse. 
M.R.P. in a Dilemma 
France had abundant ani justifiable reasons in the eyes 
of the M.R.P. for hanging on in Indo-China. But how effec-
tive was the prosecution of the war under the guiding hand 
of Letourneau? First as Minister of Overseas France and later 
as High Commissioner for Indo-China, Letourneau referr~ 
again and again to the excellent morale of the troops. In 
May, 1952 he gave figures to contradict the charge that 
France had her fighting done for her by "mercenaries 11 • But 
by that time the M.R.P. leaders had accept~ at least the 
ne~ of a native Vietnamese Army. Also in December, 1950 a 
treaty had been signed in the presence of Letourneau pro-
viding for military aid from the United States. Neverthe-
less, Letourneau continued to resist actual recourse to inter-
national military assistance, and Schuman supported this 
stand, although he was reproached by French senators for 
failing to seek allied aid. 40 
The National Assembly was quite disturb~ at the actual 
conduct of military operations. If the operations had been 
40. Ibid., Oct. 23, 1950, p. 1; Nov. 20, p. 1; Nov. 14, p. 
3; Nov. 17, p. 1; Nov. 23, pp. 1, 4; Dec. 8, p. 1; D~c. 25, 
p. 1; also London Times, May 10, 1952, p. 5e; L'Annee Poli-
tique, 1952, p~ 284. See comment in the National Assembly, 
Journal des Debate, Oct. 24, 1953, p. 4563. 
166 
,effective, the arguments of Ivl.R.P. leaders might have borne . 
more weight. In the spring of 1952 Letourneau was criticized 
for unwise interference With military operations. One par-
ticular "unlucky advance" which had unfortunate results was 
made against the judgment of the military commander de Lattre 
and at the insistence of Letourneau, who was charged with 
wishing to impress Washington. By the following year France 
was tiring of carrying on the struggle alone. But in Nov-
ember the National Assembly supported the policy of fighting 
to the finish, with certain provisos. These were that there 
should be an increase of native Viet Nam troops (who were 
still conspicuous by their absence), that the Government 
should seek to negotiate a cease-fire agreement, and that 
the subdivisions of Indo-China would be promised uind.epen-
dence" w1 thin the French Union. 41 
The M.R.P. was not alone in its dilemma on the Indo-
Chinese issue; no French leader seemed to have an idea how 
to end the confusion. There were continual attacks on 
Letourneau, however, for raising questions of "face" or 
saying that a declaration of willingness to negotiate would 
lead to the "massacre of the expeditionary force". But 
Letourneau warned the National Assembly that an appeal to 
Ho Chih Minh would break the morale of the troops and create 
the impression that France was not going to fulfill her 
41. Nation, Mar. 15, 1952, p. 249; Vital Speeches, Nov. 1, 
1953, p. 43; Christian Centu~y, Nov. 11, 1953, p. 1285. 
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promises to Indo-China. He had said ln early 1952 that the 
Government would in no case treat directly with Ho Chih Minh, 
who was too important in the Communist game to be alone. 42 
The split within the M.R.P. over the question of nego-
tiation in Indo-China widened in 1953. The party congress 
that year supported international negotiation, and so did 
Schuman·~ on his own. But Denis asked why Russia would wish 
to help France out of the Indo-China mess. He favored direct 
negotiation with Ho Chih Minh, as did the more respected 
party critic Monteil, who thought France still had some 
trumps left. 43 The leaders who held the reins were adamant. 
Bidault held out for a continuation of the war. Both Letour-
neau and Teitgen were confident that only firmness could 
bring a satisfactory result for weakness would merely post-
pone the day of the real "cease-fire". But firmness had 
merely led to disaster in the surrender at Dian Bien Phu. 
France was slowly on the way out, and rationalization became 
/ 
the order of the day. La Brun Karis argued that the strate-
gic importance of Tonkin had been exaggerated; Cochin China 
in the south, he said, was most important. 44 
42. L'Anne~ Politique, 1952, pp. 195, 205; N.Y.Times, Apr. 
2, 1952, p. 6:3; Manchester Guardian Weekly, Apr. 17, 1952, 
p. 5; Esprit, Jan., 1953, pp. 81-7. 
43. Forces Nouvelles, May 30, 1953, p. 12; June 5, pp. 6-7; 
N.Y.Times, June 11, 1953, p. 1:4; June 26, p. 4:8; Journal 
des D®ats, Oct. 23, 1953, pp. 4580, l!-613-4615. 
44. N.Y.Times, Jan. 11, 1954; Forces Nouvelles, May 8, 1954, 
p. 6; Le Monda, May 4, 1954, p. 2:3; May 11, p. 4:1. 
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Most M.R.P. leaders interviewed by the author in early 
1954 opposed international assistance in the Indo-China war. 
Although Bidaul t was reported to have approved in January, 
1954 of direct American military aid, the party as such op-
posed this, and attention was called in the Secretariat to 
the contrast between American and French purposes in Asia. 
The United States wanted primarily to atop communism and the 
French primarily to stop the Indo-China war. 45 Yet events 
were more demanding than doctrine, and at the Berlin confer-
ence of February, 19,54 Bidault declared France's willingness 
"to take any meanatt to make peace in Indo-China, subject to 
agreement of the Associated States, 
In the eyes of Bidault, Russia was on the offensive in 
Asia and on the defensive in Europe. Hence Bidaul t believed 
the chance for an accord over Germany was smaller than over 
Asian problems. But there should be no artificial link, he 
said, between European and Asian problems, no "marchandage 
planetairett" . The attack upon Government policy on Indo-
China, which during this period was identical with official 
M.R.P. policy, was often a pretext for those who were basic-
ally opposed to the · program of European construction. For 
the political strength of the M.R.P., staunchest supporter 
46 
of :&..uropean integration, was thereby being sapped. 
45. La Monda, loc. cit.; also Jan. 6, 1954, 1:5; Forces Nou-
velles, Apr. 10, 1954, p. 3; La Croix, Jan. 6, 1954, p. 1:5. 
Also see Appendix A. 
46. Le Monde, Jan. 12, 1954, p. 5:1; Feb. 11, p. 1:3; N,Y. 
Times, Jan. 29, 1954, p. 1; Jan. 26, p. 4:2; Figaro, Apr. 26, 
1954, p. 1:4; Forces Nouvelles, May 8, 1954, p. 6. 
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Criticism mounted against the M.R.P. 's "wall of' silence" 
which was said to have been substi tutE!d for negotiation in 
Inio-China. In the fall of 1953 Mollet had lEd a Socialist 
demand for the end of "blood-letting" in Inio-China, and it 
was the Socialist stani on Indo-China that complicatEd M.R.P. 
tactics in June, 1954 at the time of a possible change in 
the Government. 47 CompouniE!d with th1.s Socialist opposition 
were the continual attacks by the Communists. As early as 
February, 1950 they had demaniE!d a plain French w1 thdrawal 
from Indo-China. The author w1 tnessE!d a sharp verbal attack 
launched in the National Assembly by :Madame Peyrolles (Ivl .R.P.) 
upon the Communist deputies in April, 1954. They had refused 
to rise with the others in tribute to the soldiers involved 
in the disaster of Dien Bien Phu. .,Young men twenty years 
old die, and they don't even rise!" she exclaimed, and was 
silenced by the presiding officer - ~nly with great difficulty. 48 
Since the 1954 M.R.P. congress was held at the same time 
as the Geneva conference of the Big Four with Communist China, 
the only motion dealing with Indo-China merely reflected con-
fidence in Bidaul t, who had been given "carte blanche" by the 
French cabinet. 
/ .. 
Le Brun Karis, as rapporteur on French Union 
47. T~oignage Chr~tien, Jan. 1, 1954, p. 11:2; May 7, p. 
5:5; L 1Aube, May 29, 1950, p. 1; N.Y.Times, May 30, 1950, 
p. 7:3; May 16, 1951, p. 17:1; Nov. 17, 1952, p. 11:5; New 
Republic, Oct. 5, 1953, p. 6; Spectator, Mar. 13, 1953, 
p. 302; Le Monde, June 1, 1954, p. 1:4. / 
48. Nation, Feb. 25, 1950, p. 170; Journal des Debats, Oct. 
23, 1953, p. 4568; Le Monda, Apr. 11-12, 1954, p. 3:1. 
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policy, was also silent on the Ind.o-Cl1ina situation in order 
not to embarrass the foreign minister,. However, in an inter-
/ 
view w1 th the au:bhor not long before that, Le Brun Keris had 
said that there had been a basic error in French policy when 
the French Government bowei to Amari can pressure to make the 
premature declaration of July, 1953 preparing Viet Nam for 
independence. Although the p~rty specialist on the area was 
quite critical of American tactics, by implication he was 
also quite critical of the party• s for•eign minister in the 
Government (Bidaul t) who had given in to the United States. 
,. 
Despite these criticisms, Le Brun Keris saw no satisfactory 
solution of the Indo-China problem. 49 
At no cost, said Bidaul t in the troubled spring of 1954, 
should the European Defense Community "be exchangei for Indo-
China". Nor should settlement of the Indo-China issue be 
made a condition preceient for the approval of the E.D. C. 
treaty. The M.R.P. would not sacrifice this phase of Euro-
pean integration for more support in the defense of Indo-
China. Time and again Bidaul t had held out against any 
"marchand age planetaire" (worldwide bargains). He was asked 
in the National Assembly whether he believed that Moscow and 
Peking would make free presents in Asia, since in the eyes of 
these critics France had few trumps left there. "vve shall 
see", said Bidaul t. In this "wager" of Bidaul t, said the 
49. Forces Nouvelles, May 30, 1953, p. 12; June 5, 1954, pp. 
6-7; also see Appendix A. 
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political commentator Servan-Schreiber, a great part of' the · 
national destiny was in play. If' the wager :failed, he said, 
the Government would be replaced by a neutralist government. 50 
Before the wager :failed and Bidault was replaced by his 
' arch-rival Mendes-France in June, 195L~, the Western powers 
met in con:ference with Russia and China at Geneva. The 
French gave particular credit to ~idault for securing the 
agreement of the West to this con:ference. His purpose was 
to contact Peiping directly rather than try to negotiate with 
Ho Chih Minh, leader of the Viet Minh. But the unity :found 
among the Western powers at Berlin in .February was missing 
at Geneva in April and May. Colin, Secretary-General of' the 
M.R.P., made the bitter comment that until it met, a confer-
ence including China was considered in France to be the best 
chance for peace in Asia. But when it met it was attacked as 
a method of evading a solution of' the I ndo-China problem. 
tfuen Bidault returned from Geneva to speak to the National 
' Assembly, he was met by acrimonious charges from Mendes-
France ani demands :for a cease-fire in Asia. The handling 
of' the Inio-China affair and the Geneva conference were the 
immediate causes of the eviction of' the M.R.P. from control 
of' the foreign ministry after ten years of tenure. 51 
50. Le Mond.e, Feb. 26, 1954, p. 4:1; Mar. 17, p. 1:3; Apr. 
16, p. 1:2. Time, Sept. 13, 1954, p. 28. For the opinion of 
Schuman see Ibid., Mar. 25, p. 3:4. 
51. N.Y.Times, Feb. 19, 1954, p. 2:2; Forces Nouvelles, 
Mar. 27, 1954, p. 1. 
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In his report on the French Union at the :t-f.R.P. congree'S 
, 
of 1954, Le Brun Keris saw the picture in a larger focus. 
The "master-woro" of nationalism, he said, had entered Asia 
-
along with the "baggage" of colonialism. The French could 
not close their eyes to the growing importance of Aaia, es-
pecially in view of the weakening of Europe. 52 
Retribution had set in: the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man was being turned against its authors, the French. 
There is a balance wheel operating in politics, as in other 
affairs of life; no movement works always to the aP.vantage 
of its originators. 
Submission to the Fifth Estate 
1n North Africa 
During the spring of 1954 the North African situation 
had been overshadowed by the growing tension in Southeast 
Asia. Young Frenchmen were dying there. They might die in 
North Africa in the future, but as often is the case the 
future gave way to the present in the public mind. The 
future, however, came fast, and in 1956 raised the North 
African situation to the forefront of French concern. 
In North Africa, as in Indo-China, the M.R.P. made a 
choice. Despite their ideological emphasis on human and 
social values, and despite the implications of decentraliza-
tion to be found in their doctrine of pluralism, the leaders 
52. Le Monda, ]!lay 15, 1954, p. 5:2; Forces Nouvelles, 
June 5, 1954, pp. 6-7. Also Appendix A. 
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of the M.R.P. made a choice again and contradicted words with 
deeds in submitting to the pressures of the French bureau-
cracy and of other special interest groups, a fifth estate 
with strength overshadowing that of the fourth estate, the 
press. The result was a hesitant approach by the party's 
representatives in the Government and especially vague pro-
nouncements of policy at official party meetings. When 
Vignes, party specialist on Tunisia, referred to pressures 
exerted by local administrators in the protectorates, and 
opposed a new •'Middle Ages" with bastions created against 
the power of any central authority, he failed to realize 
that M.R.P. pluralism might lead toward something similar 
to this. For pluralism has a two-edged blade. Moreover, 
when it came to suggesting specific reforms, Vignes was 
quite vague. Certain topics were out of discussion, he 
said, such as the "general interests of France" and the 
guarantee of the private interests of all French settlers 
in Tunisia. 53 
The Resident Generals dominated the Quai d 'orsay which 
itself was 11une maison venerable", and were in turn compro-
mised by irresponsible actions of local "fonctionnaires 11 • 
Even more important was the influence of the French settlers 
("colons"} which was far out of proportion to their numbers.54 
53. Forces Nouvelles, May 30, 1953, p. 12. 
54. Satu!Uay Evening Post, May 28, 1955, p. 81; Le Monda, 
Mar. 9, 1954, p. 2:3; May 11, p. 6:5; May 18, p. 6:5; 
La Nef, Mar., 1953, pp. 138-141. 
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By December, 1951 Schuman had been foJ:-ced primarily by the 
pressure of the "colons'' to reverse his relatively progres-
sive policy. He also gave the support of silence to the 
doctrine of "co-sovereignty", ani at another point referred 
to an association with Tunisia based on the tradi tiona of 
France, "a Moslem power"! Usually the M.R.P. had been 
insistent, in contrast, on a reverse assimilation of the 
Moslems into French culture,55 
Opposition to Schuman was increasing in the National 
Assembly in 1952, having been precipitated by a military 
attack on Destourians on Cap Bon in Tunisia. Although the 
National Assembly rejected a motion by the Gaullists to 
declare Schuman incompetent to handle the Tunisian question, 
it opposed the extent of the Government' a proposed reforms. 
On the other hand, some of the M.R.P. deputies as well as 
the Socialists thought the reforms had not gone far enough. 
When France took a strong line in March, 1952 by arresting 
the Tunisian cabinet, Schuman had been strongly criticized 
by members of his own party for having "left policy to sub-
o!'1inates ". It was little help to Schuman that Premier 
Pinay belatedly rushed to his defense.56 
55. Manchester Gua!'1ian \veekly, Sept, 18, 1952, p, 7; Vie 
Intellectuelle, Dec., 1951, p. 93; May, 1952, pp. 69, 74-80; 
Esprit, Jan., 1952, pp. 75-76. 
56. Terre Humaine, Jan., 1952, pp. 77-84; London Times, Mar, 
28, 1952, p. 48; N,Y,Times, May 27, 1952, p, 1:7; June 21, 
p. 1:2, 
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Pressure group activity was at t h e center of the delays-
and contradictions in M.R.P. North African policy. Accord-
ing to the British correspondent Werth, the ''crazy policy 
of the colons (French settlers in Nort.h Africa) was allowed 
by the Government to triumph all along the line". This ex-
perienced correspondent referred to the strength of' other 
pressure groups linked w1 th the colons, such as the Employ-
er' s Federation and the Bank of' France. Within the M.R.P., 
Dupraz was unier a cloud of' accusations of' being an uhomme 
des trusts". Not only trusts, howevei', were active, but 
also bureaucrats, as has been seen. "bo:-sovereignty" had 
been the suggestion of' the colons for a new regime in 'funi-
sia; this would work in favor of the bureaucrats as well. 
Lecourt, parliamentary leader,_: of the M. R.P., referred in 
1953 to the co-sovereignty of the ucorporative" trusts and 
administrative groups in the Government. It did not seem 
to occur to M. R.P. leaders that such a situation might also 
be the logical outcome of the actual enactment of the party 
doctrine of pluralism. The danger lay in the "replacement 
of Parliament by the Government, and of the Government by 
the administrative agencies~.57 
57. New Statesman and Nation, Jan. 23, 1954, p. 89; Feb. 13, 
p. 183; N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1950, p. 27:5; N.Y. Times Mag., 
Nov. 1, 1953, p. 28; Esprit, June, 1953, pp. 853-901; Feb., 
1954, p. 255. See other pressure groups in Barrat, Robert, 
Justice pour le Maroc, pp. 150-154. 
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It can be said in favor of Bidault that, while foreign 
minister, he did not try to avoid responsibility for actions 
of "functionaries" in Morocco. But at the same time he did 
not try to curb such actions. Nor did other leaders of the 
M.R.P., except that a few of them signed the manifesto of 
the Comite'France-Maghreb which was fighting the banking 
pressure g~ups.58 It was only after Schuman was replaced 
as foreign minister in early 1953 that he cri ticize;:l the 
ineffectiveness of central authority in France. Since the 
Liberation, said Schuman, France had been governed by a 
- ' , . 
"systeme colleg1ale 11 leading to anonymous decisions and 
resulting in mediocrity. He assigned the principal respon-
sibility for the situation to the Resident Generals. The 
control from Paris was very limited. In calm periods min-
isters of foreign affairs got the credit, and they were 
blamed in case of reverses. Schuman recommended a rav'ision 
of the French administrations in the protectorates, and a 
return to the idea of exact responsibility of lower adminis-
trative echelons. There must be no delay, he said. "Our 
worst enemy is routine which knows only how to trust the 
past". 59 
58. Le Monds, Mar. 9, 1954, p. 2:3; Reoorter, Dec. 22, 1953, 
p. 19; Terre Humaine, Sept.-oct., 1953, pp. 11-27; Vie 
Intellectuelle, Jan., 1954, pp. 41-2, 51, 58; La Nef, Mar., 
1953, pp. 71-2; Esprit, Sept., 1953, pp. 351-378; Barrat, 
QQ. cit., pp. 86, 95, 108. 
59. Terre Huma1ne, Apr., 1953, pp. 1-4; La Nef, Mar., 1953, 
pp. 7-9 et seq. 
177 
Certainly Schuman had put his finger on a m-ajor source 
of trouble. But he had been in the foreign ministry for 
years. If there must be no delay, why had he not tried 
harder to change the situation? If he had laid the princi-
pal blame on the rest of the ministers in the Government 
who could have overruled him, he would have had some excuse. 
But Schuman directed his criticism at the misfeasance or 
nonfeasance of suboroinate officials, many of whom were under 
his control. Lamennais, the early Christian democrat, had 
said, "He who despairs of convincing others, either commits 
blasphemy against the power of truth, or else lacks confi-
dence in the truth of the doctrines he supports''. Finally, 
Schuman said that France had not chosen between various pol-
icies for North Africa. But in submitting to the colons, 
to the 11fe6daux'' (local administrators), and to the banking · 
interests, France and the M.R.P. had made a choice in 
practice. 60 
In 1954 the political writer Raymond Aron considered 
Schuman's record on policy toward Tunisia a demonstration 
of his inefficiency as foreign minister. Poher, M.R.P. 
senator, found a particular reason for Schuman's failure in 
North Africa. He said Schuman had been too good to the 
lower functionaries. In another interview with the author 
Borne told of an occasion when Juin, Resident-General in 
Moro ceo, had seized an issue of L 'Au be for publishing a 
60. •rerre Humaine, June-July, 1953, p. 156. 
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speech of Schuman in the National Assembly on North African 
policy. Anyone else, said Borne, would have taken immediate 
action against Juin, but not Schuman; nothing was done.61 
One of the reasons for the success or the M.R.P. in re-
taining the foreign ministry for ten years was to be round 
in the French political tradition of executive control or 
foreign policy with little interrerence from Parliament. 
But by 1953 ani 1954 the tradition was losing some of its 
force. Also, the M.R.P. had to accept compromises in North 
Africa in order to retain the support of as many Radical 
Socialists as possible for the success of its policy or 
European integration. The Radical Socialists were bound up 
closely with the vested interests. This brings us to the 
Q).ost significant point: "faits accomplis", which had worked 
in the past in the interests of the foreign ministry, were 
now being accomplished on the lower levels. The M.R.P. 
foreign ministers were handicapped by situations created by 
subordinates. Besides the control of other special inter-
ests, a particularly effective control is to be found in 
the influence exerted by the permanent officials at the Quai 
d'Orsay. They made it possible to preserve the continuity 
of a foreign policy, although it might not always be the 
61. See Anpendix A; also N.Y.Times, Jan. 4, 1953, IV, 
p. 8:1. 
same one as that of a political appointee to the post of 
foreign min1ster.62 
Too Little and Too Late in North Africa 
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The editor of L' Aube, Corval, was unorthodox w1 thin the 
M.R.P. in his direct approach to the issues raised in North 
Africa. 63 He said the notion of a protectorate was pass~ 
"When your son has grown", said the Arab proverb, "make him 
your brother." In supporting the Sultan and the Moroccan 
nationalists, Istiqlal, Corval declared that "we take our 
responsibility for this stand u. 64 
Who were the "we" who took this clear stand? In a 
meeting w1 th the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the National 
Assembly Schuman supported the Sultan as the "natural mid-
dleman" between France and the North African people. But 
directives to Resident-General Juin from the foreign min-
ister did not seem to take effect. This highest French 
official in Morocco demanded, in fact, that the Sultan con-
demn Istiqlal. .And Schuman himself hat!. been opposed to any 
62. See Appendix A; also see Frederick Schuman, War and Dip-
lomacy in the French Republic (esp. p. 128) and Howard, 2£• 
cit., p. 152 for situation under the Third Republic; also 
Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Feb., 1951, p. 105. Be-
tween 1946 and 1951 the rate of continuity of cabinet mini-
sters themselves never fell below 45%. Pflimlin and Schuman 
had the longest tenure: 33 months. Journal of Politics, Nov. 
1952, pp. 643-658. 
63. Algeria has been technically outside the scope of this 
study of foreign policy in its status as part of metropoli-
tan France. 
64. N.Y.Times, Dec. 17, 1952, p. 10:3; L'Aube, Sept. 18, 
19 50, p. 1; Nov. 1, p. 3; Oct. 10, p. 3; Jan. 13-14, 1951, 
p. 1. 
interference by the United Nations, which had intervened 
over the Moroccan issue when Egypt made a complaint. 65 
Was it, then, Bidault who had taken a clear stand? 
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When he took over from Schuman in early 1953, his proposals 
to solve the Moroccan problem were full of generalities. 
They did not appear as forward-looking as those of Schuman 
had been. Boisdon of the M.R.P. National Committee reflec-
ted the party's attitude when he said that if North Africa 
should leave the "mouvance francaise", Black Africa would 
l!J 
follow. "We have decided to defend our institutions", he 
said. The argument was that the French took naturally to 
centralized administration, ani were not used to the idea 
of a policy for protectorates. But they had had seventy 
years to learn, in the case of Tunisia, and fifty in the 
case of Morocco • 66 
Bidaul t spoke of Morocco and Tunisia in what seemed to 
be "precise and generous" terms in his bid for the premier-
ship in June, 1953. But his actions belied his words when 
the crisis came in August. 67 At the time of the 1951 rup-
ture between el Glaoui, the Pasha of ~Iarra.kech, and the 
Sultan, the French Government had leaned toward. support 
65. L'Aube, Feb. 3-4, 1951, p. 3; Feb. 20, p. 1; Terre 
Humaine, Mar., 1951, pp. 90-94; London Times, Nov. 14, 
1951, p. 6e; Dec. 14, p. 6d. 
66. London Times, loc. cit., Terre Humaine, Dec., 1951, pp. 
126-131. / 
67. Terre Humaine, Sept.-oct., 1953, pp. 11-27; L'Annee 
Politigue, 1953, p. 503. See also Barrat, Q£. cit., pp. 
101-2, 109. 
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for the former. Friction increased, and violence broke out . 
in December, 1952. This was in itself a protest against 
the killing of a nationalist leader in Tunisia. The climax 
came on August 17, 1953, when the French Government ordered 
Resident-General Guillaume to protect the Sultan of Morocco. 
But this was to no avail, and after a stormy cabinet meeting 
on August 19, the Government stand was reversed. The Sultan 
was removed the following day, an action characterized at 
the time by an American wri tar as a "ghastly mistake". And 
in retrospect, this does not seem an exaggeration.68 ' 
A week later Bidaul t outlined a 11vast plan of reforms 11 , 
and declared that France's main concern was to maintain 
treaty obligations through an attempt at reconciliation. 
The course, he said, was justified by the return of calm. 
But it was the calm before the storm. Criticism mounted 
within the M.R.P. as well as wi t hout. The editor of Esprit 
declared that in this Moroccan incident the extent of offi-
cial lies reached the level of 1940-1941. He charged the 
French Government with complicity with the United States. 
Fra~ois Mauriac, in his turn, said that a width of i n ter-
stellar space separated Bidault as foreign minister from 
Bidault the journalist of the 1930's. Mauriac called on 
the electors and militants of the M.R.P. to learn finally 
to speak as masters of the party. But this was unlikely to 
68. Sat. Eve. Post, May 28, 1955, p. 78; Esprit, Feb., 1951 
pp. 276-281, Lorden Times, .Aug. 27, 19 53, p. 6g. 
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happen in a party as centralized as the M.R.P. 69 
The M.R.P. followed, rather than ordered, what had hap-
pened. But Bidault, not wishing to oppose the "complot", 
covered it up in a surprising fashion. He said to the Coun-
cil of Ministers, as they considered possible punishment of 
Moroccan administrative of'ficials who had forced the Govern-
ment' s reversal, "one doesn't punish people who succeeded so 
., -
well 11 ! "They keep gpod step~~, said Domenach of Esprit, "the 
children ~f the choir! n70 
The rest was anticlimactic for the M.R.P. In 1954 party 
leaders favored an iucrease in the numbers of French police 
in Morocco but a change in their methods, and also the crea-
tion of a political party of French residents there in order 
to undermine the influence of pressure groups. 71 No parti-
cular advance was maP.e in this M.R.P. policy at the Congress 
of 1954, although the members were unusually polite and con-
siderate to the North African delegates. The general impres-
sion of the author as an observer at this congress was that 
the relegation of French Union and North African issues to 
the last afternoon of the congress was significant. It in-
dicated. a desire of the party not to get any more embroiled 
69. London Times, loc. cit.; Terre Humaine, Sept.-oct., 1953 
pp. 11-27; Esprit, Sept., 1953, pp. 351-378; Le Monda, Jan. 
27, 1954, p. 4:1; Apr. 15, p. 4:3; Buron was an M.R.P. leader 
who seemed to support the_... transfer to J~oroccans of definite 
responsibilities. See Temoignage Chretien, May 21, 1954, p. 
1:3. 
70. Esprit, Oct.-Nov., 1953, p. 658; Reporter, Dec. 22, 1953, 
p. 19. 
71. Forces Nouvelles, Apr. 24, 1954, p. 3; May 8, p. 5; May 
·22, p. 4; also see Appendix A. 
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over these matters than necessary, On a smaller scale it 
illustrated the French tendency to be always "late with an 
idea" in North ·Africa. 72 
When new Tunisian reforms were put into effect under 
Bidaul t in March, 1954, they were immediately attacked from 
both sides, Terrorist bands became active again, and it was 
not until April 22, 1955, long after the M.R.P. had lost con-
trol of the foreign ministry, that an accord was reached 
which, it was hoped, would be more lasting. But the M.R.P . 
ministers, while in office, had delayed action too long. 
About a year later France was brought to recognize the in-
dependence of Morocco and Tunisia, and at the date of 
writing Algeria, part of metropolitan France, is moving in 
the same direction. If the M.R.P., and specifically Bidaul t 
had stood behind the Sultan o.f Morocco (since returned to 
his post), that protectorate might have accepted a com-
73 promise solution. 
72. Forces Nouvelles, June 5, 1954, pp. 6-7. 
73. N,Y,Times, Mar, 12, 1954, p, 2:1. 
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CHAPTER VII 
}111 . R.P. TACTICS 
Disadvantages of P articipation 
in the Government 
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The Ivl .R.P. had to :facr the test of imme1iate success in 
1945. The result was that its leaders were soon forced to 
play the political game. A middle course was more or less 
required of the M.R.P. by its position in French politics. 
Cabinet members and deputies in the Assembly gaine1 great 
importance in the party from the fact that the M.R.P. was a 
Government party, never in opposition, during the first ten 
years of its life. But at the same time such a position of 
responsibility was a definite obstacle to the outwa.I\i ex-
pression of the party "mystique" or ideology •1 
It is little wonder, then, that at least from 1953 on 
many labor allies on the left wing of the M.R.P., such as 
the members of the C.F.T.C., became disenchanted with the 
party. The opposition of Catholic trade unions to the Euro-
pean Defense Community was based on the belief that it 
would lead to a disequilibrium of the Atlantic alliance. 
1. Occidente, loc. cit., p. 378; Politigue, July-Aug., 1948, 
p. 634. Fre"Ville, local leader and mayor of Rennes, was an 
illustration of this transition from a theoreticaJ. to a 
practical approach. See Appendix A. 
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In Reconstruction, the journal of the left wing of the C.F. 
T.c., the complaint was voiced that instead of facing a 
Russian military danger and a German economic danger, in 
ten years France might face a German military danger and a 
Russian economic danger. 2 
French labor groups are always prone to be suspicious 
of politics. In the earlier years of its growth, the M.R.P. 
did not feel the effect of this. The party congress of 
1950 had included numerous workers, and in the elections of 
1951 about one seventh of the total vote of the M.R.P. came 
from the seventeen most industrialized departments. Goguel 
maintained in 1954 that there were still more workers be-
hind the :D<i.R.P. than behind the Socialists. The situation 
for the M.R.P. should also improve, he said, from the disin-
tegration of the Gaullists. But a change had already set 
in by the time of the exclusion of Denis in January of 1954. 
Denis had been careful to keep close to the laboring class. 
The M .R.P., said Domenach of Esprit, "has chosen its com-
panions", and now it had only a weak link to the workers 
through Borne. Domenach charged that Borne was coniemned 
to live like a parasite within the party.3 
2. R~onstruction, Jan, 1954, pp. 1-5; Apr., p. 19. 
3. See ~~pendix A; also L'Aube, May 19, 1950, p. 1; Esprit, 
Feb., 195 : pp. 253-255; Einaudi and Goguel, QQ. cit., p.l87. 
Goguel's figures on the elections of 1951 are puzzling; else-
where he said that 41.5% of the M.R.P. total vote came from 
the seventeen departments, while only 38.9% of the total Com-
munist vote came from them. Esprit, Sept., 1951, p. 364. 
Christian Century, Oct. 14, 1953, p. 1160; Manchester Guar-
dian Y.Teek1y, Oct. 22, 1953, p. 2; Reporter, Sept. 16, 1952, 
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Goguel maintained that there was a greater danger that · 
the M.R.P. would lose the support of intellectuals than that 
of the workers. 4 Under the guidance of its editor, Domenach, 
Esprit was moving away from the party. A referendum taken 
in 1953 revealed that 90% of Christian trade union leaders 
favored the Iv! .R.P. -supported plan for European integration, 
in principle. More reticence on this issue was found among 
the intellectuals than among the workers. In all French 
parties intellectuals are more important than in those of 
the United States. The influence of intellectual groups 
through the press in France is far out of proportion to their 
numbers. Therefore it is important to pay proper attention 
to opinions expressed in the very influential journal Esprit. 
On the other hand, Esprit's prestige is balanced by its small 
circulation, being about 15,000 in 1954. Mallet of the 
M.R.P. Secretariat looked upon the directors of Esprit as a 
tight little group of non-political philosophers.5 
The alienation of the workers and the intellectuals on 
the political left was not surprising, since any party 
which remains in the government for ten years is bound to 
become more conservative. Through its retention of the 
3. (cont.) p. 5; N.Y.Times, Nov. 15, 1953; Jan. 28, 1954; 
Jan. 31, IV, p. 7:6; Feb. 21, p. 1:1; Feb. 27, p. 6:8. One 
particular reason for . the disenchantment of labor lay in the 
"worker-priest" issue. 
4. See Appendix A. 
5. International Conciliation, Feb., 1953, p. 64; Time, 
Jan. 25, 1954, p. -31 • . 
foreign ministry for that period the M.R.P. had the chance 
to maintain the contiuity of its foreign policy. But at 
the same time the party was handicapped by its continuing 
position of responsibility. Bidault was premier in 1946 
as well as in 1949 and 1950, and Schum~ in 1947 and 1948. 
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After the fall of the Bidault Government in June, 1950, the 
principal M.R.P. members (Schuman, Pflimlin, Letourneau and 
Paul Coste-Floret) were returned in the two succeeding Gov-
ernments. The following year Bidault, as vice premier, 
became one of nine IIIJ:.R.P. members in Queuille' s second cab-
inet. The party again held the key jobs in the Faure cabi-
net of 1952. Bidault was successively vice premier and min-
ister of national defense, Schuman retained the foreign 
ministry, and Pflimlin held the ministry of state for matters 
relating to the Council of Europe, which was about at the 
peak of its influence. 6 
The M.R.P. had begun in 1952 to feel some qualms about 
the significance of this continuing responsibility. When 
Pinay replaced Faure in February the party refused to take 
the ministries for economic, financial and social affairs. 
Although the Socialists were anticlerical, the M.R.P. had 
c<ertain affinities with them in its ideology, and the 
6. President Auriol made the comment, "No matter who is pre-
mier, I always see the same faces around me". Duverger, Q12.. 
cit., p. 15; L'Aube, July 3, 1950, p. 1; July 13, p. 1; N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 11, 195l,p. 11:1; Aug. 9, 1952, p. 1:7; Time, 
Jan. 28, 1952, p. 26; Manchester Gua:rUian·,;weekly, Jan. 24, 
1952, p. 2; Newsweek, Mar. 19, 1951, p. 35. 
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Socialists had refused to support the conservative rightist · 
ministry of Pinay. But Robert Schuman stayed as foreign min-
ister, and Maurice Schumann and Pflimlin held key positions. 
The Mayer Government of early 1953 again included six ~'I .R. P . 
members, and the Laniel Government of 1953 and 1954 had five, 
including Bidault as foreign minister and Teitgen as vice 
premier. 7 
The only Government since 1950 which was headai by a 
member of the M.R.P. was, however, that of Bidaul t in the 
first half of 1950. What, then, did it accomplish in deeds 
in its several months in power? Considerable criticism arose 
outside the M.R.P. at its lack of accomplishments. There 
was a certain justification in Reynaud's words to Bidault, 
"Find a program or get out!" Certainly there was exaggera-
tion in the Government's own proclamation that the Assembly 
"could be proud of its worktt and of the "prodigious and al-
most unprecedented reorganization" that had been accomplishai. 
When the Bidault Government fell in June 1950, it was the 
first time under the Fourth Republic that a government had 
been defeated on a vote of confidence. 8 
7. N,Y.Times, Feb. 29, 1952, p. 1:6; Mar. 7, p. 1:5; Mar. 8, 
p, 1:3; Jan~ 9, 1953, p. 1:5; June 19, p, 1:1; June 29, p. 
1:5; L'Annere Politique, 1952, p. 273. . 
8, Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Jan., 1950, p. 306; 
Apr., 1951, p, 89; N.Y. Times, June 25, 1950, p, 1:2; 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 29, 1950, p. 2. 
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The Hinge 
There is at times a certain value in inaction; hence 
if the M.R.P. was inactive in internal affairs while it was 
in power it was not necessarily unwise. By retaining a 
balance of power between two extremist groups such as the 
Communists and the Gaullists it prevented such extremists 
from coming to power. French foreign policy was thereby 
steerei away from the Communist line and on the other hand 
from a reactionary type of nationalism. In the early days 
of the Fourth Republic the M:.R.P. was the only effective 
counterbalance to the Socialists and Communists. From 1945 
until 1947 "tripartism" was the pattern. The M.R.P. ma1n-
ta1nei the balance in these years, and steerei clear of too 
close association with the CommUllists. Although both par-
ties had a centralize:l structure, the M:.R.P. did not want to 
resemble the Communists otherwise, and after 1947 consistently 
opposei them except in the case of their mutual distrust of 
and distaste for an electoral system allowing for electoral 
alliances.9 
After the rise of the Gaullists in 1947 the M.R.P. be-
came a point of balance between them and the two leftist 
parties. At the Ivi.R.P. congress of 1949 emphasis was placed 
on the theme that the greatest danger for France was to be 
found in the R.P.F. of de Gaulle, not in communism, or else 
9. Wright, QQ. cit., pp. 86-88; Nation, Aug. 6, 1949, 
:p. 124. 
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-in the latter only as re.flecterl through the Gaullists. Com .... 
muniam would play a key role in the resistance to this "new 
.fascism". Hence the M.R.P. sought to avoid a awing toward 
extremes by keeping in power a government coalition o.f the 
10 
"midd 1 e 11 parties • 
Unfortunately, just as under the Third Republic, inter-
nal politics had a paralyzing effect on foreign policy. In 
the midst of a list of parties in the National Assembly num-
bering twenty-three in 1948, the M.R.P. had to maintain a 
central position to preserve its hold on the foreign o.ffice. 
The party managed to persuade the Socialists to stay in the 
Government until 1952. "Agreeing only on their peril, they 
could agree on nothing eise."11 The M.R.P., a party with a 
"red head and a white tail", had to try (in the words o.f 
Bidaul t) to "govern in the center with right-wing methods to 
attain left-wing enis". Its right-wing methods included pre-
serving contact with de Gaulle, although opposing the spec-
tacular and provocative steps of his R.P.F. Bidault made it 
clear in 1951, however, that although he regretted that the 
General hall. "bolted the door", he (Bidaul t) would not be the 
one to ring the bell.l 2 
10. Commonweal, July 22, 1949, p. 360. 
11. White, QR. cit., pp. 11, 91. 
12. Howard, QR. cit., p. 157; Taylor, QR. cit., pp. 83, 212; 
Einaudi and Goguel, QR. cit., pp. 190-200, 214-218; European 
Political Systems (ed. Cole), pp. 663-4; L'Aube, May 18, 1950, 
p. 3; May 17, p. 3; May 11, p. 3; Jan. 8, 1951, p. 3; Terre 
Humaine, June, 1951, pp. 1-2; Current History, Jan., 1951, p. 
14; N.Y.Times, June 18, 1951, p. 1:8; June 20, p. 26:5; 
Journal of Modern History, Sept., 1952, p. 283; New Statesman 
· and Nation, May 12, 1951, p. 527. 
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''Moving straight ahead by devious paths", the M.R.P. 
sought by making concessions to avoid what Bidaul t called 
the old evil of domestic anarchy. After all, he said, "gpv-
ernment is conciliation". By 1951 Bidaul t had b:ecome the 
symbol of the most conciliatory group in the M. R.P. In the 
early fall of that year he was accused by an M.R.P. critic 
of compromising too much in co·nnection with the temporary 
, 
removal of Beuve-~l ery from La Monda. Suffert said that 
Bidaul t, "whose nose is so keen, smelled the wind and felt 
it freshen: it was time for the stroke of purity". Hence 
/ Beuve-I-iery was returned to the control of Le Monde. But 
thereafter Bidaul t was labeled by Domenach as one of the 
-
"double pensants 11 (double thinkers). In foreign policy 
Bidaul t was said tp be "Atlantic i n woros and in acts, but 
resisting the Americans between the pear and the coffee" •1 3 
Duverger had said in 1950 tha t it was time that the 
M.R.P. decided whether to remain faithful to its origins or 
move to the right. The center, he said, is a position that 
does not exist in politics. But in late 1951 the party still 
acted as a hinge, since no majority could exist w1 thout it. 
Although it remained 11fai thful to its origins 11 in 1952 by 
abstaining from various confidence votes on Pinay, the ]II . R. P . 
did not directly provoke the fall of any Government in the 
13. Wright, ~· cit., p. 78; L'Aube, Oct. 24, 1950, p. 4; 
Nation, Oct. 29, 1949, p . 409; N.Y.Times, Aug . 19, 1951, IV, 
p. 5:3; Esprit, Nov., 1951, pp. 663-4. 
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first ten years of its existence. On the other hand, it 
appears that the M. R.P. did not carry conciliation as far as 
to make direct bargains with special interests, whose agents 
were experts in manipulating votes. The party made no use 
of the nblack fund" of the strong Conseil National du Patro-
nat Francais. When Bidaul t was defeated by one vote in the 
summer of 1953, the lack of close contacts of the M. R. P . 
with such business groups doubtless took its to11. 14 
Electoral Tactics 
Much of the reason for the quick rise of the M. R. P . was 
to be found in the electoral system. The "Catholic party" 
gaine:i from the granting of suffrage to women, who are as a 
rule under strong clerical influence in France. Also the 
11 scrutin de listen · device was introduce:i in 1945. This re-
sul te:i usually in voting for parties or programs rather than 
for individuals, and increased the influence of the central-
ized leadership of the M. R.P. In addition this leadership 
steadily supported proportional representation "sans pana-
chage" (no splitting of tickets), since unier t h e Third 
Republic the use of the majority vote and the "run-off" had 
15 led to an anticlerical alliance on the second ballot. 
14. L'Aube, July 7, 1950, p. 3; Duverger, QQ. cit., p. 245; 
Esprit, Oct., 1951, p. 575; N.Y.Times, Mar. 8, 1952, p. 
1:3; Dec. 23, p. 1:1; also see Appendix A. 
15. Occidente, loc. cit., p. 384; Wright, QQ. cit., p. 78; 
also pp. 26-9; Duverger, QQ. cit., p. 392, p. 375; Common-
weal, July 22, 1949, p. 359; Esprit, Jan., 1950, pp. 153-
162. 
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When the new National Assembly was chosen in 1951 under 
a revised electoral law, the M.R.P. lost over two and one 
half million votes and sixty-two deputies, retaining 12.38% 
of the total vote cast. The story of the struggle over 
this electoral reform is a good demonstration of how motives 
can become confused, but being only indirectly connected 
with foreign policy, cannot be ha.niled in detail here. 
Suffice it to say that for reasons of principle as well as 
tactics the M. R.P., ih its support of proportional represen-
tation, prevented the formation of a united front against the 
Gaullists and Communists. Despite the <"curious alliance" be-
tween the M.R.P. and the Communists on the issue of electoral 
reform, and despite feelers by Bidault toward the Gaullists, 
the M.R.P. reflected again its tendency to prefer conciliation 
to compromise. Rather than make specific bargains, party 
leaders are more in£lined to use the gentler but more diffi-
cult tactic of changing the attitude of other contestants for 
power.16 
16. For this contest over electoral reform, see Foreign 
Affairs, Oct., 1951, pp. 146-150; L'Aube, Apr. 24, 1950, p. 
4; May 22, p. 2; Feb, 7, 1951, p. 1; Jan. 15, 1951, p. 1; 
London Times, Apr. 25, 1951, p. 7c; N.Y,Times, Mar. 22, 1951, 
p. 30:5; May 19, 1950, p. 5:1; New Statesman and Nation, 
July 8, 1950, p. 30; News From France, Apr. 15, 1951, pp. 
2-4; Esprit, Apr., 1951, pp. 630-633; Jan., 1950, pp. 153-
162. The 88 seats that the M.R.P. retained after the elec-
tion of 1951 were further reduced to 70 in the next election 
of December, 1955. In 1958 the M.R.P. was still hostile to 
electoral changes that would eliminate or alter the system of 
voting by departments. It did not have enough individual 
candidates or enough local strength to be very successful in 
a system based on electoral districts. N,Y,Times, Feb, 26, 
1958. 
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The more a party is in the government, the more its 
principles are bound to yield to a practical approach. In 
May, 1950 Etienne Borne, the leaP.ing intellectual and theore-
tician of the M.R.P. who was the party's main contact with 
the political Left, had contested the accusation that the 
party hai fallen from the dynamism of Sangnier to the "immo-
-
bilisme" of Guizot. It was necessary, he said, first to de-
feni the Republic against anticons.tt.tutional parties of the 
left and the right.l7 Yet the party teamed up on occasion 
w1 th the left or the right in the electoral battle, which 
was a little unusual for a "movement" that professed uncon-
cern with temporary electoral reverses. The M.R.P. was 
growing more and more jealous in 1951 of Socialist freedom 
from government ties. 18 Even Borne was becoming uncertain 
of the party. In an article entitled ''Should there be a re-
birth of the M.R.P.?" he said that French political history 
was full of movements that had sacrificed the future for the 
present. A secon:l foun:lation of the Movement was needed, de-
clared Borne.l9 
In 1952~ t:P.e M.R.P. was splitting up between Christian 
democrats on the left flank ani what Duverger called "Chris-
tian Radicals" on the right, despite its surface uni t <y. 
17. See Appendix A; also L'Aube, May 27-28, 1950, p. 1. 
18. Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 17, 1952, p. 7. 
19. Terre Humaine, May 1952, p. 1-5. 
The party was charged with supporting the Pinay Government 
w1 th the visible hope of seeing it fail, which would prove 
the incapacity of the right. But if this were the case, 
the plan of the M.R.P. boomeranged. The Pinay Government 
was the turning point of the Fourth Republic. 20 In a 1952 
editorial in Terre Humaine anti tled "Death of the Fourth 
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Republic'', Borne called the Pinay Government a return to 
orthodoxy and at the same time a return to control by pri-
vate interests. Through its hold on the foreign ministry 
under Pinay the M.R.P. became part and parcel of this swing, 
and in particular let itself fall into an impasse over Indo-
China and then over Tunisia. 21 
Effect of Domestic TacUce on M.R.P. 
Foreign Policy 
In considering how the M.R.P. managed to retain control 
of the foreign ministry for such a long time, we have found 
that the party gained some advantages from the post-war 
situation in France, and also compromised or conciliated in 
its domestic policy. But in some cases it refused to bend 
very much, as in the cases of electoral reform, taxation and 
the school question. This cut into the effectiveness of 
M.R.P. foreign policy, since French Governments still fell 
over issues of internal policy, as a rule. 
20. Esprit, Nov., 1951, pp. 663-4; Reporter, Sept. 16, 1952, 
p. 8; American Poll tical Science Review, Dec., 1952, pp. 
1073, 1075. 
21. Terre Humaine, Apr., 1952, pp. l-5. 
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The leaders of the M.R.P. were constantly preoccupied 
with the danger of a break in the continuity of the party's 
foreign policy. At the Paris congress of 1953, for example, 
Schuman intervened. to defeat an attempt by the militants to 
condemn, "post mortemn, the Pinay Government. Tei tgen, 
president of the party; also warned. against going into the 
opposition since it would turn control over to the conserva-
tives, incur the risk of dissolution, and lead to a break or 
reversal in foreign policy. Throughout 1953 there were two 
majorities in the National Assembly, one for internal policy 
and the other for foreign policy. This delayed. any action 
on the European Defense Community. Also the problem of 11free-
dom of education" handicapped M.R.P. foreign policy through-
out 1953. That question alone, said Duverger, separated. the 
l:![ .R.P., except for its extreme right, from the Socialists. 
It is striking that partisans of the E.D.C. were looked upon 
as "leftist" if of the Socialist party, but as "rightists" 
if of the Ivf.R.P. 22 
If the key to M.R.P. compromises at home is to be found 
in its foreign policy, it must not be forsotten that the 
M.R.P. also had to compromise in foreign policy itself. 
Schuman's policy toward Germany was one of ''skating on thin 
ice", trying to satisfy the French who favored. reconciliation 
/ 22. L'Annee Politique, 1953, p. 46; Spectator, Mar. 13, 1953, 
p. 302; N,Y,Times, Dec, 14, 1953; Le Monda, Jan. 14, 1954, 
p. 1:3; American Political Science Review, Dec., 1952, p. 
1073. 
'With Germany (including himself) and also those who were 
unable to choose the "lesser evil", Germany or Russia. He 
agreed to the unfortunate complication of the Pleven Plan 
for a European defense commtini ty primarily to get cabinet 
ag~eement on his Coal and Steel Community. And when the 
European Defense Community was in the process of being 
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drafted, the leaders of the M.R.P. hali to compromise again 
and again with opponents without and also within the party. 
There were those in the R.P.F. who insisted on the separate 
existence and independence of the French army. There was 
the indirect opposition of certain economic organizations. 
De Gaulle himself contended that "all great Europeans hali 
been strongly national", as he ·.threw his influence againat 
the E.D.C. Within the M.R.P. also there were strong sup-
/ porters of nationalism. The senator Hamon was dead set 
against a European army, deriding the "taste for the supra-
national 11 that was then in fashion. 
- / 
Hamon warned that 
peace was no safer with the reduction of the great powers 
to two, and he favored an independent national policy which 
was founded upon a development of the economic status of 
. 23 France. 
23. Luethy, oo. cit., p. 401; Spectator, Jan. 16, 1953, p. 
62; Journal des D~ts, Feb. 13, 1952, pp. 677-683; La 
Revue Politigue, Apr. 25, 1953, pp. 188-9; Manchester 
Guardian Weekly, Nov. 19, 1953, p. 2; Vie Intellectuelle, 
Dec., 1951, pp. 26-59; Terre Humaine, July, 1951, p. 37. 
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It was not only the "heretics" like Hamon in the M.R.P. 
who put such a stress on nationalism. Bidault had claimed 
to be a "fEderalist", but he made statements such as that 
in October, 1950 to the effect that the European army ''did 
not entail any absnionment of national independence". He 
did, however, point out that a European army would rEduce 
national difference ani 11 sacred. egoisms" which are, he said, 
equivalent to suicide. But Houl:Uin of the M.R.P. helped 
little to reduce national differences when in December 1951, 
he quoted a recent statement in the German journal, Der 
Stahlhelm, that "German blood ani language are stronger than 
the idealist vision of the world imposed upon us". 24 
Most of the compromises that the M.R.P. made over the 
E.D.C. were either compromises in words, as indicated above, 
or compromises in time, in o±lher words procrastination. 
During the National Assembly debate of February, 1952, 
Heuillard, a Radical Socialist who had been crippled in Ger-
man captivity, made a "dying speech" against any military 
commitment with Germany. This drew great applause and was 
influential in pushing through the National Assembly the 
co:ndi tiona referred to in Chapter One which delayed the time 
schedule of the M.R.P. In September of the same year Schuman 
had been ready to submit the E.D.C. treaty to the National 
Assembly, but was restrained by Premier Pinay. The following 
24. N.Y.Times, Oct. 29, 1950, p. 8:6; L'Aube, Sept. 2-3, 
1950, p. 1; Terre Humaine. Dec., 1951, pp. 70-73. 
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month came the "Herriot bomb" attacking the E.D.C. The 
-
l-1 . R.P. was incensed that the "national debate" on the treaty 
had commenced just when discussion of an E.P. C. had begun. 
But the party did not so much want a debate as to know where 
Pinay stood. With Schuman's acquiescence, Teitgen called on 
Pinay to say so if he was in accord with the Schuman policy. 
Schuman was ready to resign if the Government did not decide 
on debate by October 22. 
This "sudden bout of political fever" in the M.R.P. sub-
sided quickly. Schuman agreed to postpone submission of the 
treaty to the National Assembly until a preambie was com-
pleted. It appears that at this stage the M. R.P . parliamen-
tary group was more concerned about reconciling party words 
with deeds than was the party's foreign minister who had 
taken such a part in drafting the treaty. Hence, another 
delay ensued. Of course this was the time when Schuman was 
in such trouble over Tunisian policy, ani he could not 
afford to get in more trouble with the National Assembly. 
On the other hand he was too deeply involved in European 
integration to consider lightly the question of resigning. 
The rank ani file of the party also refused to be stampeded 
into a decision for immediate debate on the treaty. They did 
not want to run the risk of overthrowing the Government. 25 
M.R.P. parliamentary tactics were continually complicated 
by the issue of the E.D.c. When Bidault sought the premier-
25. N. Y.Times, Sept. 25, 1952, 2· 7:1; Oct. 21, 1952, p. 1:1; 
London Times, Oct. 22, 1952, p. 6c; Oct. 23, p. 6o. . 
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ship in June, 1953, he left open the possibility that he 
would use the weapon of a confidence vote on the E.D.C. But 
when he sought the presidency at the end of the year he with-
drew his candidacy when it appeared that the treaty was being 
made too much of an issue. To complicate matters more the 
European Community had now entered the realm of discussion. 
Despite his :coolness toward the E.P. C., Bidaul t was ready as 
foreign minister in September, 1953 to give it priority over 
the E.D.C. His purpose was to get the support of former 
Gau11ists, who would be free to vote against the E.D.c. later. 
Bidault thought that the E.D.C. could be ratified by a dif-
ferent majority. However, this seemed rather a fruitless 
maneuver, since at this time de Gaulle was opposing any 
E.P.C. that did: not include England and all of Germany. In 
contrast to this stand of Bidault in the fall of 1953, he 
was distinctly cool to the E.P. C. at the Berlin conference 
of February, . 1954, although emphatic in his professed desire 
to get the E.D.c. treaty ratified without delay. But in 
May, 1954 the party itself approved the postponement by the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of a final vote on the treaty, 
since it did not wish to handicap Bidaul t or reduce his 
"trumps" at the Geneva Conference. 26 
26. N.Y.Times, June 11, 1953, p. 1:4; Dec. 19, p. 1:1; 
Sept. 18, p. 1:4; Sept. 20, p. 22:4; Mar. 3, 1954, p. 1:2; 
Figaro, May 27, 1954, p. 9:7. At the same time the M.R.P. 
was strongly critical of Radical Socialist tactics. Le 
Monde, Jan. 1, 1954, p. 5:3. 
201 
\'le have seen that Bidaul t identified government with 
conciliation. As we trace his attitude through these post-
war years, we are forced to the conclusion that Bidault em-
phasized conciliation too much. He was too yielding in his 
action and too devious in his thought. Despite the many 
class ani other group divisions, there is a great degree 
(too great) of mutual tolerance among them in France. Per-
haps the "Republic of Comrades" of the Third Republic is 
out of date, but not all camaraderie. Ironically Bidaul t 
was repaid for his belief in conciliation by being attacked 
on all aides while he represented France at the Geneva Con-
ference in the spring of 1954. Le court, parliamentary leader 
of the M.R.P., asked at this time what minister could succeed 
whose least initiative was immediately suspected and cut to 
pieces in his own country. The great weakness of France, he 
said, was in morale and in such partisanship of the press as 
would make the strongest nation weak. But it still seems 
that what France needed most was a leader who had convictions 
plus courage of those convictions, and Bidaul t did not 
qualify. 27 
Compromises were also made, and principles gave way to 
opportunistic tactics, in the foreign trade program of the 
27. Reporter, Dec. 22, 1953, p. 19; N.Y.Times Mas., Nov. 1, 
1953, p. 30; Forces Nouvelles, May 8, 1954, p. 1. 
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M.R.P. The party had criticized the individualistic liber-
alism of the French Revolution, and the negative concept of 
democracy and the tradition of resistance to government typi-
cal of the Third Republic. Yet the M.R.P. gave in to the 
individualistic liberalism of French economic interests. 
Nationalistic trade restrictions on imports were being cham-
pioned by M.R.P. leaders at the same time that they were 
pushing the Schuman and Pflimlin Plans for European economic 
integration. In March, 1950 Schuman himself had told the 
M. R.P. National Committee that there was need for France to 
maintain her protective "dikes" for the time being. Later 
Valay and Buron pushed the expansion of agricultural exports, 
but reference to the necessary equivalent increase of im-
ports was conspicuous by its absence. The development of 
French agricultural production, said Valay, was a "national 
and European duty". The M.R.P. had, in fact, provided in 
its program of June, 1950 for a lim1 t on agricultural im-
ports which was very restrictive. The necessary effect of 
the Pflimlin Plan on French imports was glossed over, in 
fact not mentioned by a research section of party headquar-
ters. Although the M.R.P. was pushing the Pflimlin and 
Schuman Plans unier the leadership of Schuman as foreign 
minister, new additions were made to French tariff walls at 
the contemporaneous Torquay conference. The Government was 
also burying "without music" the Franoo•Ital1an custom 
un,,on. ~8 
:t t was c1nleali1ng tor th$ party to give the a.gr1cul-
tural int reate the 11)1pi'e$s1on t hat, in thq lons run · ronoh 
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xporta oould l:>e expani 4!Jid at th«J same timG that 1 porto were 
b ins raduoed by th rai.slng or tariff walla·. Y$t this $con-
om1c nat1onalism, persisted 1n i . R.P. federation meeting&. 
L' Aube also opposed any 1norea8e of 1mpo:rts .tmm Germany, or 
nny out t in · or exports ..!Q. Germany. Only Duron ani fl1ml1n 
i n the party tns1sted that internal economi c r ·v1val and the 
orsanl.zat1.on ot 1nt~mat1onal mark$t& W$re two anpooto of 
t~he s t.e effort. Dut f tl1ml.1n' s Plan d1ci not osoapo the 
baroa or t he ori tics. Tlutr wel"e even some w1 t hi n t he party 
·ho saw such plans to be rom ot escapism. 'fb.ey asked how 
s upporters of his "green pool" hop.,:i to deal w1 t h such men 
as Ginsembre ot thtl Feti ts et ~ ·oren2 E:ntrepr1 es 1n wi d r 
Europ an· ma~kets when t hey l a cked the energy an" ooura.ge to 
c.ee.l with hie · type ·at homa ,.2.9 
The f· .. R. P. pro tosoei to a&ek expana1on or social 8nd 
economi e demo·crnoy. Frano.e, said . aur1oe SohUaJ.ann in 1950,. 
28. E1naud1 an1 Goguel, ~· t.' pp. 123-130; Goguel, sm • 
.QU., p . 152; o ea , · r GU ian \ieekl , ar. 30, 1950, p . 
15J It'Aybe, Kay , 1950, p. ; Ma7 15, p. 4; June 13, p. 1; 
June . 30, p. 4; ~!R£3.~, Mar., 1951~ pp. · 394•5. As .-!mater 
ot · 1n1ater ot Finance, Pn1m11n waa at1ll preoccupiei w1 t.h 
in$uft1 o1ent exporta in 1955 • . <sf• T1;!2e~. . ay 26, 1955: 2?· .Forges ,Noyyelles, ay 8, 19 , p .. a, June 5, p. 6, 
L Aybe, v. 7, 1950, p. 2; also 6J:.rqend~Jf. 6• 
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could not choose between rearmament and social reconstructioh; 
what good would armor be on a skeleton? If there were not a 
guaranteed minimum level of living, France would be extending 
an automatic invitation to Stalin to enter western Europe. 
The struggle against communism and neutralism must be one of 
acts, not words, said Secretary-General Colin; social justice 
is worth ten divisions. But during the ten years after 1944 
there was constant temporizing and contradictions by the 
Government on its internal economic policy. 'rhroughout this 
period the important economic ministries, besides the foreign 
ministry, were very often in the hands of M.R.P. leaders. 
Goguel blamed the M.R.P. for the constantly rising prices, 
since Buron, Louvel and Pflimlin had steadily held economic 
posts in the Government. De Gaulle spoke for many when he 
asked in 1951 how there could be a strong foreign policy with 
a weak ani incoherent internal policy.3° 
Party Loyalty 
At the same time that the M.R.P. sought to perform a 
balancing act between the other French parties, it also tried 
to increase its inner cohesion. The degree of apparent unity 
30. L'Aube, Aug. 7, 1950, p. 3; Aug. 21, p. 3; Aug. 25, p. 
Jan. 22, 1951, p. 3; Jan. 27-8, p. 6; Esprit, Apr., 1951, pp. 
630-3; Dec., 1951, p. 840. See, however, an intelligent 
approach by Buron in Lea Cab.iers Economiques, Apr., 1954, 
pp. 2-5, which was also reflected in -his interview with the 
author (Appendix A). 
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and loyalty to be found in the :M.R.P. was surprising, in 
comparison with other French parties. The general homogen-
eity in the action of members of the ~I.R.P. during the 1940's 
was based very much upon their common experience in the 
Resistance. Although the rise of the Gaullists cut the 
M.R.P. adherents from 200,000 in 1946 to 100,000 in 1950, 
the result was a separation of the chaff from the wheat. 
Members of the M.R.P. were not authorized to join the non-
party Gaullist organization named the R.P .F., but :Michelet 
and Terrenoire revolted and many of the party's electorate 
switched their allegiance. For those who remained in the 
party, precautions were taken in the party statutes to in-
sure that the action of M.R.P. adherents accorded With 
official party doctrine and that opinions of M.R.P. members 
of Parliament should prevail over those of the "militants". 
In any event, the militants remained in general faithful 
to the party except during the Pinay Government of 1952. 3l 
There was, however, a certain degree of dissension as 
early as 1950. Pierre Dumas, referring to dictatorial 
methods of party leaders, expressed the fear that party 
ideals would sink in the parliamentary morass, and would 
be forgotten by leaders dozing comfortably in their arm-
chairs. The left wing, led at that time by Teitgen, was 
31. Esprit, Mar., 1953, p. 374; Fauvet, OP. cit., p. 182; 
Duverger, Q£.. cit., pp. 155-162; Einaudi and Goguel, Q£.. 
cit., pp. 204-5~ 
-· growing impatient wi~h the influence of moderates on party 
policy. There was an incipient split in the party when 
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the Bidaul t Government fell in June, 1950, and another under 
the premiership of Pleven. It is interesting that elements 
in the M. R.P. were more restive under Governments of business-
men, such as Pleven and Pinay. A party that had few con-
tacts with business felt uneasy under such leadership. Mil-
itants were also tiring of the enforced cooperation with the 
other majority parties. At the Lyons congress of 1951 there 
was "something of a gulf between ministers and mill tants ", as 
well as between ministers in the Government and some rank-
and-file deputies like Andr: Deh.is of Dordogne. 32 
The result of the June, 1951 elections was a qualita-
tive gain although a quantitative loss for the party, in 
the sense that a majority of those elected came from the 
less amorphous left wing. In any event there was a greater 
.. 
homogeneity in the party's following, except .for some 
"enfants terribles" like -De~is and senator Hamo"D.. But by 
early 1952 a leftist faction was grouping around deputies 
Monteil and Bouret over the troublesome issue of the E.D.c. 
When the E.D.C. plan was approved in principle by the 
National Assembly in February, six members of the M.R.P. 
J2, Journal of Poll tics, Feb., 1952, p. 109; L' Aube, May 10, 
1950, p. 1; Dec. 22, p. 1; Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 
6, 1950, p. 3; News from France, Sept. 15, 1950, p. 2; 
New Statesman and Nation, May 12, 1951, pp. 526-7. 
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were included in the opposition. 33 
A ticklish problem was presented to the M.R.P. leader-
ship when the conservative Pinay became premier in March, 
1952. Only by a close vote of 17 to 12 did the party's 
National Committee decide that M.R.P. members should join 
Pinay' s cabinet, and then on conii tion that members of the 
M.R.P. would not take the ministries of finance, national 
economy, or social security. By April Pinay lost the backing 
of twenty members on the left wing of the M.R.P. Since the 
cohesion of the party was at ita low point under Pinay, it 
is worth while to examine the resul ta of a study that was 
made of the discipline and loyalty of French parties in 
Parliament during his Government of 1952. With eighty-eight 
deputies in the National Assembly, six of whom voted as a 
separate unit because they were members of the Government, 
the M.R.P .• clung together remarkably well. In 32% of the 
"divisions'' 5% of the party voted against the rest; in 7% 
the figure went as high as 10% of the party. Although the 
majority of the M.R.P. were against the Government 16% of 
the time, they did not oppose it in any ucri tical" division. 
In the Council of the Republic where there were only twenty-
four lvi.R~P. senators the recoro was not quite so good for 
33. Einaud.i and Goguel, 212.· cit., pp. 170-1, 173-187; Terre 
Humaine, Nov., 1951, pp. 106 et seq.; Vie Intellectuelle, 
Dec., 1951, pp. 26-59; Manchester Guardian Weekly, Feb. 21, 
1952, p. 2. 
party loyalty. They voted as a bloc in only 64% of' the 
cases.
34 
Despite the criticism by Denis and Fonlupt-Esperaber 
208 
of' party policy on Tunisia, at the time of' the actual vote 
on the plan of' ref'orm there was only one M.R.P. member 
against the plan. There was more of' a split w1 thin the 
party over the Indo-China problem. When it came time f'or 
the municipal elections of 1953, however, the party showed 
remarkable electoral stability. It was later, in June, that 
a crucial test came in the National Assembly. When Mend~­
France made his bid f'or investitube, 52 of' the 89 M.R.P. 
deputies voted f'or him, although in m:any respects his pro-
gram was diametrically opposed to official 1-1.R.P. foreign 
policy. The intricacy of' French politics is partly respon-
sible for this tremendous departure from party loyalty, but 
more responsible was the intricacy of' M.R.P. foreign policy, 
which led to f'requent contradictions between professions and 
practice. Many M.R.P. members abstained from the vote, only 
"' two voting against Mendes-France, who had with him the 
younger members of all the parliamentary groups. When 
Bidault made his attempt for investiture at this time, the 
party was solid behind him with one exception (Denis).35 
, _ 
34. London Times, Mar. 8, 1952, p. 6c; L 1 Annee Politique, 
1952, _ pp. 16, 19, 25; Manchester Guardian -Weekly, Apr. 10, 
1952, p. 2; Apr. 17, p. 2; Political Studies, Oct., 1953, 
pp. 247-255. (Campbell, Discipline and Loyalty in the 
French Parliament during the Pinay Government) 
35. L'AnnJe Politique, 1952, p. 202; p. 228; 1953, p. 49 
_and 50; Contemporary Review, July, 1953, p. 9; Terre 
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The M. R.P. drew considerable criticism for officially 
/<. \ 
opposing its 11bete-noire 11 , Mendes-France. But the party it-
self pulled together again after this crisis, with only five 
M. R.P. deputies opposing the National Assembly resolution 
of November, 1953 supporting the E.D.C. This lasted until 
the exclusion of Denis in January, 1954. By the time o f the 
National Committee meeting in March, the "malaise du mouve-
ment" was again the dominating spirit. Tei tgen, who although 
moving toward the right had been the most consistent of all 
M. R. P . leaders in his support for the E.D. C. and the E. P . C., 
tried to discount the classic distinction between Ri ght and 
Left in France, and to emphasize instead the influence of 
the bureaucracy against proposed reforms. But the more un-
orthodox Bouxom replied t hat the popular masses recognized 
well enough the existence of Right and Left, and the M. R.P. 
should be forewarned of the support it woul d lose if it 
moved farther to the Right. 36 
Within the M. R.P. there had been expectations that the 
tenth congress at Lille in May, 1954 would be one of re-
orientation after a decade of existence. But as it turned 
out there was relatively little controversy. A critic in 
35.(cont.) Humaine, May, 1953, pp. 104-5; June-July, 19~3, 
pp • . 153-4. According to ·rerre Humaine, 14 opposed Mendes-
France and 35 abstained. 
36. Esprit, July, 1953, p. 136; feb~ , 1954, pp. 253-255; 
N.Y.Times, Nov. 20, 1953; Nov. 23, p. 3:3-4; U.S.News, 
Jan. 22, 1954, pp. 46-7; Le Mende, Apr. 29, 1954, p. 5:2; 
Mar. 9, p. 2:3; Forces Nouvelles, Oct. 11, 1952, p. 1. 
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Le Mende charged that the congress was only disposed to 
hear the language of optimism, and that in his address Borne 
skipped over the seamy side of party affairs. From an on-
the-spot observation by the author, it did appear that the 
congress went off much more smoothly than anticipated. The 
E.D.c. was still the center of attraction in the discussion 
on foreign policy, and Lecanuet, chosen at the last moment 
to replace Schneiter, gave a good presentation of the party's 
arguments in support of it. There is no doubt that the con-
gress was in general behind Lecanuet, although respectful 
attention was also given to the critic Monteil, if not to 
the "enfant terrible" Hamo~. Opposition to the party's 
established foreign policy program seemed rather fruitless 
at this stage. However, it was somewhat disturbing to the 
author to hear the automatic and rather mechanical ovations 
at the mention of the names of Bidault and, especially, 
Schuman. One was inclined to glance up at the walls to see 
whether there were any huge picture posters such as are 
displayed frequently at gatherings of the Communist party~7 
At the time of the final defeat of the E.D.c. in 
August, 1954 only two of the eighty-eight M.R.P. deputies 
opposed the treaty. These two {Monteil and Bourdet) plus 
37. Figaro, May 27, 1954, p. 9:5; Le Monde, May 29, 1954, 
p. 4:4; also see Appendix A. Upon inquiry it appeared that 
the author was the only person of English or ·Amer1can nation-
ality at the Cohgress. Correspondents were concentrating on 
t h e simultaneous critical Socialist congress. 
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·senator Hamon were soon expelled from the party. When the 
Paris Pacts for an expande:i Western European Union came up 
for vote at the end of the year, sixteen M.R.P. deputies 
finally did break away to give positive support to this pro-
..... ject of Mendes-France. In contrast to this relatively high 
loyalty in the M.R.P., fifty-three out of one hundred and 
five Socialist deputies disregarded party discipline and 
voted against the E.D.c. in August.38 
Intraparty Disagreements on Foreign Policy 
1. In General Outlook 
The overall outward unity of the Ivi.R.P. was unusual for 
French parties. But within, of course, there were many dif-
ferences of opinion which militated against the effectiveness 
of party foreign policy. Frequently these differences of 
opinion were well conce~ed, as was to be expected in such 
a centralized party as the M.R.P., especially in view of the 
party's continued responsibility in the Government. To 
illustrate this, during the debate of October, 1953 on Indo-
China Juglas had announced the stand taken by the M.R.P. 
for the vote. He was asked whether the party's minister of 
foreign affairs (Bidaul t) had not led to a modification of 
the 1949 and 1950 conventions with the Indo-China states. 
Juglas replied. that he could not answer, since he was a 
38. Time, Jan. 10, 1955, p. 18; Sept. 13, 1954, p. 28; 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1954, p. 11. 
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member of a Government which had to be "solidaire 11 • 39 
. 
But the differences were there, and some of them were 
based on general difference of outlook. Except for Schuman, 
leaders of the M.R.P. were quite French in their psycholo-
gical approach to the German problem. The fact that Schu-
man 1 s early life had been spent under German sovereignty 
altered his outlook. It was, as a matter of fact, used 
against him by non-M.R.P. critics at times. During the 
National Assembly debate on the E.D.C. in February, 1952, 
, -
Independent Anire said to him: "You above all do not have 
the right to impose upon France what the people of Lorraine 
would call a mortal sin." Several members of the M. R.P. 
attacked the insinuations implicit in this, but Schuman mere-
ly replied, ui scorn your words". It was Schuman who had 
been the one to stand alon~ against the other eleven repre-
sentatives of the N.A.T.o. powers in 1950 in insisting on the 
right of the French Parliament to consider the "new" question 
of German rearmament, and in opposing such a move until a 
European community had been created. 40 
In January, 1953, Schuman told an M.R.P. caucus that he 
did not care to stay to be prisoner of a policy no longer 
his. He himself suggested that Bidault take his place as 
foreign minister, and after his appointment Bidault declared 
, 
39. Journel des Debats, Oct. 23, 1953, p. 4616. 
40. Ibid., Feb. 16, 1952, p. 731; L'Aube, Sept. 18, 1950, p. 
1; Oct. 9, p. 3. 
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that there would be no change in F·rench policy. But 
Bidaul t' s pursuit of European unity was far less ardent 
and far more qualifi eel than was Schuman's. "Let us hope 
that with his (Schuman's) departure Franco-German reconcil-
iation and an authentic European policy have not been 
buried.'', said a political commentator. r.rh.roughout 1952 
. . 
Bidaul t had been trying to follow a middle course. "Our 
.. 
memories and reason rebel", he said, "against an indepen-
dent German army ••• \ie deal with an emotional question 
which must follow its own course of evolution". Bidault 
was too prone to take a laissez-faire attitude on such 
questions. Would the 11 course of evolution" be the same as 
that which had led. Europe from the first world war into the 
second ? 41 
In his general attitude toward the construction of 
Europe Bidault believed., then, in making haste slowly. He 
told the M.R.P. National Committee in early 1953 that if a 
choice must be made between slowness and precipitation, he 
would choose the former. He thought it "not particularly 
scandalous 11 that such a great problem could not be solved 
today or tomorrow, and he discounted French fears of even-
tual German supremacy. Yet the previous year Bidaul t had 
upheld the E.D. C. on the ground that if Germany were not 
41. N.Y.Times, Jan. 8, 1953, p. 6:3; Jan. 30, p. 5:4; Feb. 
21, 1954, IV; La Revue Politique, Apr. 25, 1953, p. 189; 
Terre Humaine, Jan., 1953, p. 122; U.N.World, Sept., 1952, 
p. 41. 
rearmed in some way she would have a tremendous economic 
advantage (hence economic competition was a motive for re-
arming a competitor!). As a former professor of history, 
Bidaul t usually gave greater attention to the past than to 
the future. When it is a question of Germany, he had said 
in 1945, it is wise to take the counsel of the French.42 
At the time that Bidault replaced Schuman as foreign 
minister, the M.R.P. National Committee praised them both 
as uchampions and artisans" of the program for a united 
Europe. But by the time of the Paris congress of 1953, 
veiled interventions began to indicate the nature of the 
controversy between the two. Since March the party had 
failed to give strong support to the Schuman policy, which 
had been oriented on Franco-German reconciliation and on 
the belief that France's future lay in the leadership of 
Europe. In contrast, Bidaul t clung to the concept of 
France as a world power, and placed the Atlantic world and 
the French Union first rather than Europe. With respect 
to European integration, Schuman was primarily a function-
alist, but he saw at different levels the construction of 
the E.D.C. and that of Europe. As for the E.P.C. by 1954 
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it appeared that Bidau1t would not accept it, and that Schu-
man might have, but by then had become something of an 
opportunist. In one other way the two differed. Bidault was 
42. Forces Nouvelles, May 30, 1953, p. 8; L'Aube, Nov. 3, 
1950, p. 3; U.N. v·lorld, Sept., 1952, p. 41. 
·closer to the tradi tiona of French diplomacy; on the other 
hand Schuman was lacking in respect for them. At the same 
time he had a certain fear of the preservers of these tra-
ditions in their headquarters at the Quai d'Orsay. One 
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should be cautioned, however, against exaggerating the dif-
ferences between the two men, since all French foreign 
ministers have a small margin of freedom in actual deter-
mination of policy.43 
One thing that other M.R..P. leaders seemed to a gree on 
was that there was a clear difference between the approaches 
of Schuman and Bidault to foreign policy. Perhaps partly 
because of his origin on the eastern frontier of France and 
his lack of travel, Schuman was inclined to stress the Franco-
German problem. Bidault, the initiator in 1949 of N.A.T.O., 
emphasized that organization more than "Europe". The contrast 
between the two was said otherwise to be that between "coeur" 
(Schuman--heart) and "raison" (Bidault--mind). Less in a 
hurry, Bidaul t was more French in temperament, but Schuman 
. knew Germany better because of his lane;uage ability and 
personal contacts. 44 
43. International Organization, May, 1953, pp. 210-11; Lon-
~on Times, Jan. 20, 1953, p. 5b; L'Ann~ Politique, 1953-,--
p. 46; also p. 18; also see Appendix A. 
44. See Appendix A. 
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2. European Integration 
Although Bidaul t had borne down on political and mili-
tary considerations in his negptiations with the United 
States in 1948 leading toward the creation of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, party policy had always em-
phasized the economic value of N .A. T.O. A basic part of 
the pact was considered to be Article 2 providing for 
economic cooperation. As foreign minister, Schuman had 
explicitly exclude::l the rearmament of Germany from both the 
immediate and possible consequences of N.A.T.O. But the 
M.R.P. was finding it hard to decide whether the main gpal 
of French security could be better achieved through closer 
ties with the continent or by elaborating the network of 
relations with the Atlantic powers. Only Schuman consis-
tently favored Europe. The lack of continuity in the 
shaping of party policy by other M.R.P. members of the 
Government reflecte::l to a great degree fluctuations in 
American diplomacy. 45 
Although he was closer to the Atlantic powers than 
Schuman at most times, Bidault was very critical of the 
United States in late 1950 (when he was not a member of 
45. Terre Humaine, Dec., 1951, p. 60; L'Aube, Dec. 21, 1950, 
p. 3; Lea Cahiers de Formation Politique, (bi-mensual M.R.P. 
organ) Sept., 1949; La Pacta Atlantique; Esprit, Mar., 1953, 
p. 363; N,Y.Times, Apr. 18, 1950, p. 4:3; Chroniques de 
Politigue Etrang~re, Sept.-Nov., 1952, p. 544. It is inter-
esting that no M.R.P. name appeared in the list of 169 Euro-
peans who favored a widening of N.A.T.o. in Dec., 1954. See 
N.Y. Times. 
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the Government). The rearmament question, he told the Coun-
cil of the Republic, had been posed by the Americans in the 
worst manner at the worst moment. However well-meaning these 
third powers might be, Bidault believed that their inter-
cessions between France ani Germany complicated the problem, 
and that Europe would be more quickly organized through 
agencies such as the Schuman Plan if others did not "mix in"~6 
Even without others mixing in, the proposal for a mili-
tary pact complicated party foreign policy very much. / Hamon 
was considerably justified by party "mystique" in saying that 
the economic challenge of communism was of first importance. 
From 1954 on this became increasingly evident, but some mem-
bers of the M.R.P. had anti,cipated this development soon 
/ 
after the proposal of the European army plan in 1950. Hamon, 
' for one, followed Mendes-France' a principle of measuring 
perils, and believed that the greatest danger lay in dealing 
with everything in military terms, which he thought led to 
increases in tension. Of course party leatl.ers tried in 
various ways to rationalize the E.D.C. SQh.uman, for instance, 
distinguished in 1950 between N.A.T.o. with its temporary 
objective and the European army plan which he said was a de-
finite solution and conati tuted a step toward a Europe. 
It was at this time that Bidaul t cut the grouni from 
under Schuman's feet by saying in L'Aube that a military 
-· 
effort toward a Franco-German "entente" somehow eliminated 
46. L'Aube, Sept. 23-4, 1950, p. 1; Nov. 25-6, 1950, p. 1. 
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the 11 charmes 11 of such an entente. Later, when the army plan 
seemed doomed to defeat, Schuman indulged in rationalization 
and drew a sharp line between the E.D.C. ani "Europe". 
Teitgen was more consistent; he did not waver from his argu-
ment of late 1952 that Germany could not be chained forever. 
If she were not Europeanized, he said, ahe would be "German-
ized". In answer to the fears of German hegemony in an 
E. D.C., Teitgen called attention to the fact that the German 
Social Democrats were denouncing the plans as an example of 
French imperialism.. Only under the E.D. C., said Tei tgen, 
could Germany subordinate military to civil authority. 47 
Bidaul t and Schuman were also at odds over the inter-
pretation of the Bonn Contract, which had been signed along 
with the E.D.C. treaty and was tied to it. Opponents of 
the treaty were able to profit by Bidault's forthright 
acknowledgment at the Berlin Conference of February, 1954 
of the significance of Article 7, paragraph 3 of the Con-
tract. This provided that a unified Germany would be able 
to accept or reject the E.D. C. Bidaul t stressed the inter-
national legal aspect; Schuman on the other hand maintained 
that rights and obligations would pass automatically to a 
unified Germany, although treaties might have to be modified 
47. See Appendix A; also see L'Aube, Nov. 25-6, 1950, p. 1; 
Nov. 27, p. 3; Forces Nouvelles, Oct. 11, 1952, p. 1; Report 
of speech of P.H. Teitgen at Venice, Apr. 29, 1953, pp. 6-7, 
21-3. 
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-to include East Germany (but Article 10 of the Bonn Contract 
referred to the possibility of modification of that agree-
. ment, not of the E.D.c., in case of German reunification). 
In the spring of 1954 Schuman announced his formal disagree-
ment with Bidaul t' a int.e:ppretation of Article 7. When 
Bidault appeared before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the National Assembly, he explained that he considered this 
matter to be primarily a political question. A~·policy could 
not be imposed on a government that did not exist, he said, 
although he professed to have no doubt that a unified Ger-
many would accept the E.D.C. It appears that Bidault was 
more correct when he stood on the international legal aspect. 
But since the E.D.C. treaty was a political treaty and would 
not necessarily survive to a new government, both the legal 
and political questions coincided in this case.48 
Although the differences between the Bi.daul t and Schu-
man approach to European integration are the most important, 
the opinions of other M.R.P. 11dirigeants" are worth noting. 
Alfred Coste-Floret, who was more active in support of 
European integration than his brother Paul, took a very in-
dependent stand during the National Assembly debate on the 
48. N,Y,Times, Feb, 20, 1954, p. 3:2; Le Monde, Feb, 6, 
1954, p. 2:1; Mar. 25, p. 3:4; Feb, 13, p. 1:1; p. 2:2; Feb, 
26, p. 4:1. See varying interpretations by Bidaul t and 
Schuman in Le Mende, Apr. 8, 1954, p. 16:1 and Revue Po1i-
tique et Par1ementaire, Mar., 1954, p. 315. The author 1 s 
interviews revealed that LeBrun Ke1-is and other "dirigeants" 
considered the question as one of fact rather than law. 
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E .D.C. in February, 1952. In Coste-Floret's opinion Germany 
- -
was commencing a "balancing act" leading toward more asso-
ciation and less integration. Besides favoring more control's 
on Germany, Coste-Floret sought more action toward a poli-
tical authority. He was opposed to as extensive a rule of 
unanimity for the Committee of Ministers of the E.P.C. as 
was supported by Schuman and especially Bidaul t. "For us" , 
said Coste-Floret in alidressing Bidaul t (!), the proposed 
executive council of a political authority was more impor-
tant than the committee of national ministers.49 
Both Alfred Coste-Floret and de Menthon believed, in 
contrast to Bidault, that the French Republic should enter 
the E.P.C. intact. Coste-Floret also favored creating the 
E~P.C. prior to a revision of the French Union. De Menthon 
wanted closer ties of these European Communities with the 
Council of Europe, and was unique in his support for a re-
striction in the powers over foreign affairs of the pro-
jected E.P.C. At least he was the only M.R.P. member to 
speak out on this, as he did just prior to the adoption of 
the E.P.C. draft by the Consultative Assembly of the Council 
of Europe. 50 
Bidaul t was one of those in the M • .R.P. who seemed to 
agree with those critics to the left and the right of the 
L 49. Journel des Debats, Feb. 12, 1952, pp. 648-650; Nov. 
17, 1953, p. 5186, pp. 5206-5210. 
50. Ibid., Nov. 17, 1953, pp. 5186, 5206-5210; N.Y.Times, 
Mar. 7, 1953, p. 8:8. 
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,M .R.P. who believed that a Europe of six would be a straight-
jacket now that economy was expanding to a world scale. The 
R.P.F. to the right believed .there was a need for world se-
/ 
curity alliances; the Jeune Republique on the left wing of 
Christian democracy saw China as the coming power, and be-
lieved that all Europe including Russia would have to unify 
against her. 51 
Borne expressed the frustration of the M.R.P. planners 
of European integration when he said that instead of being 
a unifying idea, it created another point of discord. The 
nationalists, he said, cry against attacks on sovereignty, 
the liberals cringe instinctively at the idea of interna-
tional organization, and the anticlericals suspect an idea 
is not modern which has not been condemned by Rome. The 
pacifists fear an armed Europe. How then, he asked, are we 
to make a Europe?52 
3. On the Saar 
There were two disagreements among M.R.P. leaders which 
involved above all else questions of parliamentary tactics. 
The first disagreement revolved around the status of the 
51. Le Mende, Jan. 21, 1954, p. 1; Vie Intellectuelle, Apr. 
1950, pp. 408-417; N,Y,Times, Nov. 12, 1952, p. 14:3; 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, Mar. 13, 1952, p. 2. Reference 
might also be made to the attacks of Lav~gne, on the 
extreme left. See his articles in L'Annee Politique et 
Economique, also the books referred to in the bibliograp~y. 
Although disregarded by M.R.P. lead..ers, he had some telling 
points on the method of negptiation of the Schuman Plan. 
52. Terre Humaine, Nov., 1952, pp. 5-7. 
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.Saar. In the debate of November, 1953 Coste-Floret dis-
agreed with Bidault in opposing a settlement of the Saar 
problem as a condition "prEfalablen (precedent) for the 
ratification of the E.D.C. treaty. Schuman (no longer in 
the Government) agreed with Coste-Floret that the Saar 
settlement should not hold up debate on the treaty, although 
it might be a coniition for ratification to take effect • 
., 
The original purpose of the "prealable" on the Saar, first 
required in early 1953, was merely to prevent the E.D.C. 
from becoming effective before a Saar agreement. Neither 
should a solution of the Saar problem be made a condition 
precedent to the acceptance of the E.P. C., said Coste-Floret, 
since the status quo in the Saar was acceptable to France.53 
In March, 1954, Schuman suggested changing this 
"pre"alabie" to a "suspensif" by simply adding an article to 
the act of ratification of the E.D.C. subordinating the ex-
change of ratifications to an accord on the Saar. Neverthe-
less, the official party stand, and that of Bidaul t, did not 
change. The private opinion of an M.R.P. "dirigeant" (not, 
however, a specialist on the Saar) was that it would be 
worth it to hand the Saar over to Germany rather than stir 
up trouble by trying to hold it. In other woros, the game 
was not worth the candle.54 
/. 53. Journal des Debats, Nov. }7, 1953, p. 5186, pp. 5206-
5210; Nov. 19, p. - 5291; L'Annee Politique, 1953, pp. 427-8. 
54. Le Monde, Mar. 24, 1954, p. 1:2; also Appendix A. In 
June Bidaul t said that an accord in all its details was not 
.sought before ratification. Figaro, June 2, 1954. 
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4. On the Question of a Referendum 
There were also hesitations and differences of opinion 
among the M. R.P. leaders on whether the party should seek a 
referendum over the E.D.C. or whether it should support dis-
solution of the National Assembly if it rejected the treaty. 
Either move would have been in line with M.R.P. doctrine. 
In the Constituent Assembly in 1945 and 1946 the M. R.P. had 
sponsored the inclusion in the Constitution of provisions 
for a referendum, and also had favored g1 vdng to the presi-
dent a qualified right to dissolve the National Assembly. 
After 1945 the party continued to support greater use of the 
55 
referendum in controlling the constitutionality of laws. 
Here we are primarily concerned with the question of a 
referendum or of dissolution of Parliament as ·they related 
to M.R.P. tactics on the E.D.C. issue. The tacit agreement 
to keep the treaty on ice had been disturbed by the M. R.P. 
as early as the spring of 1953 when party leaders, including 
Bidaul t and Schuman, took the stand that if there were in-
definite postponement of the issue then the party would seek 
a national referendum. Teitgen supported such a move if the 
E.D.C. were rejected and no alternative approved by the Na-
tional Assembly. He favored a plebiscite either through a 
general election (hence following dissolution of parliament) 
or through a vote on modification of the Constitution 
55. Foundation for Foreign Affairs, ~· cit., pp. 117-121; 
Wright,~. cit., pp. 86-88; Einaudi and Goguel, QQ. cit., 
pp. 132-6. 
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implying either acceptance or rejection of the treaty. Le-
court made it clear, however, that the M.R.P. supported a 
referendum not because the E.D.C. was thought unconstitu-
tional; in fact, he said that there was no such thing as an 
unconstitutional treaty in France. Teitgen believed that 
the referendum should somehow cover the whole policy of con-
struction of Europe, but it would seem that Tei tgen and 
others had not thought out too well just how to pose the 
question. 56 
Lecourt apparently .. spoke for the party at this time 
when he expressed a preference for a referendum over dissolu-
tion, sinc.e too many internal questions would be involved 
w1 th the latter. Although the party had not conditioned 
ratification of the E.D.C. upon the construction of an 
E.P.C., Lecourt argued that the referendum would be clearer 
if it included the idea of the latter as well. But such 
were the complexities of M.R.P. tactics that this might make 
it less clear, if anything. No further important move was 
made within the party until, in his June, 1953 bid for the 
premiership, Bidaul t hedgei in his statement by saying that 
if the treaty ''were presented 11 he 11 would be obliged 11 to ask 
for a vote of confidence. But he favorei dissolution of the 
56. See Report of Teitgen's Mar. 20, 1953 press conference. 
In that month Bidaul t and Schuman suggestei a national plebi-
scite. Schuman complainei that with the preiominance of 
opposition to the treaty, it was a one way contest. Ironi-
cally, he had done much to make it so. N.Y.Times, Mar. 19, 
1953, p. 9:1; Mar. 20, p. 4:2. 
National Assembly only if there were no majority for an 
alternative to the treaty. 57 
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In early 1954 the M.R.P. finally made it clear that if 
the E.D.C. were rejected, the party would gp into the oppo-
sition to the Government. For the M.R.P. alone among French 
parties, it seemed that disaolution of the National Assembly 
was preferable to a change in foreign policy. But they did 
not want to talk of a crisis before a decision was m~e on 
the treaty. In February the party publicly annourrced its 
intention to provoke dissolution if the treaty were rejected, 
although there was some difference of opinion in the leader-
ship whether debate should be begun before or after Easter. 
The question was solved by the usual procrastination of the 
Government. 58 
In contrast to the M.R.P. stand in early 1953, by the 
following May a responsible party dirigeant iniicated to the 
writer that the M.R.P. haA come to favor dissolution over a 
referendum. After some local electoral successes in the 
spring, the national congress at Lilla went on record that 
it neither desired nor feared dissolution, and the party was 
ready to demand it if inadmissible condi tiona were proposed 
to the continuation of the construction of Europe. 59 But 
57. Report of Teitgen Mar. 20 conference; London Times, June 
11, 1953, p. 6e; N.Y. Times, June 11, 1953, p. 1:4; . 
58. Figaro, May 6, 1954; May 11, p. 9:7; Le Monda, Feb. 11, 
1954, p. 1:3; Feb. 23, p. 3:5; 1'-iar. 17, p. 1:5. 
59. Appendix; also Le Monie, Mar. 23, 1954, p. 3:1; May 18, 
p. 5:3; May 25, p. 7:2; Forces Nouvelles, June 5, 1954, 
p. 7; Figaro, May 28, 1954, p. 15:4~ 
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·despite the protestations of the party leaders, perhaps the · 
M.R.P. deputies were too chary of their seats to push them-
selves out by a vote for dissolution. Certainly there had 
been enough time for these leaders to have fulfilled their 
threats, with the E.D.c. issue hanging fire week after week, 
month after month.60 
Parliamentary Tactics of the M.R.P. 
Schuman believed that the primary poll tical purpose of 
his Plan for a coal and steel community was to break down 
barriers between France and Germany. Unfortunately, M.R.P. 
leaders were not as interested, and hence not as effective, 
in overcoming political barriers in the French Parliament. 
Except for Bidaul t, they often demonstrated a lack of poli-
tical skill when they sought, as members of the Government, 
to put into effect official party policy. rvr.R.P. members 
of Parliament themselves were not experienced enough in the 
ways and by-ways of French legislative custom. When a deli-
cate question arose in the National Assembly, the session 
was frequently suspended 11 to permit groups to deliberate 11 , 
which led in effect to secret debate. M.R.P. members ap-
peared to be less devious than those of other parties in 
making known their support for or opposition to a delicate 
measure. This is merely one example of parliamentary habits 
that were frequently a poll tical handicap to the party, 
60. T~oignage Chr6tien, May 14, 1954, p. 1:1. 
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however politically moral they may have been. 61 
The M.R.P. leaders have not taken enough advantage of 
their political opportunities. During the National Assembly 
debate on Indo-China in March, 1954, ~I.R.P. speakers were 
conspicuous by their absence. This was typical of the sit-
uation in many earlier debates on foreign policy. To be 
sure, parliamentary time limits on debate usually gave the 
advantage to opponents of Government policies, and the M.R.P. 
was on- the side of the Government until 1954. A political 
opportunity that Schuman missed was the chance to get 
earlier support from Great Britain for European integration. 
The long-run wisdom of his policy of surprise in springing 
the Schuman Plan on Great Britain is subject to question. 
The M.R.P. was unsuccessful in its attempt to make up for 
this bluntness by formally seeking the concurrence of Great 
62 Britain in the Plan during June, 19 50. 
An illustration of Schuman's inept political tactics is 
to be found in an incident that .occurred during the Febru-
ary, 1952 debate on the E.D.C. KnoWing that Socialist sup-
port for the E.D. C. depended greatly on the assurance of a 
British guarantee of assistance, Schuman did not take action 
to contradict a baseless rumor that was published and re-
layed to the Socialist executive committee by Premier Faure. 
61. L'Aube, :r.-Iay 16, 1950, pp. 2, 3; Nov. 29, p. 1; Nov. 30, 
pp. 1, 3; Dec. 2-3, pp. 1, 3; Politique, Oct., 1947, p. 689. 
62. Le Monda, Mar. 6, 1954, p. 1:2; L 1Aube, May 22, 1950,p. 
1; June 19, p. 4. 
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This report was to the effect that an .American ani Bri tiah 
guarantee was immediately available. (Most likely these 
were the N.A.T.o. guarantee later ratified by the u.s. Senate, 
bringing the E.D.C. under the coverage of Articles 5 and 6 
of the N.A.T.o. Treaty, and the United. Kineiom guarantee, 
relating to Article 51 of the U. N. Charter.) Schuman, re-
cently returned from a meeting in London, was also evasive 
before parliament as to whether he was to meet .Adenauer 
there. This was only one instance among many of a contin-
uing reluctance of Schuman to be explicit in his relations ,. 
. 63 
with parliament. 
It was also in 1952 that Schuman ran into trouble in 
trying to develop North African policy. The previous year 
he had not tried to deny a charge by de Gaulle that a 
secret accord had been made with the United States on Moroc-
can military bases. Schuman suffered in his relations with 
parliament over North African policy because he was too un-
informed on Africa, because he failed to give sufficient 
attention to France's "world role 11 , and also perhaps because 
he was too honest to take the anomalous uFrench Union" at 
anything but face value. Opposition to Schuman slowly 
mounted in 1952. In the spring the foreign affairs commit-
tees of both the Assembly and the Council of the Republic 
/ 63. Journal des Debats, Feb., 16, 1952, pp. 739-744; Feb. 
19, p. 789; N,Y.Times, Feb. 17, 1952, p. 1:8; Feb, 18 , p, 
9:1; Feb. 19, p. 4:4. 
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had expressed dissatisfaction at Schuman's methods, and the 
Gaullists kept up their attack on his ~isian policy. 64 
M.R.P. political tactics were also rather weak in the 
handling of the Pflimlin Plan and the Saar issue. There 
had been no diplomatic preparation for the conference of 
March, 1951 on the Pflimlin Plan, and with the fall of the 
Pleven Government just prior to this, non-M.R.P. Laurens 
took over the ministry of agriculture and relegated the idea 
of a high authority to the background of the conference. 
Pflimlin, inexperienced in the conduct of international con-
ferences, was also neutralized against his will by being 
chosen to preside. In short, no decisions were taken at this 
meeting. As for the Saar, when the issue came to a head in 
the spring of 1954, the attempt in late May of Vice Premier 
Tei tgen to seek a solution in a meeting with Adenauer at 
Strasbourg backfired, since Adenauer advised Dehler of the 
Free Democrats that Teitgen was not sufficiently familiar 
with the details of the problem, nor was he authorized to 
conclude an accord. The German press criticized France for 
sending Adenauer an "incompetent negotiator".. A written 
question was also posed to the French Government by Gaullist 
Noel asking in what capacity Tei tgen had talked with Adenauer?5 
64. Vie Intellectuelle, Nov., 1952, p. 114; Feb., 1951, pp. 
81-2; International Organization, May, 1953, p. 203; 
N.Y.Times, May 22, 1952, p. 1:4; June 21, p. 1:2; Sept. 19, 
p. 3:1; Aug. 31, 19 51, p. 4:6. 
65. Vie Intellectue1le, May, 1951, pp. 81-2; Le Monde, May 
23-24, 1954, p. 1:1; p. 5:2. 
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Most M.R.P. leaders were deficient in the requirements 
of a politician. Schuman's gifts were those of a negotia-
tor and a committeeman rather than those of an orator and 
propagandist. Somewhat of an idealist, he crossed the grain 
of many of the practical French. Since he lacked ability to 
handle Parliament, he sometimes disregarded it, as we shall 
see. Bidault, on the other hand, had the essential require-
ments for a smart parliamentary tactician in a brilliantly 
logical mind, a genius for formulas to bridge contradictory 
views, and considerable drive. But his occasional fainting 
spells sometimes came at critical moments, as in his speech 
of November 20, 1953. His greatest weakness, according to 
Goguel, was a propensity for sibylline formulas and an in-
clination at times to have too high an opinion of himself. 66 
With a rather fiery temperament and a reluctance toward 
compromise, Teitgen was less skillful than Bidault, but had 
strength based on the ardor of his convictions and his abi-
lity as an orator. Of the few who spoke consistently for 
the M.R.P. in the National Assembly, it was perhaps Teitgen 
who made out the strongest case for the E.D.C. There were 
some critics, however, such as Domenach of Esprit, who 
attacked Teitgen and Maurice Schumann and even Bidault for 
66. Spectator, Mar. 13, 1953, p. 302; Vie Intellectuelle, 
Nov., 1952, p. 114; U.N.World, Sept., 1952, pp. 23-.lt.; 
Einaudi and Goguel, QJ2.. cit., pp. 165-7. Bidault's ailment 
was partly due to a circulatory disorder called "tendance 
lypothymique". 
.·their "violence" at the least contradiction and the first 
two for their inclination to indulge in "incessant hyper-
boles". 67 
Inconsistencies and Contradictions 
of M.R.P. Leade:rs 
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Besides the disagreements existing between M.R.P. 
leaders, some of these leaders cont:radictei their own state-
ments over a short course of time. It is probably impossible 
to take part in politics without imrolving oneself in some 
sort of contradictions in public statements before long. 
Even the more politically astute Biciaul t fell by the wayside 
in this respect at times. But Schwnan was particularly prone 
to lay himself open to the charge o :r contradictions in his 
public commitments. Even in France_, where political consis-
tency is no necessary virtue, inordlnate contradictions in 
public statements lead to a weakening of the political in-
fluence of the speaker. 
France, and especially the French industrial interests, 
became intent after the second Worlci War on the maintenance 
of international controls over the German industrial area of 
the Ruhr. At a press conference on November 14, 1949, Schu-
man said there would be no increase in Ruhr steel ~imits. 
The following May he insisted to a 1aenatorial commission 
that his recently proposed Plan was compatible with the Ruhr 
Statute, although it seemed obvious to at least one 
67. Esorit, Oct.-Nov., 1953, pp. 6'58-660; Einaudi ani Goguel, 
Qg. cit:, pp. 165-7. 
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poll tical commentator that the two •w-ere contradictory. In 
June, 1950 Schuman had assured the l~.R.P. National Committee 
that regardless of the Schuman Plan, all control measures 
and restrictions placed on Germany ·w-ould be maintained, but 
in a statement to the same body in November Schuman shifted 
his policy toward the Ruhr by declaring that there was no 
question of changing the Statute "so long as the Schuman 
Plan was not in effect''. If the St;atute and the Plan were 
not incompatible, what then was the need of changing the 
former? Finally, at the time of the National Assembly de-
bate in December, 1951 on the E.c.s.c., Schuman took the 
sta.ni that no ratification of the t :reaty could be effective 
until a deconcentration of Ruhr industries had been 
completed. 68 
As might be expected, it was i:n connection with the 
E.D.C. that the greatest wavering was found in the public 
statements of party leaders. Not all of them would have 
agreed with Schuman's statement to the National Committee 
in January, 1951, that the European army plan was the 
"conception par excellence de notre poll tique" (nor did he, 
later). During the debate of February, 1952, the Communists 
charged that Bidault and Schuman hai protested violently in 
1948 against the Communist contention that the break in the 
68. Pickles, £2• cit., p. 209; L'Aube, May 27-8, 1950, p. 1; 
Mar. 19, 1951, p. 4; Esprit, Dec., 1951, pp. 842, 850; 
Ivianchester Guardian lveekly, June 22:, 1950, p. 8; London 
.Times, Dec. 7, 1951, p. 5c. 
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denazification program had '< meant the beginning of German 
rearmament. A Communist speaker charged that Schuman had 
said in 1949 that the Government would not accept any French 
grant to the United States of military bases in France. 
M.R.P. leaders, who were usually quick · to refute unwarranted 
assertions of the Communists, were conspicuous by their .. 
silence this time. However, there were few present in the 
Assembly that day, and while Bidault and Teitgen were there, 
there is no evidence to show that Schuman was there ·to 
explain the circumstances surrounding such an alleged state-
ment of his in 1949. It was also during this debate of 1952 
that Bidault ani Schuman contradicted. each other indirectly 
in their efforts to do homage to the French conception of 
sovereignty. As foreign minister, Schuman declared that he 
more than any was respectful of national tradition, but part 
of that tradition was the conception of generous and strong 
ideas. When he went further and said that it was the present 
pattern not to fight for a piece of land, a frontier, or 
prestige, but for liberty, he got scant applause. The fol-
lowing day {when attendance had dropped appreciably) Bidaul t 
repeated that France was being faithful to her oldest tradi-
tion in supporting the E.D.C., but he put it differently 
than Schuman had done when he said that there are three 
things for which men die: their 11li ttle plot of ground, 
their nation, and an idea (in order of priority?). 69 
, 
69. Journal des Debats, Feb. 13, 1952, p. 699; p. 695; Feb. 
12, pp. 573-6. 
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It is interesting to examine the fluctuations in the 
pronouncements of M .R.P. lead era on the aubj ect of German 
rearmament. At a press conference in November, 1949 Schuman 
had declare:i there would be none, and he said the same in 
effect the ~alloWing spring. When the question of common 
defense came up in the Consultative Assembly in August, 1950, 
Bidaul t said 11I do not know whether one day we shall be re-
duced to building a Europe that we did not intend, but I do 
not think that the moment has yet come to make such a grave 
decision". Just before this Schuman had told the Council of 
the Republic that before considering arming Germany, France 
herself must be properly armed. 70 
But the idea of German rearmament in ~ form was 
slowly being accepte:i nas men accept surgery performe:i on 
their bodies 11 • In September, after having broached the idea 
at Strasbourg of a common control over European defense, 
Bidault rationalized his stand in a series of editorials in 
L'Aube. Without a European army, he said, national differ-
ences would be exaggerated, and moreover the defense of Ger-
many would be impossible. The battle against communism, if 
it must be, should be as close to the iron curtain as pos-
sible. In a press conference on September 6, Schuman hedged 
considerably on this question of German rearmament. The per-
mission to Germany at least to provide basic materials, if 
70. Pickles, 2£. cit., pp. 202, 209; L'Aube, May 2, 1950, p. 
1; July 29-30, p. 4. 
hot armaments, would not require the permanent raising of' 
the ceiling on steel production, according to the f'oreign 
minister. Moreover, an increase of the West German police 
f'orce was necessary, he said, although a German army must 
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not be reconstituted under the guise of' police. In November, 
after the Pleven Plan had been advanced, as noted above, 
Schuman pressed for the ratification of the Schuman Plan 
treaty before irreparable mistakes were committed "based on 
the presumed necessity" of German rearmament. 7l 
By the following month the line between rearmament of 
Germany within a "Europe" and German rearmament was becoming 
very thin, no matter what Schuman could say. An important 
criterion for the distinction was the maximum size of all-
German units. Scherer of the National Committee held out 
strongly against German divisions, and Schuman took the same 
stand in the name of the Government at this time. France 
officially went into the Paris Conference of February, 1951 
(during which Germany was accorded equality of' status) on 
the definite assumption that only German combat groups were 
contemplated. But by the following November Schuman and the 
other French negotiators were accepting German participation 
by national divisions, thereby subjecting themselves to an-
other attack by many critics, including Domenach of Esprit. 
Obliged to admit, he charged, that they have grossly 
71. White, ~· cit., p. 275; L'Aube, Sept. 2-3, 1950, p. 1; 
Sept. 4, p. 3; Sept. 7, p. 1; Feb. 15, 1951, p. 3. 
236 
deceived Parliament and public opinion, they resort to a new 
"mensonge" {rationalization, or even stronger: lie); the 
number of divisions would be lower than that for France. 
And then, he said, "les malins 11 (the evil ones) put off to 
an undetermined date the setting of the number~. 7 2 Schuman 
had said in early 1951 that "active German participation 
(in a European army) ••• would 1 ead to the danger of a con-
flict of which France will assume neither the risks nor the 
responsibilities". But his participation in the Government 
led Schuman around to the idea of substantially active German 
participation. Bidaul t, for his part, did not come out in 
flat support of the E.D.C. until his speech to the Council of 
the Republi.c in October, 1953. "The treaty," he said, 11 '\'Tas 
concluded as a result of a given situation which it is not 
in our power to modify ••• It is a problem o f conscience for 
each one of us and I have spoken according to mine". 73 
Now that West Germany has entered N.A.T.o., it is in-
teresting to note the lack of consistency of M.R. P . leaders 
on the question of such an expansion of the treaty. In 
November, 1949, Schuman had flatly opposed German entry into 
N. A. T.o., and had clung to this stand before the Committee 
72. L'Aube, Feb. 15, 1951, p. 1; N, Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1950, 
p. 30:2; Nov. 25, p, 5:4; Feb. 16, 1951, p. 8 :4; Esprit, 
Nov,, 1951, p. 669. The numbers were set, however, not long 
thereafter, 
73. Terre Humaine, Feb., 19 51, p. 6; London Times, Freb. 18, 
1952, p. 4f; N.Y.Times, Oct. 31, 19 53, p. 16:2. See .Discours 
de Bidaul t ••• (bibliography). 
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on Foreign Affairs at the end of 1950. But at this time 
Scherer had hinted, as a possible alternative to the Euro-
pean army plan, that German units might enter the "Atlantic 
forces". During the National Assembly debate on the eve of 
the N.A.T. o . meeting in Lisbon, Schuman argued that the 
entry of Germany in the E.D.c. would not connect her in any 
way, in law or in fact, with N.A.T.O. But in the spring of 
1953 Teitgen pointed out that the army of the former was 
subor:iinated to the command of the latter (hence France 
would not be "left alone'' on the continent with Germany), 
and the following year Alfred Coste-Floret was emphasizing 
that administratively the E.D.C. would fall within N.A.T.o. 
Sc:P.uman offered no rebuttal to these contradictions of his 
statement. 74 
The M.R.P. was apparently commit:teid to the indivisi-
bility of the Bonn Contract and the E.D.C. treaty, both 
having been signed at the same time. When, prior to their 
signature, assurance was sought in the National Assembly 
debate that the two documents would stand or fall together, 
Schuman repliai, "I gave it in the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs; I g1 ve it again willingly". There was not the same 
firmness on the question of the British and American b~aran-
tees to the European army against German secession. Upon 
74. Pickles, QQ. cit., p. 209; L'Aube, Dec. 21, 1950, p. 3; 
Dec. 7, p. 3; Le Monde, Mar. 25, 1954, p. 3:1. The N.A.T.O. 
arrangement in February, 1952 for joint sessions with the 
E. D.C. would have brought Germany closer to the former • 
. Manchester Guardian Weekly, Feb. 28, 1952, p. 1. 
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instruction from the cabinet, Schuman had set this as one o f 
four conditions to the signature of the treaty. He had pre-
viously said that the guarantees should have legislative 
backing in England and the United States. But the final de-
cision at the time of signing was to accept a joint Anglo-
American statement. This did not satisfy Parliament, and in 
December, 1953 Bidaul t reminded Dulles and Churchill that the 
lack of an "ironclad pledge to keep United States and Bri tiah 
troops on the continent indefinitely" was the principal block 
to French ratification of the E.D.C • . treaty.75 
The question of additional protocols to the E.D.c. 
brought about contradictions within the M.R.P. Bidault con-
templated certs.in "lateral modifications" when he sought to 
take the treaty "out of the refrigerator" in December, 1952. 
Additional protocols were presente:i by Bidaul t at a six-
power meeting in Rome in March. But the opinion of presi-
dent Teitgen in January had been that the treaty should be 
ratified at once and modified later, and in his March press 
conference he refrained from commenting on the pro to cola. 
Bidault himself was quite equivocal in his stand on these 
protocols. He secured cabinet approval of them in February, 
and agreed at a six-power meeting that month to consider 
75. Manchester Guardian Weekly, May 29, 1952, p. 1; N,Y,Times, 
May 22, 1952, p. 1:4· Christian Century, Dec, 30, 1953, p. 
1515; Journel des D?bats, Feb, 12, 1952, p, 635. Elsewhere 
Bidaul t said, "Great Britain has at least the curious habit 
of keeping promises she never made". Spectator, Mar, 13, 
19 53, p. 303. 
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·them as interpretive, But at the beginning of March Bidault 
declared that the French parliament would not be asked to 
ratify the treaty until the protocols had been redrafted 
(this in spite of his agreement to press for speedy ratifi-
-
cation). At one point Bidaul t said that, 11"the French inten-
tion is not to alter the treaty but to render it clearer and 
more significant"; at another point he said, "The French 
don 1 t know very well what they want" (he might have added 
"and I am French" ! ) 76 
On several occasions Bidault sought to de-emphasize the 
supranational features of the E.D.C. The bug of sovereignty 
had also bitten Schuman enough by early 1954 to lead him to 
oppose any further supranational authorities in the economic 
field, and to seek to dissociate the E.D.c. from the "Euro-
pean idea". Schuman appeared to be seeking a back door out 
of the dilemma created by the E.D. 0. In an attempt to ex-
plain French delays in the ratification of the treaty, he 
said in 1953: "When a treaty is to last fifty years all 
possible effects must be forseen." / La Brun Keris, in his 
turn, had argued as early as January, 1953 that a European 
authority could be constituted on the base either of a fed-
eration or of a confederation without supranational 
76. N.Y,Times, Dec. 30, 1952, p. 3:6; Jan. 18, 1953, p. 
1:6; Feb. 8, p. 26:3; Feb. 26, p. 1:6; Mar. 1, p. 33:1; 
Politique Internationale, Apr., 1953, p. 468; Manchester 
Guardian Weekly, Mar. 5, 1953, p. 1. For the six conditions 
in the protocols see N.Y.Times, Jan. 10, 1953, p. 1:5; Feb, 
17, p. 26:1. 
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characteristics. As for the Dutch project of a "common 
market", Pflimlin raised doubts at this time about the wis-
dom of French support for it, and in February, 1954 Schuman 
said he believed it was going too far too fast to plan on 
commencing a common market before the sixth year of a Euro-
pean political community. This did not seem to be the same 
man who had presented the sudden proposal of May, 1950 for 
a coal and steel community.77 
Bidaul t, for his part, resembled a pendulum in his 
temperamental attitude towa:r::l Germany. In 1946, while for-
eign minister, he had said, •'Many things change with time; 
Germany is something that never changes." But in his speech 
to the National Assembly in November, 1953, referring to 
Germany, he said that "humanism and scripture alike teach 
that nations are perfectible". In the interim he had argued 
that France should not wait until Germany was "again dom-
inated by a power complex regained in isolation". In 1947 
Bidaul t found Germany to be the major problem in the world; 
if there was an understanding on Germany, there would be an 
understanding on everything. If not, he said, "may God have 
pity on man". 78 
/ 77. Le Brun Keris report, Jan. 25, 1953; Relations de 1 1 Union 
Europ~n et France Outre-Mer, p. 6; Pflimlin, L' Europe et 
L 1Union Fran)aise, 1-'Iar. 19, 1953, p. 6; Le Monde, Mar. 25, 
1954, p. 3:4, May 18, p. 5:3; Feb. 20, p. 3:2 (In a February 
article on the E.D.c. Schuman did not mention the tenn "supra-
national" Feb. 5, p. 3:1); Foreign. Affairs, Apr., pp. 356-7. 
78. White, ~· cit., p. 263; N.Y.Times, Nov. 21, 1953, p. 1; 
Politique, Apr., 1947, p. 246; L 1Aube, Oct. 23, 1950, p. 4. 
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There was · some lack of agreement among the M.R.P. lead .ers 
on the question of the link between the German problem and 
world problems. Prior to 1951 statements by Schuman and 
others had been to the effect that German problems could 
not '· se isolated from others. But Maurice Schumann main-
tained that since the outpreak of the war in Korea this was 
no longer true, although an agi'eement on Germany might lead 
79 the nations out of an impasse. By February 1954 there was 
a full swing of the pendulum, and Bidaul t was distinguishing 
between Asian problems and European problems, at least, in 
the Berlin Conference. The M.R.P. was seeking to dissociate 
the dilemma in Indo-China from the dilemma in Europe. 
Running to Extremes 
A sense of balance is an advantage in most situations, 
and it is especially advantageous for a political party to 
maintain its balance. Instead M.R.P. leaders either were 
more enthusiastic than the political situation of the moment 
warranted or else were unenthusiastic for some party policies, 
especially the Pflimlin Plan. Party optimism was at its 
peak over the Schuman Plan. Maurice Schumann hailed it as 
the greatest victory ever achieved over the trusts. In pro-
posing a treaty of fifty years duration Robert Schuman re-
flected extreme optimism. The surest economies, said Droit 
80 Social, limit their plans to five years. 
79. L'Aube, Nov. 15, 1950, p. 1; Jan. 3, 1951, p. 3. 
80. Ibid., Mar. 19, 1951, p. 4; May 22, 1950, p. 3; Droit 
Soci~ar. 1951, p. 149. 
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Schuman's optimism in May, 1950 provided a striking con-
trast to the pessimism of Bidaul t, who ·spoke in 1948 with 
"agonized b:ittarness" of the need of uniting "what ' remains 
of Europe" and as recently as April, 1950 had sought the 
alternative of further economic integration of the members 
of N.A.T.o., including of course France. We have already 
note:i the lack of enthusiasm within the M.R.P. for the E.P.C. 
and especially the distaste for the European army plan. 
During the debate on the E.D.c. in February, 1952 Schuman 
. . 
gave the "impression of following his project's hearse". 
Later in the year when the much respected Herriot of the 
Radical Socialists formulated detailed criticisms of the 
E.D.C. treaty, he charged that it was the M.R.P. supporters 
of the treaty, not its critics, who had not read the docu-
ment carefully. 
By the time of the Berlin Conference of February, 1954, 
Bidaul t had come around to the opposite extreme in expressing 
overweening confidence in the success of the European army 
plan, which he said "virtually insures against a resurgence 
of German militarism". Yet during the spring of 1954 Bidaul t 
was criticized. by the Socialist leader Mollet for failing to 
take more initiative to get actual participation of Great 
Britain in the army plan. The Government (including Bidaul t), 
he said, was more preoccupied with the reactions of opponents 
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of the treaty than with those of supporters of Europeaniza- -
... 81 
uion. 
The M.R.P. president, Teitgen, was overoptimistic about 
the chances of the European political community. He pre-
dicted in December, 1952 that there would be .elections for 
the proposed popular assembly within a year, and in September, 
19 53 he rushed to the Rome conference to urge the French 
delegates to go to the limit of their instructions in pre-
paring a political community. But Bidault'a caution over 
this E. P . C. balanced the optimism of Tei tgen. Moreover, 
when the foreign ministers of the six "E.D.C. powers" ap-
proved the principle of the Dutch usingle market" plan in 
February, 1953, Bidaul t opposed any appearance of haste. 82 
M.R.P. enthusiasm was especially lacking for the 
Pflimlin Plan for a ngreen pool" for agriculture. Even 
before the Plan had a chance to gain momentum, the official 
M.R.P. organ L'Aube, was discussing obstacles and reviewing 
reasons against it rather than for it. No attempt was made 
to suggest solutions for difficulties inherent in the pro-
ject nor to stress ita intrinsic advantages. Action by a 
high authority would be handicapped, said L 1Aube, by two 
characteristics of the agricultural industry: a multitude 
81. Luethy, ~. cit.,pp. 361, 383; N.Y. Timea, Oct. 18, 
1952, p. 1:1; Jan. 31, 1954, p. 3:1; Manchester Guardian 
Weekly, Sept. 24, 1953, p. 2; Lo~on Times, Feb. 18, 1952, p. 
4f'; Le Monda, Mar. 16, 1954, p. 4:5; Apr. 13, p. 2:5. 
82. Le Monde, Jan. 7, 1954, p. 1; N.Y.Times, Oct. 28, 1953, 
p . 1:2; Dee. 21, 1952, p. 20:2; Feb. 25, 1953, p. 1:6. 
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,(>f producers and imme:liate effect of a change in price on 
consumers. It was forgotten that Pflimlin himself had not 
considere:l a high authority an essential of his Plan, al-
though the common impression was otherwise. 83 
The conference on the Pflimlin Plan of March, 1951 was 
calle:l on the initiative of the Council of Europe rather 
than on that of any of the M.R.P. dirigeants. During the 
following year the realization grew, within the party and 
without, of how the Plan would threaten the extensive French 
farm subsidy system. Many troublesome questions were raised 
·in the M.R.P. organ Terre Humaine, one of whose writers sum-
marizEd his pessimistic turn of thought by saying, "the idea 
of a uni te:l Europe is not yet completely dead 11 ! Only Pflim-
lin and Buron kept up the struggle within the party. The 
latter note:l in May, 1954 that a minimum of organization was 
necessary to liberate the excnanges of Europe, and world 
markets were necessary to prevent the spread of communism. 
Even Buron himself had emphasized in 1951 the French (nation-
alistic) pulicy of encouraging exports, without reference to 
84 
necessary complementary effects on imports. 
On the touchy Saar problem the M.R.P. was, in contrast, 
overoptimistic. Perhaps with his tongue in his cheek, 
83. L'Aube, July 4, 1950, p. 1; July 5, p. 1; July 6, p. 1; 
June 15, p. 3. 
84. Manchester Guardian Weekly, Apr. 3, 1952, p. 9; L'Aube, 
Mar. 30, 1951, p. 1; Mar. 1, pp. 3-'+; N.Y.Times, Mar. 29, 
1952. p. 3:7; News From France, June 15, 1951, p. 5; 
Forces Nouvelles, Dec. 20, 1952, p. 4; Le Monde, May 8, 1954, 
p. 1:4; May 4, p. 5:5; also see Appendix A. 
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Schuman declarai in the f'all of' 1950 that the political pro-
blem of' the Saar could be considerai as resolved. Adenauer 
demonstratai in periodic statements that this was merely 
whistling in the dark. Yet in July, 1952 Schuman again re-
f'errai to the proposal f'or Europeanization of' the Saar in a 
conf'ident tone. In the spring of' 1954 most M..R.P. leaders 
interviewed by the author continued to be too optimistic, in 
seeing a definitive Saar settlement within a matter of' 
weeks. 85 
In September, 1953 Schuman had shown himself' to be a 
master of' understatement when he said that "any great enter-
prise has its moments of' let-down". He f'ound the three 
great obstacles to European unity to be nationalism, protec-
tionism, and pacif'ism or neutralism. The belated national-
ists closed their eyes to the evidence, he said, that nation-
alism was going out of' f'ashion. He recalled that during his 
speeches once only had nationalist demonstrators resorted to 
violence, and then they were recruited f'rom a distance · of' one 
hundred miles. Protectionism, he said, ref'lects the f'ear of' 
the f'oreigner; "what was once a necessity in war has become 
a habit in peace". With respect to the f'ear of' Russia by the 
neutralists, SchUJD.an said that "to f'i t one's own attitude to 
that of' an adversary is always detestable", and leaves the 
initiative to the adversary. 86 
85. L'Aube, Nov. 17 1950, p. 3; May 11, 1951, p. 3; Journel 
des D4bats, Nov. 6, i953, p. 4932; Manchester Guardian Weekly, 
May 1~ 1952, 2P· 2~ 7; July 31, p. 2; N.Y.Times, Apr. 25, 1952, 
,p. 3:o; Nov. 7, 19::>3; also see Appendix A. 
86. N,Y,Times Mag., Sept. 27, 1953, pp. 28-30. 
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" \"le cannot recognize the right of anyone to prevent us 
from being united 11 , said Schuman. 87 Unfortunately, the right 
to European unity was omitted from the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man. Even M. R.P. leaders themselves were not i m-
mune to the diseases of nationalism and protectionism, and 
part of their political philosophy was akin to neutralism. 
Hence there was little reason for such rank optimism, 
especially in view of the fact that the M.R.P. was building 
its policy towaro Germany on the support of Adenauer almost 
alone within Germany. If he should die or lose control, 
chances would be much slimmer for the program of European 
integration. In the interim, M. R.P. leaders were wanting 
in energy to overcome the comparative indiff erence of French 
public opinion to foreign affairs. Schuman belatedly 
launched a campaign to publicize the E.D.C. in January, 1954, 
but little more was heard of this campalgn. 88 
M.R.P. Disregard for Parliamentary Opinion 
1. Parliamentary Practices 
There is no denying that the most persistent and skilled 
tacticians would easily be frustrated by the temperament and 
practices of the French Parliament. The National Assembly 
87. Ibid. According to Nation, M.R.P. "handouts 11 in early 
1954 were that the ratification of the E.D.C. was a fore-
gone conclusion, and that Bidault was indispensable at the 
Quai d'Orsay. Nation, Sept. 25, 195~, p. 254. 
88. Esprit, Dec., 1951, p. 850; Le J.vionde, Jan. 14, 1954, 
p. 3:4; Jan. 23, p. 2:5. 
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has been reluctant .to take responsibility of any sort in the 
field of foreign policy. The deputies shift responsibility 
to the Government ministers and then blame the latter. For 
example, when closure of debate on the E.D.C. was voted in 
February, 1952 by 327 to 287 over lively protests, a cry 
came from the extreme right: "forty votes, forty ministers!" 
Although many interpellations are made and many questions 
are put to the cabinet ministers, few of the questions relate 
to foreign policy. 
There has been some change, however, in recent years. 
It was an axiom of the Third Republic that French govern-
ments never fell over issues of foreign policy. But in 1952 
Faure made it clear that he would resign if the Government 
were defeated in the vote on the E.D.C. In 1953 foreign 
policy was the decisive factor in the fall of the Mayer 
Government. The following year, when Bidault went out of 
office along with Laniel in June, 1954, the basic issue was 
that of policy in Indo-China. 89 
Committees within Parliament are growing in importance 
and taking over control from individual deputies and sena-
tors. As is true of Congressional practice in the United 
States, parliamentary debate has to v/ai t frequently upon the 
readiness of the "rapporteurs" of committees, who were said 
89 Terre Humaine, Apr., 1953, pp. 5-6, 101; Journel des De~ats, Feb. 19, 1952, pp. 791-3; Howard, Qg. cit., p. 61; 
Le Monde, Feb. 9, 1954, p. 1:4; N.Y.Times, Feb. 20, 1952, 
p. 1:7; Feb. 21, p. 2; Contemporary Review, July, 1953, 
pp. 6, 9. 
by Howard (in his book on French parliamentary practice) 
sometimes to regard their assignment "as a means for the 
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furtherance of their personal ambi tiona through the produc-
tion of monumental volumes". Schuman preferred the rela-
tively quieter control exerted by committees to disclosures 
to the full Assembly, but committees could be quite trouble-
some themselves. For example, Moch 'a committee on foreign 
affairs posed sixty-two technical questions on the E.D.c.9° 
Even more reliance was placed on committees after Bidault 
replaced Schuman, and some of the momentum of Schuman's 
earlier policy was lost because committee decisions, like a 
all group decisions, tend to be more compromising than those 
of individuals. More bargains were the result. 
In one way the M.R.P. foreign ministers, Bidault and 
Schuman, had an advantage in the development of the economic 
phase of European integration. ·rhis advantage lay in the 
relative ignorance of or disregard for technicBJ._ economic 
matters to be found among most members of Parliament. 91 
90. Esprit, June, 1953, p. 853; Howard, Qg. cit., pp. 81, 
Le Mende, Feb. 26, 1954, p. 16:3; Mar. 18, p. 16:4; Inter-
national Organization, May, 1953, pp. 210-211. In August, 
1953 Bidaul t claimed to be "touched to the quick" by reports 
of French hesitation and reluctance on the E.P.C. (The 
E.c.s.c. f oreign ministers had agreed on the need of an 
E.P.C. including the E.c.s.c. and the E.D.C.) N.Y. 'rimes, 
Aug. 9, 1953, p. 1:7. 
91. Although parliamentary disregard for technical matters 
led to relatively little specific, direct criticism of econo-
mic projects such as the Schuman Plan w1 thin Parliament it-
self, such criticism was not lacking. The critical function 
was taken over by the strong industrial pressure groups. It 
is very difficult to get specific information on the activi-
ties of these groups, but it is at least significant that in 
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·This is perhaps the result of the fact that French legisla- . 
tion is much more general than Congressional legislation in 
the Uni too States; detailed implementation is left to the 
administrative branch, But the resultant inadequacy of mem-
bers of Parliament benefitted M.R.P. policy-makers only when 
they could sidestep the deep-seated political resentments of 
French law-makers, for many deputie~ in the National Assembly 
are psychologically as well as technically unprepared to 
treat plans on their merits. In the case of such a plan as 
the E.D.c., on the other hand, M.R.P. leaders ran up against 
the French disposition to forsee all possible dangers, which 
produced a sense of helplessness and an escapist outlook.9 2 
Many of the 628 deputies in the National Assembly were also 
frustrated and bitter, having risked their lives in an effort 
93 to make France great once more, 
91. (cont.) France more perhaps than in other countries the 
"Fourth Estate" of the press is joined t~ the "Fifth Estate" 
of the pressure groups. Le Monde and Temoignage Chrei.ien 
are the exceptions among Paris newspapers in not being tied 
to any particular special interest groups. Nationalized 
industries also exert pressures, but most important are the 
cartels, whose tight control of French industry survives. 
Appendix A; Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1949, p. 31; White, Qg. 
cit., p. 68; Terre Humaine, July-Aug., 1952; p. 22. See list 
of pressure groups in Carrere, Qg. cit., p. 137. 
92. Manchester Guardian Weekly, Dec. 28, 1951, p. 6; 
Virginia Quarterly Review, summer, 1950, p. 355; Atlantic, 
Apr., 1952, p. 11. / 
93. Journel des Debats, Feb, 19, 1952, pp. 791-3; N,Y.Times 
Mag,, May 31, 1953, pp. 29-30; White, Qg. cit., pp. 81-2. 
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2. Parliamentary Attacks on the M.R.P. 
During the National Assembly debates the M. R.P. leaders 
were the butt of many personal attacks b y their opponents. 
Although these make very interesting readi n g in the Journal 
,. 
des Debate, they did not make the party's path any easier, 
and at times the answers of M. R.P. leaders were rather testy. 
In February, 1952 debate the Gaullists made cutting jibes at 
them. Barr~s quoterl a diplomat supporting the E.D.C. as 
having said, "the Germans long ago enterEd France in uniform; 
the political problem is to help them enter as civilians". 
Bidaul t rejoined, "vmo is the imbecile who said that?" When 
' Barres referred to a proposal of a French general that 
special benefits be given to those entering into French-Ger-
man mixed marriages, Bidault said, 11Another imbecile!'' 
Barr~s explained that the author was Guillaume, Resident-
General of Morocco! The same day Koenig (Gaullist) took a 
cut at Schuman, saying that in such a debate as the present 
one "l'amour propre" had no place. "Who spoke of that?" 
94 
retorted Schuman. 
It was of course the Communists who were specialists at 
this sort of diatribe. In the above-mentione:i debate Billoux 
quoted Adenauer as having said on July 10, 1951 that young 
Frenchmen could die in o:rUer to return Danzig to Germany. 
"It is a lie! 11 said Bidault, "and you know it!" Duclos 
, 
94. Journal des Debate, Feb. 13, 1952, pp. 686-9; Feb. 19, 
p. 789. 
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referred to the alleged source, Revue Intellectuelle, which · 
he said included contributions by M.R.P. writers such as 
, 
Hamon. Bidaul t insisted t h at it was a lie. "You lie! 11 
said Duclos in turn, to which Bidaul t replied, "Allez-vous-
en! 11 (Get out!) Duclos: "You work for Adenauer and not for 
France! 1195 Just before t his Ivialleret-Joinville of' the Com-
munists had asked whether the majority would "trample on the 
tombs 11 or two million Frenchmen, to which Bidaul t replied: 
"Taisez-vous!" (Shut up!) Finally the Communist, on getting 
no acknowledgment from Bidaul t or :t'amiliari ty with a certain 
bit or German news, resorted to an attack on the latter's 
health: "The particular state or fatigue of M. Bidaul t can-
not excuse everything. u96 
In the debate of November, 1953 the Communist leader 
Duclos charged that Bidaul t was disregarding the Franco-
Soviet Treaty or which he had spoken so warmly in 19~4, and 
also that the E.D.C. could not qualify under the provisions 
or the preamble or the Constitution dealing w1 th international 
arrangements for the defense of the peace. \'lhen Bidaul t 
quoted Article 7 of the Bonn Contract which specifically 
95. A :rew days later Bidaul t was careful to read out a cor-
rection in the February issue or Revue Intellectuelle. The 
woroing in the January issue had been, as it developed, only 
a commentary on the Adenauer text taken from the extremist 
French journal L 10bservateur. Billoux was unsuccessful in 
trying to get permission for a last word. Ibid., Feb. 16, 
1952, p. 746. 
96. Ibid., Feb. 19 52, pp. 791-3. 
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subo!Uinated the fixing of any frontiers to considerations o-:f 
maintenance of the peace, Duclos countered with the charge 
that ~enauer had said in September that the first objective 
of Germany was a readjustment of the Oder-Neisse line.97 
; De Chambrun, leader of the few "Chretiens pro gressistes" 
in the Assembly, gave frequent support to the Communist at-
tacks .98 The temper of the French National Assembly is like 
that of no other legislature in the world, and these illus-
trations may partly explain the reluctance of M.R.P. mini-
sters to descend into the arena and seek Assembly approval 
of their foreign policy. 
97. Ibid., Nov. 20, 1953, p. 5299. Communist aspersions were 
cast at the Cotholicity of the M.R.P. When the E.D.C. was 
finally defeated in August, 1954, M.R.P. deputies shouted at 
the cheering Communists, "Back to Moscow!" Time, Sept. 13, 
1954, p. 28. 
98. He asked in November, 1953 why Adenauer had to be consul-
ted before speaking to Russia; by the 1944 Pact, · he contended, 
the priority should be reversed. To his argument that the 
Bonn Contract giving West Germany a certain status had not 
yet been ratified, Bidault replied that neither had the 
Franco-Soviet Treaty been ratified, although he admitted that 
it had been informally approved by the Consultative Assembly 
in de Gaulle's Provisional Government. A device used by all 
these extremist critics was the anonymous statement. Noel 
referred in the above debate to the additional protocols 
which, "dit-on" (one says), the highest "personnalitesu re-
sponsible for French military security would judge of no 
technical value. Bidau1t interjected, "C'est un 'dit-on"'·,-
Bichet of the M.R.P. criticized the "protestations fabriquees" 
which Noel said had been coming from -local patriotic and 
military organizations. Ibid., Nov. 17, 1953, pp. 5202-6, 
5228. --
3. Avoidance of Parliament 
by M.R.P. Leaders 
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Although the level of much of the criticism in the 
National Assembly might provide a partial explanation for 
l.VI. R.P. leaders' avoidance of that body, they were tactically 
unwise in failing to take the sensibilities of both branches 
of Parliament . into account. There was, for example, a 
striking failure to prepare parliamentary opinion and also 
public opinion within France for the Schuman Plan. Further-
more, in June, 1950 Schuman opposed a resolution in the 
National Assembly requiring preliminary agreement on the 
negotiations by Parliament, explaining in the debate the 
folloWing month that he was willing to give information, but 
that he could not tie his hands in the middle of negotiations. 
He promised, however, that there would be no "faits accomplis 11 
and that the Assembly would have a full chance to make its 
decision. 
Bidault, in his turn, frequently showed that he prefer-
red the channels and methods of traditional diplomacy in de-
veloping foreign policy. In September, 1950 he criticized 
the intense publicity of the negotiations over the project 
for a European army, referring to such publicity as "one of 
the supersti tiona of today". Needed at the time were deci-
sions, not talk, he said, if the West were to take the 
initiative away from Russia. There was nothing worse in a 
dangerous situation, said Bidault, than announcing a course 
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·that could not yet be taken; it smacked of internal politics. 
Yet the very occasion for the demand for publicity and dis-
cussion which displeased Bidault may have been the too fre-
quent attempts of Schuman to disregard Parliament and keep 
the negotiations on the European Army quiet.99 
In a country like France, where members of the legisla-
ture pride themselves on independence of thought, disregard 
for them is always dangerous, regardless of the fact that 
until recently they have concentrated their attention on 
internal affairs. Perhaps Parliament in France is so dif-
ficult to handle because its members sense the decline in 
the importance of the legislature and react motivated by a 
feeling of frustration. During the campaign for a European 
parliament under the E.P.C., a writer in a French journal 
commented that it made one smile sadly, for "we no longer 
believe in parliamentarism except in opposing dictatorship". 
French governmental instability had led towaro an increase 
in povver of permanent officials not responsible to Parlia-
ment, and also to a disaffection for parliamentary govern-
,. 
ment. There was a growing "depossession du Parlement par 
le Gouvernement, du Gouvernement par lea bureauxn.lOO 
99. Esprit, Dec., 1951, pp. 842, 850; L'Aube, June 21, 1950, 
p. 1; July 26, p. 1; Sept. 18, p. 1; Sept. 23-4, p. 1; Feb. 
3-4, 1951, p. 6; :Diianchester Guaroian Ueekly, July 27, 1950, 
p. 1 (Schuman asked the .Assembly to be logical for once, 
since it was always reproaching the Government for lack of 
initiative. June 22, p. 3). 
100. Vie Intellectuelle, Apr., 1950, pp. 469-471; Esprit, 
Mar., 1953, p. 365; June, 19 53, p. 862. 
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In a declaration to the Assembly on August 30, 1951 
Schuman referred to Briand 1 s inability in 1929 to announce 
his stand on coming negotiations at the Hague, and said that 
he was faithful to Briand's rule. A debate, said Schuman, 
would involve statements that would tend to bind the nego-
tiators, and therefore could not be accepted; it was the 
Government that was responsible for negotiations. It was the 
function of Parliament to accept or not accept the results 
of the negotiations, he said, not to give instructions which 
would handicap the negotiators. By the vote of investiture 
of the premier the Assembly had, accoriiing to Schuman 1 s 
argument, accepted the general policy being followed by the 
Government. In contrast to Bidaul t, who was inclined to 
prefer to rely on the diplomats, Schuman seemed to rely on 
himself. 
Even an M.R.P. writer in that party's journal, Terre 
Humaine, declared in 1951 that there seemed never to have 
been such a split between official policy and the reactions 
of the French. He found the answer in the traditions of 
secret diplomacy supported by Schuman, who refused to take 
any precise directives from the deputies. In that year 
Schuman told the National Assembly that there would be no 
11 fai t accompli 11 , nor were there any moral commitments on 
the European army plan before a parliamentary debate. Yet 
the following month, after announcing "very great progress 11 
at the meeting of the six foreign ministers at Strasbourg, 
S chuman stated that "we all made concessions 11 , and now it 
was "certain" that a supranational authority would be set 
up to run the army. Opening the debate in the National 
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Assembly in February, S chuman reminded his hearers that he 
had said several times that it was "not the function of 
Parliament to intervene in negotiations in process"; this 
was an executive function, and in interfering with it there 
was the danger of creating a precedent. But the gravity of 
the situation had led the Government, he said, to seek this 
debate. 101 
In this debate S chuman urged the deput ies to "reflect 
without passion", but his audience was in general unenthu-
siastic, to say the least. The violent opposition to the 
E . D.C. on both left and right of the Assembly had not 
expressed itself much until this time because of the rela-
tive secrecy of the negotiations. It was only a week before 
the debate that the Foreign Office had finally circulated a 
summary of the project.102 
Again in April, 1954, the M. R. P . foreign minister, now 
Bidault, was charg ed with disregarding Parliament. Conven-
tions with Great Britain had been signed which committed the 
/ ' \. 101. Bull~tin Quotidian de Presse Etrangere, Ministerre des 
Affaires Etrang~es no. 1967, Aug. 31, 1951; Terre Humaine, 
Oct., 1951, p. 579; Manchester Guardian Weekly, Sept. 6, 
1951, p. 2; N,Y,Time~ Nov. 2l, 1951, p. 5:1; Dec. 12, p, 
8:3-11-; Journal des D ats, Feb, 12, 1952, p. 573. 
102, N,Y. Times, Feb, 12, 1952, p. 1:2; Esprit, Mar., 1951, 
p . 329; Manchester Guardian Weekly, Feb. 14, 1952, p. 2. 
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latter to a definite amount of military support on the con- . 
tinent for a determinate period of time. However, these 
were presented to the French cabinet by Bidaul t and Tei tgen 
in such a manner as seemed in the eyes of some critics to 
force the hands of the ministers and of the National Assembly. 
Some ministers had seen:. the text only an hour previously, 
and adversaries also protested the holding back of the text 
until the National Assembly was on its extended Easter 
recess. 103 
4. Committing Parliament 
As early as January, 1950 the National Assembly itself 
had required that under no circumstances should West Ger-
many be allowed the reconstitution of her military forces 
and after the February, 1952 debate on the European army 
plan and upon the demand of the Socialists, the National 
Assembly set five specific conditions to the ratification 
of the E.D.c. treaty.104 Once the treaty had been signed, 
103. Le Mende, Apr. 14, 1954, pp. 1:1, 2:4. The observa-
tion of the author on the last point is that the Assembly 
took too many and too long recesses! Perhaps the reason for 
Bidault's reluctance to show the text lay in the fact that, 
although reports were that British army units were to be 
stationed with E.D.C. forces, among them one armored divi-
sion, a perusal of the text of the United Kingdom statement 
reveals no reference to any specific units, and also quali-
fying clauses such as "where military considerations make ~ ~ 
this desirable". Contrast Time, Apr. 26, 1954 with :Che 
Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 26, 1954, pp. 619-621. 
104. Manchester Guardian Weekly, Feb. 21, 1952, p. 2; News 
From France, Jan. 15, 1950, p. 12. 
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however, Schuman was persistent in his demand that the Gov-
ernment defend it. At the M. R.P. congress of 1953, after 
he had left the foreign ministry, he declared that a govern-
ment does not have the right to fail to defend a treaty it 
has signed, referring apparently to the French government 
rather than to any particular Government of any one premier. 
In the debate of November, 1953, speaking as a deputy, Schu-
man declared that he remained faithful to the policy that 
"we" had commenced. But Bonnefous, fo:mnerly head of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, took the occasion in this de-
bate to criticize the idea that France was committed to the 
E. D.O. because it had given its signature to the treaty.l05 
Schuman's failure to be more solicitous of British 
sensibilities in drafting the Schuman Plan also had later 
repercussions in Parliament since powerful elements of the 
National Assembly, particularly the Socialists, were opposed 
to a "Europe" without England. 106 During the embryonic 
discussions of a European political community in the fall of 
1950, Schuman was more concerned about England's attitude, and 
called on the British to form part of this united Europe. 
His effort was nipped in the bud, however, ·by a semi-official 
105. Forces Nouvelles, May 30, 1953, p. 8; Journal des 
Debats, Nov. 19, 1953, pp. 5290-3; Nov. 18, p. 5242. 
106. Howard, ~. cit., p. 159; L' Aube, May 11, 1950, p. 1; 
May 31, p. 3; June 18, p. 3. Schumann did say that it was 
"impossible to think of Europe without her (England)". 
Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 22, 1950, p. 3 ••• Did 
Robert Schuman imply that the French were not accustomed to 
reflect before speaking? 
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statement from the French Government saying it had not yet 
consid ered the question. (Schuman was discovering that he 
could not drag France along in his wake.) In t h e fall of 
1952, Schuman favored drafting a charter for the E.P.C. under 
the auspices of the Council of Europe, since such procedure 
11 conforms with English views". In supporting the need for .~ 
association of Great Britain with the E.D. C., _,in his address 
to the National Assembly in 1953, Bidaul t said that Great 
Britain would rather~ engagements than~ them. 107 
5. ll:I. R. P . Weakness in Debate 
In the actual debates in the National Assembly, which 
were few and far between so far as forei gn policy was con-
cerned, M. R.P. participation was somewhat wanting to ·say 
the least. Perhaps Teitgen gave t h e best account of h i mself; 
to t h e objections raised against the Pleven Plan in the 
early debate of October, 1950, for example, he replied at 
length, and in an optimistic manner. There was something 
more pessimistic in the quality of Schuman's address to the 
National Assembly in February, 1952.108 Except for Teitgen, 
a very limited number of speeches were made by its memb ers 
in Parliament in support of the program of European con-
struction. Despite the extenuating explanations to be found 
107. N.Y •• :Times, Oc,....,t. 29, 19 50, p. 8:6; July 15, 1952, p. 
4:4; Journel des Debats, Nov. 20, 1953, p. 5354 et seq. 
108. L 1Aube, pet. 26, 19 50, p. 1: N.Y,Times, Feb. 12, 1952, 
p. 1:2; Suoplement ~M. R .P. ~l'Action, no. 102, Oct. 25, 
1950. 
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in the parliamentary rules, the net result was a weakening 
of the i"I . R.P. case as the opposition increased in tempo. 
This effect was accentuated by the infrequency of debates; 
at the time of the signature of the E.D.C. treaty a debate 
that had been asked for was not even on the calendar, and 
although the "projet de loi" was submitted to the Assembly 
in January, 1953, the next debate did not come until the 
. 109 following November. 
Ardent reformers like Jean Monnet (who drafted the de-
tails of the Schuman Plan) and to a lesser degree Schuman 
usually preferred to avoid contact with the public, but the 
result was that there was a lack of active popular support 
for European integration. The mass of French people re-
mai ned indifferent to this as well as to other aspects of 
M.R. P . foreign policy. This lack of support was reflected 
in the people's representatives in Parliament. It is true 
that Robert Schuman had considerable justification for his 
stand that the executive must be free to negotiate interna-
tional a greements. But h e forgot one o f the principles in-
corporated by Bidaul t in M. R.P. policy: "Government is con-
ciliation." Seldom was it that Schuman tried to conciliate 
Parliament.llO. 
109. Assemble' Nationale no. 5405, annex to pro ces verbal, 
seance de Jan. 29, 1953; N, Y. Times, May 22, 1952, p. 1 :4; 
L' Annee Po.li tique, 1953, pp. 422-l.J.35. Partly due to the 
technicalities of a "question prEf""alable", Schuman, who had 
signed the treaty, was not heard from at the time of defeat 
of the E.D.C. in August, 1954. Time, Sept. 13, 1954, p. 28. 
110. · Luethy, Ql2.. cit., p. 410; Occidente, loc. cit., p. 383. 
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An Article of Faith 
The various criticisms that have been brought against 
M.R.P. tactics constitute in part, at least, an indictment 
of France more than of the M.R.P. It has been h~ for 
France and the intellectually divisive French to find that 
faith or that conviction on issues which is necessary for 
almost all profouni reform. The program of European integra-
tion, which is identified with the M.R.P., required a degree 
of devotion to the cause that was more easily developed by 
/. 
"practicing Catholics" than by "non-cretien" French leaders. 
The members of the M.R.P. had a high degree of un1 ty and 
cohesion, politically as well as religiously. The vitriolic-
tongued Domenach of Esprit was forced to concede that Chris-
tian democrats were tied to the J)ilovement by an "adhesion of 
the heart 11 , having a religious veneration of their chiefs 
such as children often have of their parents.111 
The construction of Europe became a sort of "article of 
faith" for the M.R.P. "Absence of doctrine and failure of 
authority are directly connected", said Borne in Terre 
Humaine in 1953. There had been in the recent past, he 
thought, too many opinions and too few doctrines, one of 
which was the "European idea". Periodically the M.R.P. re-
minded France of the party's close association with European 
integration. At the Nantes congress of 1950 the M.R.P. 
' I 
111. Esprit, Oct.-Nov., 1953, pp. 658-660; Gui1lemin, ~. 
cit., p. 157; also Appendix A. 
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sought to create an impression of indispensability through · 
a motto affixed to the wall of the meeting room: "If France 
were to rebuild itself without the M.R.P., Europe would have 
to be constructed w1 thout France. 11 But the party often re-
sorted to faith instead of deeds. In contrast to pre-Reform-
ation Catholics, it sought "justification through faith" 
rather than through "works" ~ 112 
The M.R.P. was .continually preoccupied with European 
integration, and by 1954 was in danger of developing an ob-
session over the E.D.c., despite its earlier hesitations and 
equivocation. The same flat stand had been taken publicly 
on other parts of the program of integration. In late 1951 
Schuman maintained that failure to ratify the E.c.s.c. would 
call into question the whole French policy since the war. 
iYI .R.P. leaders, who had cast scorn on the 11 inflexibility" of 
Communist doctrine, were themselves subject to the same 
charge of inflexibility in their policy of European integra-
tion.113 
The party made too much of the argument that there was 
no alternative to the E.D.C. In 1950 Scherer, speaking for 
the M.R.P. parliamentary group, declared that if this Europe 
were not made, therw would be a German Europe under dominance 
o:f Russia. During the debate of' February, 1952, Schuman had 
112. Terre Humaine, Apr. 1953, pp. 5-6, 101. 
113. Le !vionde, Jan. 12, 1954, p. 5:1; Lonion Times, Dec. 1, 
1951, p. 6g. 
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told the Assembly that German membership in N.A.T.O. as an 
alternative to the E. D.C. would give the former an a ggres-
sive character in Russian eyes because of the German terri-
torial claims.114 By 1954 Alfred Coste-Floret's argument 
was that Russia would not have agreed to the impending Geneva 
meeting if the E.D.c. had not been threatening ; Maurice 
Schumann warned that the failure of the treaty would result 
in the acceptance of anything by the French to escape diplo-
matic isolation; and Teitgen declared that the alternatives 
would be the gradual breakup of N .A. T .0. and. a rebirth of a 
"popular front" in France, or the retreat of the latter into 
diplomatic isolation. When the ]II . R.P. members of the Govern-
ment said there was no acceptable alternative, d i d they 
themselves really believe it? In their tactics, especially 
in early 1954, they overstressed this argument. It is un-
realistic to assume the absence of an alternative to any 
move in f oreign policy . 11 5 
Ev en the N. R.P. diri geants began to realize t his. At 
the Lille congress Lecanuet, attempting to leave a door open 
in case of the failure of the E.D.C. treaty, said tha t the 
M. R. P . d id no t hold to the superstition of a single chance 
for Europe. Borne had anticipated Lecanuet in this line of 
114. L'Aube, Oct. 26, 1950, p. 3; Oct. 9, p. 3; London 
Times, Jan. 20, 1953, p. 5b; Feb. 12, 1952, p. 4c; Manchester 
Guaroian w·eekly, Feb. 21, 1952, p. 2; Journel d es Dtbats, 
Feb. 13, 19 52, pp. 677-683. 
115. Le Monde, Mar. 9, 1954, p. 2:3; 11. ay 18 , p. 5:3. 
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a r gument on the first day of the Congress; one objective, 
he said (the E.D.C.), should not turn the M.R.P. away from 
others. As a matter of fact, it was only a matter of months 
' after the E.D.c. was finally defeated under Mendes-France in 
August, 1954 that an alternative was worked out through the 
expansion of the Brussels Pact, however successful or unsuc-
cessful it may prove to be. To every course of action there 
is always an alternative.ll6 
The initial momentum and dynamism of the M. R.P. had 
been almost exhausted by the end of 1952. Unfortunately, it 
was at this time that this momentum and dynamism was most 
needed to push towaro a decision on the most critical plan 
of European integration, the E.D. C. It is ironic that the 
key to the compromises at home and in North Africa which had 
sapped the M.R.P. 's dynamism and momentum lay in t)J.e party's 
predominant foreign policies: resistance in Indo-China and 
integration of Europe. The M.R.P. had staked its prestige 
on policies for which French public opinion was not ready. 
It is, however, to the final credit of the M.R.P. that, when 
the party found its program could not be achieved, it did 
not reverse its positions like the Radical Socialists to re-
tain a place in the Government, but went instead into the 
117 
opposition. 
116. 
117. 
Appendix A; Forces Nouvelles, June 5, 1954, p. 7. 
Occidente, loc. cit., p. 379. 
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CONCLUSION 
1. The major obstacle to M. R.P. success in its foreign 
policy lay in the contradictory nature of its political 
philosophy. As a matter of fact, the party's emphasis on 
political philos9phy was in itself a handicap. The French 
are famous for their intellectual independence, but in daily 
life and in everyday politics they are quite a practical 
people. More than once the writer heard comments adverse to 
the M. R.P. because of this party emphasis on a political 
philosophy which verged very closely on ideology. A resident 
of Burgundy (the one area that gave the M. R.P. no votes in 
1946) told the writer that his fellow Burgundians liked the 
M.R.P. leaders as individuals but were afraid that they 
would keep their promises! 
Various contradictions within this party philosophy pro-
vided particular stumbling blocks for the M. R.P. Profession 
and practice were frequently at odds. The party professed 
to be a "movement"; yet it was distinctly regional, and its 
direct influence was confined to a portion of the practicing 
Catholics and to a particular social level equivalent roughly 
to the lower middle class. It was not even able to reconcile 
the split between Left and Right in the Catholic Church, as 
it moved slowly to the Right. 
The M.R. P . had numerous Catholic or quasi-Catholic allies 
but none of great strength. Otherwise, its loss of the 
support of business, labor, the press and the bureaucracy 
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was significant since effective foreign policy pressure 
groups were to be found in some of these fields. There was, 
therefore, 11 ttle chance for the M.R.P. to develop in prac-
tice the pluralism that was part of its political philosophy. 
As a "movement", it expected to rally to its support and 
that of its objectives as many groups, otherwise called 
"ha tural communities", as po s si bl e. This effort to be 
pluralistic fell far short of attainment. In fact the family 
and the Church were the only two "natural groups" from which 
the party could get real support. But the French family, as 
such, is uninterested in foreign policy, and on the other 
hand the French Catholic Church had been in the past too 
international in approach! 
With respect to the particular foreign poll cy o bj ecti ves 
of the M.R.P., pluralism may well have been reflected in the 
functionalism of the Schuman Plan, but not in the federal-
istic plan of a European Political Community. Pluralism was 
especially absent from party policy toward the French Union 
and North Africa, where centralization rather than division 
of power was the objective. Nor was pluralism to be found 
in the centralized structure of the party itself. Another 
contradiction in political philosophy was found in the con-
trast between the M.R.P.'s emphasis on economic internation-
alism and on "human values" and the party's preference for 
the status quo in North Africa or its opposition to the form 
of economic integration incorporated in the Strasbourg Plan. 
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Contradictions and confusion also existed within the 
M.R.P. leadership; words of the leaders were frequently at 
odds with their deeds. One reason for this may have been 
that the M.R.P. was old at its birth. By this it is meant 
that in the case of ttexterior parties" like the M. R.P. the 
militants tend to predominate over the parliamentarians in 
party circles for some time. But the M.R.P. Statutes in-
sured predominance of the latter, and this in turn insured 
an increasing variance between the words of party doctrine 
(always dear to militants) and the deeds of parliamentarians. 
Moreover, there was serious disagreement between party 
leaders over priorities to be attached to party policies on 
European integration, on the East-West struggle, and on re-
lations with the French Union and North Africa. Party 
leaders admitted to confusion over what the exact relation-
ships should be between the "European communities" and the 
French Union or North Africa. Differences of opinion 
existed as well over the relationships between N.A.T.O. and 
the E.D.c., over the political scope of the E.P.C., and over 
the eventual status of the Saar. With so many areas of dis-
agreement, it is not surprising that party leaders, and 
especially those in the Government, involved themselves in 
frequent contradictions in their public statements. 
More important even than these evidences of confusion 
were specific weaknesses of particular M.R.P. leaders, for 
personalities have an important effect upon politics. Many 
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of them lacked the necessary degree of political skill to 
cope with the troublesome French parliament. Even more 
serious was Schuman's disregard for the sensibilities of 
parliament, and the failure of most party lead·ers to cul ti-
vate public opinion. Schuman's disregard for parliament 
was significant when one considers the important part 
assigned to common assemblies in the M.R.P. program for the 
creation of "European communities". The disregard of party 
leaders for the cultivation of public opinion resulted from 
their disinclination to sponsor local civic activity. But 
the i:rdictment, if any, might be brought against France, 
rather than against the party. The French are not very 
civic-minded, and a tradition of resistance to government 
has developed. It would have been hard then in any event 
for the M.R.P. to have stimulated concerted popular support 
for such a program as that of European integration. 
The party leaders, who had to "carry the ball" for 
integration, appeared to fluctuate between excessive optim-
ism for the chances of the "communi ties 11 , and a surprising 
lack of enthusiasm for certain plans such as that of Pflim-
lin. This fluctuation was one aspect of dualisms that 
existed within the M.R.P. The policy of party congresses 
conflicted with that of party leaders. The emphasis on for-
eigh policy by these leaders also conflicted with the dis-
regard for foreign policy in the lower echelons of the party. 
This latter dualism existed despite the fact that European 
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integration was by 1950 almost the "raison d '~tre" of' the 
Iv1 . R.P. A1 though inattention to foreign policy is typical of' 
lower echelons of most political parties, it was crucial to 
a party with a program such as that of the 111 . R.P. 
2. The M. R.P. had enough d ifficulties within itself. One 
cannot forget, ho wever, that it tried to accomplish its 
objectives among nationalistic, anticlerical French who were 
also jealous of their independence from American influence. 
The French preoccupation with sovereignty was the particular 
roadblock which opposed the inclusion of a signifi cant 
degree of pluralism in European institutions like the 
E.c.s,c. and the E,D.C. Some M. R.P. leaders other than 
Bidault were unrealistic in their disregard for this preoc-
cupation with sovereignty. The demands of sovereignty also 
gave priority to the "world role" of France at the expense 
of its part in European integration. In this European pro-
gram of the M. r:t .P., moreover, the anti clericals saw the danger 
of a "black Europe" under control of the Vatican, The 
growing social Catholicism of the M. R.P. lent some basis to 
t his criticism. And finally the consistent although not 
subservient support given by the M.R.P. to the foreign policy 
of the United States earnai the party the unenviai nickname 
of the "American party". 
3. Let us now move to the credit side of the ledger and 
examine the positive contributions of the M.R. P . to French 
foreign policy, despite all the above handicaps. By its 
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possession of the forei gn ministry for ten years, the party 
gave France the advantage of a high degree of continuity in 
foreign policy. 1-'Iuch criticism has been levelled at the 
apparent fluctuations in recent American foreign policy. 
In contrast, from 1944 to 1954, one knew pretty well what 
France stood for in foreign policy. A secondary but impor-
tant result of this was that, even though the M. R .P o was 
weakened by a lack of attention w1 thin its ranks to foreign 
policy, it became an increasing factor, especially after 
1953, in the rise and fall of French Governments. 
France is a country of many parties; it is quite a 
credit to a minor political party to survive for long in 
control of some part of the government in such a situation. 
Mollet was recently complimented for having beaten the post-
war record by holding on to the premiership for something 
more than a year. France's parliament could drive many a 
sane statesman to distraction. The futility of the finely 
pointed arguments and the emotional clashes stood out as the 
writer observed the National Assembly in action. Any party 
that could survive parliamentary attacks for as long as ten 
years deserves considerable credit. And the support by the 
MoR oPo of coalition governments may have saved France from 
the control of extremists such as Communists or Gaullists. 
With respect to its primary objective, although the 
~1. R.P o was not very successful in its entire program of 
European integration, it pushed through t h e important first 
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step of a Coal and Steel Community. Moreover it was real-
istic in seeking such a practical area for integration. In 
preserving the idea of integration, throughout the difficult 
years thereafter and in the face of all the obstacles al-
ready mentioned, the party made a significant contribution 
to the new steps that are now being taken in the development 
of a Euratom and a common market. In the discussions in the 
press of these new steps reference has sometimes been made 
to the Schuman Plan as such, but not enough credit is given 
to the M.R.P. for its dogged perseverance in paving the way. 
The M.R.P. also played an important part in the rela-
tive success of its second objective of maintaining a bridge 
between the East and West in the most difficult years after 
the beginning of the cold war in 1947. We are apt to forget 
how blunt was the East-West break in the years of the Korean 
war and how few political parties sought to maintain contact 
between East and West. This was a .highly realistic policy 
for the M.R.P. to follow in the context of French politics. 
And yet we must remember also that this policy of mediation 
and conciliation came into conflict at various points with 
the party theory that "peace is inii visible", since this 
theory often appeared to require resistance rather than nego-
tiation. Even though it was a matter of party ideology 
rather than party practice, considerable political courage 
was needed for the development of a world strategy based on 
the ~LR .P. idea that "peace is indivisible" and that France 
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should not try to choose between its several critical pro-
blems. The party considered as opportunistic the thesis of 
' Mendes-France that "to govern is tO choose", and believed 
that such a policy would merely postpone the day of reckoning 
for France. 
The party oppose:l any extreme stands in its policy to-
ward the East-West conflict. Juat as it serVed as a neu-
tralizer in internal politics, the Ivi .R.P. also tried to 
neutralize extreme tendencies in American foreign policy. 
It opposed a "crusade" against communism at the same time 
that it opposed bargains between France and Russia. In 
general it appears that the M.R.P. favored conciliation 
rather than compromise in its foreign policy. 
It was just as realistic for the M.R.P. leaders to 
attempt conciliation between East and West as it was for them 
to support coalition government in France. If a valid dis-
tinction has been made between conciliation and compromise, 
from the French standpoint the former was the better means 
of accomodation to employ. There were those like de Gaulle 
who arBued that France should conduct bilateral negotiations 
with Russia, since France was the only western power {until 
1952) which had a treaty with Russia. The trouble was that 
in o!':ier to have such a negotiation or any sort of compromise 
each side must have something to bargain that the other wants. 
In view of the fact that the M.R.P. was committed to main-
taining the world role of France and preserving the status quo 
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in North Africa and Indo-China, there was little that France 
(and M.R.P. foreign ministers for France) could offer Russia 
as a quid pro quo for Russian concessions such as reduction 
or military forces. Would it be an abandonment or the pro-
gram of European integration? But that was the keystone of 
M.R.P. foreign policy. Through conciliation, however, time 
might be gained until the world tension might ease. The 
M.R.P. could not take a rabid stand against communism. For 
within France the Communists had considerable political 
strength, there was widespread opposition to a crusade 
against communism, and M.R.P. doctrine separated itself as 
much from capitalism as from communism. France, and the 
M. R.P. within France, was in a middle position which made 
each a logical mediator and sponsor or a policy or concilia-
tion. 
Throughout all this difficult period, with such a com-
plicated program, the degree or loyalty within the party to 
the demands or its foreign policy was quite unusual for 
French politics. On the race or things, despite under-the-
surface disagreements among the leaders, the M. R.P. was 
successful in its attempt to develop a non-Marxian central-
ized party in France. As a matter or fact, after having met 
over twenty leaders or the party, the writer round evidence 
or a degree or integrity and courage among some or them and 
a unity that is unusual within any party. 
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4. Because the M.R.P. at temp too conciliation in its 
domestic policy as well as in its foreign policy, it often 
fell into the quicksand of French internal politics and was 
forced to engage in various compromises for its own preser-
vation. This carrie:i over into at least one phase of party 
foreign policy, although as the M.R.P. might have it the 
compromises were on "non-essentials 11 to preserve the essen-
tial policy of European integration. In its relations with 
the North African protectorates, the N.R.P. was very submis-
sive to pressure groups and engaged in various compromises 
with their demands. Usually one would think that close con-
tacts vri th business would lead toward such submission to 
business pressure groups. But in the case of the M. R.F. it 
might well have been that the submission resulted from the 
lack of contact of its leaders with business and the resul-
tant unfamiliarity with its propaganda techniques. In 
North Africa the M.R.P. demonstrated elasticity of approach 
toward pressure groups at the same time that it reflected 
inelasticity toward the growing nationalism of the peoples 
there. There was also little elasticity in the M. R . P . policy 
of resistance in Indo-China; at least it was too inelastic 
for a French public opinion which was not ready for the 
sacrifices required by such a policy as that of the M.R.P. 
In its principal program of European integration the 
party was also at least tactically unwise in its inflexi-
bility. The !vl .R.P. tried unsuccessfully to persuade the 
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French that there was no alternative to the E.D.C. As a 
matter of fact one alternative, at least, was found in an 
expanded. vvestern European Union only months after the party 
had lost control of the for~ign ministry. European integra-
tion had become a sort of article of faith with the M.R.P. 
But it was unrealistic for the party to argue that there 
were no alternatives. And in the larger sense it was un-
realistic for the M.R.P. to argq.e that France should not 
choose between European integration, the French Union and 
North Africa. Everything could not be done at once. The 
party had proved this itself in choosing between contra-
d ictory parts of its political philosophy in developing its 
policy toward Indo-China, towaro North Africa, and to a cer-
tain extent in its policy of European integration. The in-
flexibility of the M.R. P . approach was demonstrated once 
again in late 1954. ' Mendes-France was anathema to some of 
the strongest party leadeFs and they were fighting him as 
well as fighting the Paris Pacts for an expandOO. \'/estern 
European Union which he was sponsoring . 
The M. R.P., whose Christian democratic members were 
moving slowly toward social Catholicism, was taed too much 
to the nineteenth century to lead such a secular state as 
France into a European community characterized by moral, 
economic and political integration. Either this European 
community would be too closely relatOO. to Catholicism in the 
.minds of the secular French, or else it would demand ari 
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elasticity of approach that was foreign to the conservatism 
typical of social Catholicism. In another sense, the M.R. P . 
was doomed to failure in its attempt singlehandedly to lead 
such a nationalistic state as France (the state of Bodin, of 
Louis XIV, and of Clemenceau) into this supranational Euro-
pean community which would be out of line with the nation-
alism typical at least of the first half of the twentieth 
century. 
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APPENDIX A 
Between April 6 and June 15, 1954 the author had the 
opportunity to interview in person twenty-two members of the 
M. R.P. (most of them "dirigeants") for periods ranging from 
half an hour to two hours. \then the meetings had been ar-
ranged (which in some cases took considerable time) the 
author was always courteously and well received and the gen-
eral impression he received was that the leadership of the 
party was composed of men who were above average in political 
morality. The detailed criticisms incorporated in the body 
of this dissertation have been made with humility and with 
full awareness of how many of such criticisms could be . 
leveled as well at many other political parties. 
Footnote references to Appendix A or to the Appendix 
refer, then, to these interviews, as well as to personal 
attendance at the Lille Congress and in some very few in-
stances to investigations made during a trip by Fiat for 
2200 miles in a loop south of Paris. The writer prepared a 
detailed report of these interviews and investigations on 
the return sea voY,age from France, and this in turn was based 
on notes taken at the interview ani expanded on the same day. 
All this material has been saved to be available to the 
examination of those interested. 
The following political figures were interviewed in 
France by the author at least once and at least for half 
an hour: 
(a) Ivl ,R,P, 
Robert Schuman 
Jacques Mallet 
Maurice Farina 
Robert Bi chet , 
G. Le Brun Keris 
Fontanea~ 
Leo Hamon 
Andre" Monteil 
Delfosse 
Lecourt 
Colin 
Bosson 
Jan}on 
Freville 
Fontanet 
Buron 
Pflimlin 
Po her 
Borne 
Poisson 
Mme. Peyrolles 
Delahoutre 
(b) Non-J.vi,R,P, 
R, Louis 
s. Cleveland 
Leleu 
Raymond -Aron 
Francisque Gay 
FranQ_ois Goguel 
Bert~and Schneider 
The author personally attended speeches given by the 
following political figures: 
(a) M,R,P, 
P. H. Tei tgen 
H, Teitgen 
Vignes 
P. Coste-Floret 
A, Coste-Floret 
Bouret 
Mme. Dupuis 
Lecanuet , 
Max Andre 
Sauvage 
Boudet 
M, Schumann** 
Georges Bid aul t 
Bacon 
Prigent 
Bouxom 
* Alre~y excluded at the time, 
(b) Non-M.R,P. 
De Gasperi 
Spaak 
Mollet 
Hallstein 
Laniel 
Lussy 
Bardoux / 
Denis (Andre)* 
Daladier 
L e Tro cquer / 
Pierre Andre 
lo!Iounier 
Lej e1..p1e 
Mende13-France 
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** Careful distinction must be made between Schuman and Schumann. 
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APPENDIX B. 
Principal Leaders of the M.R.P. 
Reference has been made in the text to the background 
of some of the Ivl.R.P. leaders, and especially to that of 
Robert Schuman, whose character and career was briefly 
sketched in Chapter IV, page 86. The other principal leader 
of the party has been Georges Bidaul t, whom Ivlauriac charac-
terized in 1950 as the "fils spirituel" of Marc Sangnier. 1 
In his recent book Luethy called Bidaul t a "bold idealist, 
who has totally unjustifiably acquired the reputation of a 
small-scale Machiavelli". Yet Bidaul t is at the least a 
complicated individual. With a diverse background of 
training in both Jesuit and lay schools, he taught history 
before he joined the Popular Democrats (P.D.P.). He cam-
paigned against Fascist and Nazi aggression as editor of 
L'Aube in the 1930's and became president of the National 
Council of the Resistance during the war. Representing the 
center rather than the left or right wing of the :M.R.P., 
Bidaul t was handicapped by a past which included his period 
of responsibility as foreign minister for carrying out 
de Gaulle's foreign policy in 1944 and 1945, and on the other 
hand his support for the later tense collaboration between 
the Ivi.R.P. Aiid the Communists until 1947. 2 
1. See Historical Background for reference to this early 
Christian democrat. 
2. L'Aube, June, 1950, p. 1; Luethy, QQ. cit., p. 412; 
U.N. World, Sept,, 1952, pp. 23-24; Nation, Oct. 29, 1949, 
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Bidaul t held the ministry of foreign affairs from Sep- . 
tember, 1944 to July, 1948, and was chosen president of the 
Ivi .R.P. in 1949 to succeed Maurice Schumann. At this time, 
foreseeing the eventual decline of the R.P .F., Bidaul t main-
tained a tone of personal respect for de Gaulle as part of 
his plan of calculated moderation to bring back errant 
voters to the M.R.P. After his stint as premier from Octo-
ber, 1949 to June, 1950, Bidault again returned to his posi-
tion as a deputy in the National Assembly, but could not 
stay out o,f the Government for long. In early 1953, after 
holding other posts, he returned to the ministry of foreign 
affairs and continued to hold it until Laniel was overthrown 
as premier in June, 1954. 3 
Among the M.R.P. leadership in 1949, only Bidault, S chu-
man, de Menthon, Tei tgen and Letourneau were directly con-
nected with formulating foreign policy. Sangnier, the 
originator of Sillon, died soon thereafter, and by 1949 the 
earlier leader Francisque Gay had begun slowly and carefully 
to sever his contacts with the party. 4 By 1954 other 
leaders included Maurice Schumann, who then was secretary 
of state for foreign affairs, Lecourt as chairman of the 
2. (cont.) p. 409. Bourdet of L 10bservateur referred to the 
11 terrifying vanity'' of Bidaul t. ltlerth, QP.. cit., p. 663. 
3. Einaudi and Goguel, QP.. cit., pp. 165-7. 
4. Journal of Politics, Feb., 1952, p. 104. See significant 
points made by Gay in his book, Lea Democrates d'inspiration 
Chr~ienne a l'EPreuve du Pouvoir (1950). 
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~ parliamentary group, the intellectual Etienne Borne, Poher 
in the Council of the Republic, and Pierre Pflimlin, who 
has recently been president of the M. R.P. 
De Men thon, a law professor from Haute Savoie, was very 
active in the Constituent Assembly of 1945, was vice presi-
dent and later president of the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, and also for a long time was leader of 
the M.R.P. group in the National Assembly. He is well re-
spected, comes from a department where the party is well 
organized and is a connecting link with the moderates in 
French politics. 
, 
Andre Colin, a former leader of the A.C. 
J.F., served for over ten years as Secretary-General of the 
party. From 1952 to 1956 the president of the party has 
been Pierre-Henri Tei tgen, who had been very active in the 
Resistance, and subsequently became a deputy from Ille-et-
Vilaine in Brittany, and also a memberr. of the Government. 5 
Maurice Schumann, from the department Nord, has also 
been president of the party, and has represented France in 
the United Nations, besides being in the Government prior 
to June, 1954. More impressive perhaps in writing or over 
the radio than in person, Schumann as editor of L' Aube per-
petuated the pattern that had been set in the 1930's by 
5. Einaudi and Goguel, Q.:Q.. cit., pp. 165-7, 170-1. In 1952 
Schuman asked the M. R.P. to give Tei tgen freedom to accept 
a nomination as a judge of the cour!t of the E.c. s .c., but 
Teitgendeclined theoffer. L'.ArmE!ePolitique, 1952, p. 58. 
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Bidault. Other party figures include the Coste-Floret twins 
and Lecanuet, a young deputy who was called upon at the last 
moment to replace Schneiter, another leader, as "rapporteur" 
on foreign policy at the national congress in 1954. 6 
Separate mention should be made of Robert Buran, who is 
somewhat unorthodox in the stands that he takes within the 
party, has as close contacts with the business world as any 
party leader, and was the only member of the M.R.P. besides 
.... 
Mon tail to enter the 1954 Mendes-France cabinet. Reference 
has already been made above to Pierre Pflimlin. This Alsa-
tian deputy has perhaps the brightest political future of' 
any present leader of the M.R.P.; he held the ministry of' 
finance in the 1955 Faure cabinet, and is presently holding 
the same position in the Gaillard cabinet.7 
6. The Coste-Florets were quite 11 twinnish 11 ; one of them was 
roused from his bed by mistake at 2:40 A.M. when Herriot, 
president of the National Assembly, was seeking the adY.ice of 
his brother. London Times, Dec. 10, 1951, p. 3c. Lecanuet 
did an admirable job, except for a certain lack of humility 
at times, speaking as he did in the name of' the party. See 
Appendix A. Since 1954 Schneiter has served as president of' 
the National Assembly. N.Y.Times, Jan. 12, 1955, Sept. 23, 
Oct. 5, 1955, p. 1. 
7. Appendix A; also N.Y.Times, Apr. 26, 1955, p. 4. In Jan-
uary, 1955 Buron seeme:i in danger of expulsion from the 
party. Ibid., Jan. 21, 4:3. Werth referre:i to him as an 
\lndisciplined 11 member of the M.R.P. 
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The purpose of the writer is to demonstrate that the 
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, / principal handicaps to the success of the Mouvement Repub-
licain Populaire in its foreign policy objectives, while in 
control of the F.rench foreign ministry from 1944 to 1954, 
were the contradictions to be found within its political 
philosophy and among party personalities. The M. R. P . sought 
to be too much to too many. Being a distinctively regional 
party and lacking adequate contact with industry, the 
bureaucracy and the press, it was something less than a "move-
ment". Being strongly centralizOO., it did not reflect in its 
structure the pluralism that was part of M. R.P. political 
philosophy. Such contradictions as these and others to be 
mentioned presently led to a striking contrast batween words 
and deeds of party leaders, and between a professed preoccu-
pation with foreign policy and an actual preoccupation with 
domestic policy. 
During ten years of continuous control of the foreign 
ministry, European integration was the key foreign policy of 
t h e M. R.P. Aft er initial success in the creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community, the party's task was 
complicated by uncertainty within the party as to what type 
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of "Europe" should be built. Moreover the growing social 
Catholicism of this "Catholic Party" made it suspect of 
promoting a clerical "black Europe". Finally , t h e plans 
for supranational functional institutions, although partly 
in accord with M. R.P. pluralism, were opposed by strong 
political and economic pressure groups and were incompat-
ible with the French concept of sovereignty. 
The M. R.P. also believed that France as mediator should 
try to heal the East-West split. This led the party into a 
dilemma because of its philosophical affinity with neutral-
ism but its actual support for American policy in Europe. 
Moreover, although the party was in opposition to a ttcrusade" 
against communism, t h e overwhelming concern of the M. R. P . 
for the French national interest led it to oppose negptiation 
and concentrate on resistance in the Indo-China war. Simi-
larly M.R.P. devotion to supranational schemes of European 
integration came into conflict with its nationalistic policy 
toward North Africa, where it sought to preserve centraliza-
/ 
tion of control in the "metropole''. Although party leaders 
' . 
opposed the Mendes-France thesis that "to govern is to choose" 
and insisted on a consistent world policy, in their deeds 
t h ey were forced to make choices inconsistent with party 
political philospphy. 
The M.R.P. may have accepted various compromises in 
order to preserve the continuity of its pro gram of European 
integration, but party leaders preferred conciliation to 
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compromise. They played a waiting game, and it is striking 
how well the party held together during this difficult 
period. Nonetheless, the M.R.P. was troubled by internal 
disagreements on methods of achieving objectives, by inex-
perience of some leaders in political skills, by contradic-
tory statements, and by significant fluctuation in enthu-
siasm for objectives. !vlost important, perhaps, were a 
disregard for the sensibilities of the French parliament 
and a lack of elasticity of approach to objectives. 
Despite these many contradictions and weaknesses, the 
M.R.P. succeeded in preserving the continuity of French 
foreign policy and paved the way for the European common 
market and 11 Euratom". It played a part, also, in making 
foreign policy an increasingly important factor in the 
survival of French Governments. However, being tied as it 
was to the nineteenth century through its church connections, 
the M.R.P. was doomed to failure in its attempt single-
handedly to lead such a secular and national state as France 
into an integrated European community. 
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